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Abstract 
As television ads have become the primary tool of communication in American 
campaigns, research on campaign effects has focused more and more attention on how 
these ads influence the electorate. Little attention has been paid, however, to the visual 
content of these ads. Despite a format that delivers an enormous quantity of visual 
information, most research has focused only on the words spoken during the ad and the 
little research done on campaign images has focused only on emotional effects. But can 
voters learn something with the sound turned off? Do voters use campaign images to 
make inferences about a candidate’s issue positions and ideology? I use a multi-method 
approach to examine how voters use the information contained in campaign imagery to 
learn about the candidate. While most campaign strategists focus on voters’ social 
identities when designing the look of campaign ads, I find little evidence that viewers 
respond to campaign images based on identity congruence. Instead, people use the 
images shown in an ad to make substantive inferences about the candidate, and they 
incorporate those inferences into their overall evaluation of the candidate in the same way 
that they would use an explicit verbal statement. Because of the power of images within 
ads and their relatively low cost (practically and strategically), political candidates can 
realize enormous benefits by designing campaign images that appeal to voters’ policy 
preferences. 
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 Chapter 1: Campaigns and Information 
1.1: Heather Wilson for Congress! 
Located in central New Mexico, the 1st Congressional district offers a textbook 
example of a swing district with a very slight Democratic lean. The centrally located 
district includes Albuquerque, by far the largest city in the state, most of its surrounding 
suburbs, and a small rural stretch to the southeast, making it the only urban district of the 
three in the state.  Al Gore took the district with 50.1% of the two-party vote in 2000, and 
John Kerry won 50.7% in 2004.  As it has in much of the Southwest, the Latino 
population in this district has grown substantially and, currently, Latinos make up 48% of 
its population. The Latino residents in this area, like many throughout the Southwest, 
have voted for and tend to identify with the Democratic Party (Garcia and Sierra 2005).   
Given the political make-up of the area, it is somewhat surprising that the 5-term 
incumbent representing the district was, until 2009, a fairly conservative, Caucasian 
Republican: Heather Wilson. Unlike many other members of Congress serving in 
marginal districts, Wilson did not compile a particularly moderate record in office.1 
Furthermore, though she modified her positions somewhat over the course of her career, 
she was never particularly supportive of Latino political causes, notwithstanding the 
substantial Latino population in her district.2 Her record in Congress, then, should have 
left her vulnerable to challengers (Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Carson 2005).  
In fact, the Democratic Party targeted Wilson consistently, and her opponents in all five 
                                                 
1 Wilson’s annual ADA scores for her time in Congress from 1999-2009 were: 15, 10, 5, 5, 20, 25, 25, 25, 
35, and 25.  The overall average for House Republicans during the same period were: 16, 8.5, 7.8, 5.3, 
10.8, 10.5, 7.8, 10.1, 16 and 22.  Similarly, her common-space nominate scores are consistently near but 
just to the left of those of the median Republican Representative. 
2 The National Hispanic Leadership Agenda, which tracks legislation and produces annual scorecards 
similar to those of the Americans for Democratic Action, gave her a rating higher than 15% only twice in 
10 years. 
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 of her House elections (a special election in June 1998 plus the general elections of 1998, 
2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006) were all well-connected, well-funded challengers.3  Wilson 
beat two former New Mexico attorneys general and twice defeated a Latino state 
legislator from within her own district before she finally lost a contest—the Republican 
primary for Senate, which she lost narrowly to the Representative from New Mexico’s 
2nd district, Steve Pearce.   
 
1.2: Let the pictures tell the story 
So how did a conservative white woman win a congressional seat in a slightly 
Democratic, predominantly Latino district? More generally, how does a candidate 
successfully win votes if she does not connect with her constituents on substance? In 
principle, campaigns bring politicians and large numbers of ordinary citizens into contact 
more directly than any other single political event.  The former get to hear what is on 
voters’ minds, while the latter get to assess the demeanor, personalities, and policy 
preferences of their prospective representatives. Of course, campaigns are rarely fully 
informative, which may be why political scientists often seem ambivalent about both the 
normative role that campaigns play in a democracy and the actual effects that campaigns 
have on voters. The candidate’s goal is to win an election. Though she presents the voters 
with information, she does so in a way that favors her candidacy. Often, campaigns 
attempt to connect candidates with voters by showing that the candidate cares about (and 
holds the same positions on) issues important to the voter and by demonstrating that the 
candidate is “one of them” (Burton and Shea 2003; Fenno 2007). For a candidate fighting 
                                                 
3 Wilson never won more than 55% of the popular vote, though she outperformed George W. Bush in both 
2000 and 2004 (obviously so, since Bush failed to carry the district). Her opponents in these elections never 
spent less than $1.2 million. 
 2
 for her political life, the campaign is an exercise in information management and 
distribution.  She must highlight her positive qualities, perhaps a strong record of 
constituency service or an important issue where her views are congruent with her 
constituents, while downplaying her ideological or personal differences with the voters. 
While candidates are concerned with winning elections, researchers also have a 
strong interest in the information used in political campaigns. The ways that candidates 
use information as part campaign and voters use information to make voting decisions go 
to the heart of some of the most important normative questions in campaign research. Do 
politicians lie in their campaigns?   Do they try to tell voters what they will do in office? 
Do voters account for new information, or do they ignore the campaign, and rely on their 
own (possibly biased) knowledge of the political world? Primarily, we are interested in 
the effect and quality of information in political campaigns. When we study how 
campaigns persuade voters (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, 
Berelson, and Gaudet 1948), the relationship between campaigns and behavior in office 
(Sulkin 2005; Ringquist and Dasse 2004; Geer and Lau 2006), whether campaigns 
increase issue salience among voters (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004; Simon 
2002), how they improve voter knowledge (Connaughton and Jarvis 2004; Valentino, 
Hutchings, and Williams 2004; Kam 2006,) or whether or not they encourage voters to go 
the polls (Finkel and Geer 1998; Freedman, Franz, and Goldstein 2004; Goldstein and 
Freedman 2002; Wattenberg and Brians 1999; Sides and Karch 2008), we are, 
fundamentally, asking how information works in political campaigns. 
Curiously, though, most political research has looked at one type of information, 
verbal appeals, while largely ignoring a second source, visual appeals. In spite of the fact 
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 that many of the studies cited above focus on campaign television advertising, an 
audio/visual medium, most researchers have focused only on the audio content. The 
result of this oversight is that most campaign research speaks to the content of only one 
half of the campaign. 
My dissertation aims to correct this gap in our understanding of campaign ads by 
focusing on how campaigns use visual information, and how voters interpret images to 
make substantive inferences about the candidate. I argue that candidates try to use images 
to convince their constituents to identify with them affectively—the candidate’s intent is 
to show that she is just like her constituents by using images congruent with the social 
identity of the constituents.  In general, the candidate’s only goal is to make the people in 
the campaign ad look like the voters. By and large, the message that voters take away 
seems to extend beyond just identification, however.  Regardless of whether or not a 
voter is a member of the group pictured, when a candidate pictures a group, some viewers 
use that image to infer something about the candidate’s level of support for the group as 
well as a signal about the candidate’s overall ideology. Campaign ads contain a potential 
wealth of information about a political candidate, and candidates could use their 
campaign imagery to send voters strong signals about their positions.  However, because 
they often base image decisions solely on social identity groups and beliefs about how 
those groups respond to self-congruent images, candidates often fail to exploit campaign 
imagery in ways that would maximize its strategic impact. At the same time, because 
scholars have largely ignored the informational aspects of campaign imagery, we may 
often underestimate or mischaracterize the normative quality and substantive impact of 
political campaigns. 
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 Specifically, I focus my attention on ten demographic and occupational groups 
whose images could be beneficial to candidates in their political advertising: seniors, 
children, African-Americans, Latinos, teachers, farmers, blue-collar workers, 
businesspeople, police officers and military personnel.  I chose these groups because each 
could be classified as “average people” who can fit into a campaign ad unobtrusively.  
Moreover, each one is visually distinctive and represents an important social identity 
group.4  Focusing on images of people is important because of the role that identity 
groups play in political evaluations. Individuals often make sense of the world by 
associating themselves with groups and treating the interests of that group as their own 
(Converse 1964; Tajfel 1981). Each group represents a constituency that has particular 
policy interests, and a candidate may wish to strengthen his or her appeal within that 
constituency without resorting to overt pandering and position taking that could conflict 
with the candidate’s prior record or personal preferences. 
If, for example, a Congresswoman serves a large Latino population that opposes 
her on a number of racial issues, she might try to use imagery to close the gap between 
herself and her constituents. She would be ill-advised to explicitly draw attention to those 
issues (Simon 2002). Indeed, Heather Wilson has avoided making explicit overtures to 
minorities for the most part.5  Instead Wilson has cultivated the appearance of someone 
who understands and relates to her constituents. The candidate cannot change her race, 
and she changes her political positions at her peril, but she can change the way she 
                                                 
4 There are politically important groups that are not included in this study simply because they are not 
easily recognizable.  For example, I have not attempted to study images of Christians, Jews, gays or 
environmentalists.  It is not at all clear that anyone can distinguish the religion, environmental conscience 
or sexual orientation of a person simply by looking at a picture. 
5 In three congressional campaigns (2000, 2002 and 2004) Wilson only had one ad that actually mentioned 
racial equality, and that ad only made up about 11% of her advertising volume within that campaign.  In 
fact, explicit mentions of civil rights are rare in Congressional campaigns in this sample. See Chapter 4 for 
information on coding of verbal and visual appeals in campaign advertising. 
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 presents herself. Heather Wilson may not have looked like her constituents, but her 
campaign ads did. Though she may not have explicitly stated her allegiance to Hispanic 
political causes, the Congresswoman’s ads certainly left an impression of support for that 
group. She rarely ran ads with explicit appeals based on racial issues; however, she did 
make strong use of visual appeals.  After narrowly winning her first re-election bid in 
2000, she increased the presence of Latinos in her television ads in the 2002 and 2004 
campaigns, when she faced a Latino Democratic state legislator. She went from picturing 
only whites in her television ads during the 2000 campaign (when she faced a white 
opponent) to featuring Latinos in more than one-third of her advertisements in 2002 and 
2004.6 It is probably no coincidence that a successful candidate from a heavily Latino 
district would picture Latinos. Political campaigns generally attempt to make voters 
identify with the candidate (Kern 1989; Perloff and Kinsey 1992; Fenno 2007), and 
political imagery seems to be a perfect tool for the task.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the use and impact of imagery in 
campaign advertisements at both the elite and mass level.  I examine individual-level data 
to gauge the effect of campaign ads on voters, and use the content of campaigns to 
examine how candidates make decisions about what to include in their campaign 
advertisements.  I use a combination of experiments, survey research, content analysis 
and interviews with campaign professionals to try and gain a better understanding of 
imagery in campaigns. This multi-method approach is crucial because of the nature of 
this study.  Research in political campaigns involves understanding not only the 
psychology of the individual and how average citizens react to the campaign, but also 
                                                 
6 Of the 27 distinct ads produced by Wilson in 2002 and 2004, 10 contained an image of a Latino. These 
ads made up roughly one-third of her ad buy. 
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 elite behavior and motivations.  By examining the messages that images send, I hope to 
create a better understanding of the power of political campaigns.  
 
1.3: Teaching voters? 
In the last 50 years television advertising has been one of the primary tools of 
American political campaigns.  In 2004, candidates, issue-advocacy groups and parties 
spent an estimated $1.7 billion on television advertising.  In 2006, that number increased 
to $2.3 billion, and spending for the 2008 campaign exceeded $3 billion.7  Campaign 
commercials have been one of the primary tools of political campaigns for the last 50 
years. These ads reach a broad audience and often become the primary source of 
information about the campaign, particularly in lower level elections (West 2007). The 
television ad is the primary strategic tool for candidates, particularly unknown 
candidates, who want to get a message out to a large number of voters. 
Television ads have a particularly strong effect on unengaged voters, who might 
otherwise hear little or nothing about the campaign (West 1993; Craig 2005). Despite the 
limitations of the 30-second format, political ads can provide voters with a great deal of 
information about a candidate’s positions and priorities. In their analysis of 
Congressional promise-keeping on environmental policy, Ringquist and Dasse (2004) 
found that an overwhelming majority of members of Congress voted on environmental 
issues in line with their campaign statements. The positions they took in office matched 
the positions they espoused in their campaign ads. Campaign ads have also been found to 
be strong predictors of legislative activity. Candidates who make verbal issue appeals 
during the campaign often follow up on those appeals and concentrate their time and 
                                                 
7 Source: Campaign Media Analysis Group 
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 effort in those areas (Sulkin 2009).  Campaign ads may not be an ideal venue for 
extended policy debates or nuanced discussions, but they at least give voters an 
opportunity to learn where candidates stand and what candidates will do once in office. 
Yet for all the money spent on political advertising, and despite the wealth of 
information contained in that advertising, there is a great deal of doubt about how 
effective television advertisements are, and how much impact they have on voter 
perceptions of candidates.  The American public is often leery and distrustful of 
politicians, and particularly mistrusts political advertisements (Spiliotes and Vavreck 
2002). There seems to be general agreement among voters that politicians will say 
anything to get elected and that the positions their ads promise are not to be believed. 
Furthermore, voters often interpret campaign ads in line with their own 
predispositions and beliefs. Analysis of campaign appeals reveals that beliefs about 
candidates are often predetermined by the partisanship of the candidate. Partisan 
stereotypes influence voters and change the way they react to information (Petrocik 
1996). Voters think they know what a Republican or Democrat stands for, and trust in 
that knowledge more than they would in a candidate’s campaign advertising. For 
example, Rahn (1993) demonstrated the power of party stereotypes in her experimental 
study of campaign ads. Without the party label, subjects used the information from 
advertising to evaluate the candidates, but when given the party label, subjects evaluated 
candidates based on party, even distorting or ignoring information that seemed to 
contradict the party stereotype. 
Similarly, voters tend to believe that one party or the other is “better” on a 
particular issue. The issue ownership hypothesis states that candidates have much more 
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 success playing up issues that coincide with their partisan stereotype. Norpoth and 
Buchanan (1992) studied the 1988 presidential election and showed that attempts to 
“trespass” onto issues owned by the opposing party did not benefit either candidate. For 
example, even though George Bush emphasized his commitment to education (an issue 
traditionally owned by Democratic candidates) many voters believed that it was Michael 
Dukakis who promised to be “The Education President.” In the same vein, Ansolabehere 
and Iyengar (1994) found that Republican advertising on crime was far more effective 
than Democratic attempts on the same issue. These results suggest that voters’ 
preconceived notions can be only slightly mitigated by campaigns, and they imply that 
any attempt to moderate a candidate’s image by running ads counter to a stereotype will 
achieve limited success at best. Furthermore, Hayes (2005) found that as parties 
developed issue reputations, the public often used those reputations to infer personal 
characteristics about the party’s candidates. The Democratic Party’s reputation for aid to 
the poor, for example, helped to foster the idea that Democrats, in general, were more 
compassionate. Verbal campaign appeals often have limited utility for a candidate. Much 
of the discussion of campaign effects over the last two decades has centered on the 
specific circumstances required for a campaign appeal to have any effect on an 
individual’s opinions or behavior. When hearing verbal appeals, individuals are less 
likely to act as passive receivers and more likely to respond based on how they interpret 
the message in light of their own predispositions. 
Although partisan predispositions can minimize campaign effects, campaigns can 
still change the way voters perceive candidates. However, those effects will be mitigated 
by the context of the campaign, the partisanship of the voter, and the partisanship of the 
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 candidate.  Partisan stereotypes play a role by providing a starting point for evaluations 
and affecting the way that voters use subsequent information, but the image of the 
candidate can be “softened” by presenting non-stereotypical issue positions, and 
candidates can gain a strategic advantage by going against type.  Several researchers have 
found that respondents give more favorable evaluations to candidates of the opposing 
party when those candidates espouse non-stereotypical positions (Spiliotes and Vavreck 
2002; Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Sides 2006).   
In practice, though, many candidates have trouble making issue appeals that go 
against their party unless they have a strong reputation on the issue (Sellers 1998). 
Furthermore, trespassing on an opposing party’s issues comes with a great deal of risk. 
Politicians who take a controversial stand in a campaign risk alienating voters, and those 
who attempt to play against type risk alienating their own party’s base. In order to form a 
campaign strategy and calculate which issues a candidate should focus on, the campaign 
turns to an increasingly large industry of private campaign consultants. 
The dramatic increase in campaign spending over the course of the last 20 years 
has coincided with tremendous growth in the political consulting industry (Friedenberg 
1997). The professionalization of political campaigns has created a new army of political 
soldiers who spend their lives getting politicians elected at every level of government, 
and one of the first tasks of any campaign is to figure out exactly what the candidate is 
going to say. In order to do so, the campaign begins by polling the electorate to find out 
exactly how the beliefs and qualities of the candidate match up to the voters, and how 
those predispositions can be used to create a winning coalition on Election Day.  One 
campaign consultant outlined the general process for creating a campaign theme:  
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 “It starts with a benchmark survey where you find out…attitudes about the 
country, perceptions of issues, perceptions about the candidate (positive 
and negative).  You put all that together and you create a theme that (1) is 
true (2) takes advantage of your candidate’s strengths and the other guy’s 
weaknesses and (3) resonates with the electorate.”8 
 
Candidates, obviously, should attempt to capitalize on those issues where their 
positions most closely match the voters’ preferences (Simon 2002; Sellers 1998). While 
this sounds like a simple, straightforward task, candidates often have trouble 
implementing this strategy.  Simon (2002) found that candidates tried to emphasize 
issues that put them at an advantage, but in close races often abandoned this tactic and 
engaged the issues that their opponent had raised.  He used a formal model to show that 
candidates acting rationally should never engage their opponent on an issue because it 
should never be true that talking about the same issue benefits both candidates. Instead, 
each candidate should focus only on those issues where his or her position is closer to the 
median voter. In reality, Simon found that candidates often felt they had to respond on a 
particular issue even when their own position differed substantially from the electorate.  
This finding was confirmed by Kaplan, Park and Ridout (2006) when they found that 
Senate candidates tended to engage with one another on the same issues in competitive 
races. They also argued that candidates will usually ignore their opponents when their 
opponents fail to raise sufficient funds to mount an effective challenge.  
 A candidate’s tendency to engage his or her opponent in a close election is 
puzzling and illustrates some of the limitations of verbal issue appeals. At a time when a 
candidate should be struggling for any tactical advantage, he or she often pursues a 
suboptimal strategy because of factors beyond the control of the campaign. Candidates 
                                                 
8 This quote comes from one of several post-survey interviews I conducted in the spring of 2008 with 
professional political consultants. All quotes and responses from these surveys were given on the condition 
of anonymity. See Chapter 3 for details on interview methodology. 
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 seem to subscribe to the notion that a competitive opponent might be winning because of 
a particular issue, or they choose to focus on a particular issue because it garners media 
attention during the campaign.  For a variety of reasons, candidates may decide to 
abandon their own message plan in order to subvert their opponent’s issue appeals, even 
though it seems like this might be a self-defeating strategy. 
For political scientists, or any observer making a normative judgment of 
American democracy, the convergence of issue discussions is usually considered a good 
democratic practice. For the people running campaigns, of course, the issues discussed in 
the campaign are not an end unto themselves. Most studies of campaigns reveal that 
campaign strategists are obsessed with making affective connections with voters (Burton 
and Shea 2003; Hernson and Patterson 2000; Hernson 2004; Bradshaw 1995), so the 
issues discussed in the campaign are only useful insofar as they help connect candidates 
and voters. This may help explain why so many campaigns engage in dialogue even 
though it seems like an inefficient strategy. Strictly speaking, many of these campaigns 
probably believe that the substance of the issue discussion is less important than the fact 
that the discussion is taking place at all. For many campaign strategists, the worst 
possible tactic is to focus on issues that have no resonance with voters. If an issue is truly 
important enough, a candidate will have to address it simply to show that he or she is 
engaged and understands the problems of the constituents.  
 
1.4: Political imagery and emotional appeals 
While campaigns may have limited success teaching voters about their issue 
positions, there is some evidence that they are far more adept at provoking feelings. Just 
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 as many campaign professionals try to attract voters through affective and emotional 
responses, many scholars have begun to study the role of emotion and affect in political 
decision making (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000). Not surprisingly, emotions can 
have a strong impact on political opinions and political behavior. Positive or negative 
emotional responses can cause citizens to re-think their issue positions (Marcus, Neuman, 
and MacKuen 2000; Huddy and Gunnthorsdottir 2000; Lupia and Menning 2009), learn 
more about politics (Kam 2006), and possibly increase their level of participation (Brader 
2005). 
Imagery is one of the primary tools for candidates making an emotional appeal. 
What research exists on campaign imagery has focused primarily on the emotional 
impact of various images (with little regard given to the substantive contribution of visual 
messages). By and large, the effect of advertising images is something that we know little 
about, but some recent work has highlighted the emotional power of images. Huddy and 
Gunnthorsdottir (2000) showed that images can have a strong impact on politically 
interested respondents. In their experiments they found emotionally powerful imagery (in 
this case, adorable, sympathetic animals) had a greater impact on people who already had 
strong views about the issue discussed (environmental policy), and their emotional 
responses actually caused the subjects to be more responsive to the ad. For example, 
supporters of environmental protections became even more enthusiastic in their support 
after viewing an image of cute mammal.   
More recently Brader (2005, 2006) expanded on that research to show how 
different images can elicit emotional responses that can influence voters. His work 
focuses on how campaigns use images to set the tone and evoke anxiety and enthusiasm 
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 in voters.  Candidates often use gray or grainy black and white images to set a negative 
mood.  In contrast, they picture groups of ordinary people in situations that evoke hope 
and happiness in order to make positive emotional appeals.  For example, pictures of 
children playing often evoke enthusiastic emotional responses.  Brader found that 
positive emotional appeals strengthened pre-existing views and encouraged participation, 
while fear-based appeals were more likely to make viewers anxious and, therefore, more 
likely to seek new information and possibly rethink their opinion of the candidates.  
There is little doubt that campaign strategists use emotional appeals within 
campaigns (Perloff and Kinsey 1992), and Brader correctly points out that many 
campaigns think of emotional appeals as one of the most important tactics. However, as I 
discuss further in Chapter 3, campaign strategists do not necessarily think of emotions in 
terms of the enthusiasm/anxiety framework that Brader uses. Instead, campaigns attempt 
to forge an affective link with the voter by appealing to the voter’s identity.  They picture 
the candidate with a particular group in order to say “I support and care about people like 
you.”   
At the same time, political scientists and campaign professionals have largely 
ignored ideological and substantive messages that can be sent with imagery. There are 
strong theoretical and empirical reasons to believe that the effects of imagery extend far 
beyond generating enthusiasm or anxiety. Brader shows how certain images can evoke 
strong emotions, but that is only one aspect of image effects. This seems to be a 
consistent blind spot in political research when it comes to campaign ads: researchers 
believe that substantive messages affect voters (within certain limits), but seem to think 
that those messages have to be verbalized in order to be substantive.  Often the 
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 “substance” of campaign imagery is discussed only when it appears in its ugliest forms 
(e.g., the notorious Willie Horton ads in 1988 or the Playboy ads used against Harold 
Ford in 2006, which played on racial attitudes). This bias persists despite evidence that 
campaign images may be linked to behavior in office (Sulkin and Swigger 2008). If 
images are information, then the visuals used in a campaign ad may be conveying just as 
much information (and just as much useful information) as the verbal content of the ad.  
 
1.5: Plan of the dissertation 
In this dissertation, I argue that campaign imagery carries a substantive message 
about candidates. Images are information, and voters use the visual messages within an 
ad to make inferences about a candidate’s positions on the issues and his or her overall 
ideology. Beginning in the next chapter I lay out a theoretical framework for 
understanding the impact of imagery.  I use dual processing models of persuasion to 
explain how visual political messages influence voters.  Because the visual messages are 
typically processed without cognitive engagement, they can influence the voters without 
running into the typical filtering mechanisms that individuals bring to bear on explicit 
messages.  Examining previous research in advertising and psychology, I explain how 
respondents interpret visual messages and the issue inferences they might make based on 
campaign imagery. 
In Chapters 3 and 4 I investigate the political context and establish how images 
are used in political advertising. The goal is to see how campaigns view the role of 
campaign imagery, and how it fits into the overall campaign strategy. Chapter 3 deals 
with the views of consultants and campaign professionals.  We can observe the ads the 
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 campaigns run and produce, but it is helpful to take a step back and actually examine the 
motivations of the people behind those ads. What do professionals hope to accomplish 
and why do they choose the images they do? I present evidence from both an online 
survey of consultants and in-depth interviews to find out how campaign professionals 
think about ads.  Ultimately, it seems that consultants view imagery as a tool for 
generating affective attachments to the candidate and focus on group-oriented appeals, 
but they rarely focus on the ideological message of an image or account for how images 
change perceptions of a candidate’s issue positions. Professional consultants seem to 
believe that imagery is more powerful than verbal statements.  There is consistent 
agreement that images help establish affective bonds, while words are far less likely to 
attract the voter’s attention and alter the voter’s perception of the candidate. Curiously, 
campaign professionals believe that voters use images to make substantive inferences 
about the candidate, but the consultants do not seem to utilize that belief when designing 
visual appeals. 
While the data in Chapter 3 are useful, the results come from a small, non-random 
sample. In order to demonstrate the generalizability of these findings and further examine 
image strategy, I look at Congressional elections in Chapter 4. I present data from the 
2000, 2002 and 2004 Congressional campaigns and show how candidates deployed 
imagery in response to the demographics of their constituents and the changing political 
environment.   Using the storyboards from the Wisconsin Ads Project, I have compiled 
data on the type of images House candidates used, and how often they were used, as well 
as the explicit verbal content of their ads.  I find that candidates, all else equal, try to 
make their ads “look like” their constituents, presumably with the intention of generating 
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 an affective connection with their constituents. These data confirm that candidates use ad 
imagery in their campaigns to forge affective connections with voters and that visual and 
verbal content are often constructed with different strategic concerns in mind. While 
there may be a relationship between visual and verbal content, the association between 
the two tends to be fairly low.  Moreover, the images candidates deploy often have a 
significant effect on Election Day outcomes.  I find that candidates who make their ads 
look like their constituents receive more votes, but that this effect is also contingent on 
the ideology of the district.  
Those initial chapters deal with the way that political candidates use imagery in 
their campaigns.  In Chapter 5, I look at campaign effects at the individual level using 
survey data.  I matched up Congressional campaign data with survey data from the 2000 
National Annenberg Election Study.  Using cross-sectional data on attitudes toward 
Congressional candidates, I find strong image effects in real-world campaigns.  The 
individual-level data confirms some of the conclusions from the aggregate analysis in 
Chapter 4. While affect played a small role, respondents indicated they felt better about 
candidates who ran ads featuring images that sent a message of support that the 
respondent agreed with.  For example, respondents who supported labor unions 
(regardless of whether or not they were union members themselves) rated candidates 
higher when they ran images of blue-collar workers.  In contrast, I find little evidence of 
a similar impact from verbal messages of support for a group. At the same time, I find 
that candidates benefit from showing bipartisanship through their imagery.  Democrats 
who used conservative imagery and Republicans who used liberal imagery in their 
advertising performed better among independent voters and voters in the opposite party. 
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 This observational data confirms that respondents receive and interpret the messages that 
campaigns deliver visually, and alter their perceptions of candidates over time based on 
the ad strategies that candidates use. 
Finally, in Chapter 6 I investigate voter reactions to ad imagery in a controlled 
setting.  I conducted a series of experiments using an adult population and a student 
subject pool, varying the images shown in a campaign commercial and then gauging 
voter impressions of the candidates.  These experiments are an ideal way to isolate causal 
mechanisms at the individual level (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002).  I find that 
voters react strongly to campaign imagery, using those images to infer a candidate’s 
positions on issues.  The effects of imagery can be altered by the explicit content of the 
ad; respondents may take more notice of an explicit issue depending on the 
accompanying image, but the respondents systematically differed in their impressions 
based on the images they saw.  Further, in the absence of a verbal message, subjects used 
the images in the ad to make the same type of inferences that they might gather from a 
verbal statement.  For example, respondents who saw an ad featuring African-Americans 
reacted as though the candidate had explicitly supported affirmative action. 
Overall, my dissertation shows that voters see images as information and use that 
information to make judgments about political candidates. In ignoring this effect, we 
have been underestimating the amount of information transfer that takes place in a 
political campaign. Candidates may be sending messages to voters visually, and the 
voters seem to be receiving those messages. Any study of American campaigns that fails 
to account for this may systematically mischaracterize the nature of persuasion and 
learning in a campaign and the utility of the campaign in the democratic process. 
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 Chapter 2: How Viewers Process Campaign Images 
2.1: Introduction  
In this chapter I lay out the ways that imagery can have a direct impact on the 
voters’ perceptions of a candidate. Campaign ad images serve various purposes. An ad 
that pictures a candidate along with five African-Americans sends a definite message, 
one different from that conveyed when the same candidate appears with five white 
citizens. Such messages might affect voters in at least three ways.  First of all, voters 
might develop an affective attachment to a candidate based on how well they identify 
with the people pictured alongside the candidate.  The image tells voters, implicitly, who 
the candidate identifies as his or her key constituents.  Second, picturing a group sends a 
message of implicit support for that group.  For example, a candidate who pictures 
farmers sends a signal to voters that he will support agricultural subsidies and protect 
local farming interests.  Obviously, if a voter happens to be a farmer, then the image may 
appeal to him because he identifies with the group; however, the image might also appeal 
to a voter who supports in agricultural subsidies without being a farmer or otherwise a 
beneficiary of the policy. Finally, the images that a candidate uses could send a signal 
about the candidate’s ideology.  Many groups are linked in the public mind to liberalism 
or conservatism because of their past allegiances, and a candidate can take advantage of 
that link to alter perceptions of her own position on the ideological spectrum. 
It may seem strange to attribute substance to a candidate’s image choices. To 
some observers, campaign ad imagery probably seems like the most vacuous element in 
modern campaigns.  Many candidates, in the television spots, surround themselves with 
children (see Chapter 4), for example, and it can be difficult to see baby-kissing as 
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 substantive communication. Political imagery has often been featured in some of the 
most egregious racial appeals (Mendelberg 2001), taking advantage of negative racial 
stereotypes to appeal to the basest instincts of the electorate. However, as Philpot (2004) 
found, images can convey substantive information that alters the way voters perceive a 
candidate, and campaign images often reflect a candidate’s sincere positions and 
priorities (Sulkin and Swigger 2008). Through their advertising, candidates attempt to say 
that they care about the voters and that they care about the issues that the voters care 
about (Rosenberg et al. 1991; Bradshaw 1995).  They may do this through their verbal 
messages, but, whether they realize it or not, they may also transmit these messages 
through the images they use in their ads.  
 
2.2: How do we think about images? 
 While political scientists have largely focused on overt verbal messages in ads, 
other disciplines have looked at more subtle aspects of advertising.  Much of the research 
on the persuasive impact of ads in general, and ad imagery specifically, comes from 
psychology, advertising, and communication.  Although most of this literature focuses on 
persuasion in a commercial context, many of the ideas born in this literature should 
transfer to political advertisements as well.  Political campaign ads are designed to be 
persuasive messages. While candidates may not try to change voters’ issue beliefs, they 
are trying to persuade them to buy (vote) for a product (candidate). Overwhelmingly, 
commercial research shows that all information is not created equal, nor is it absorbed in 
the same way.  People respond to explicit and implicit messages very differently, 
individuals infer messages from imagery, and those images can heighten or override the 
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 impact of explicit verbal appeals. Ever since Mitchell and Olson (1981) showed that 
visual cues within an ad have a persuasive effect independent of “verbal attribute claims,” 
there has been a virtual bonanza of research on images and their persuasive effects. 
For the most part, research on persuasive messaging builds on dual processing 
models of persuasion such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model and the Heuristic-
Systematic model (Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann 1983; Petty and Cacioppo 1986; 
Chaiken 1987; Chaiken, Liberman and Eagly, 1989). In general, this research focuses on 
persuasive appeals in a commercial advertising context, although the key ideas and 
concepts in this research have often been adapted for the study of campaign ads. 
Dual processing models posit that persuasive messages are received and 
interpreted in different ways depending on the motivation and cognitive abilities of the 
individual and the format of the message. Central or systematic processing consists of 
cognitive processing in which the individual thinks about the content of the message and 
weighs the pros and cons. He or she evaluates the content and is persuaded (or not) based 
on the explicit message and other factors such as prior knowledge and prior experience. 
This does not necessarily mean that the subject evaluates the message objectively, using 
only logic and rational thought, but the message garners enough attention from the 
individual to get some kind of thoughtful response. Peripheral or heuristic processing, in 
contrast, is impressionistic. The recipient of the message does not cognitively engage the 
substance of the message; rather, he or she reflectively reacts to cues that might or might 
not be relevant to the decision-making task. 
For the most part, people seem to react to images in a peripheral or heuristic 
manner (Petty and Cacioppo 1986).  As a person becomes more interested and involved 
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 in an advertisement, he or she is more likely to use central processing to think through its 
message. However, even an attentive respondent may not use central processing to 
evaluate all of the content of an ad. Lord, Lee and Sauer (1995) argue that both central 
and peripheral processing take place simultaneously. In their lab experiments they 
demonstrate that these processes happen not only independently but also simultaneously, 
so that a respondent can be affected by both the explicit content of the ad, which he or 
she can analyze, and the peripheral content, which leaves an impression without 
triggering any cognitive evaluation. Simply put, it is difficult for an individual to pay 
attention to and evaluate all aspects of a persuasive message (verbal content, images, 
tone, music, etc.). So images not directly related to the verbal content of a persuasive 
message may be processed reflexively without receiving much thought or attention. 
The individual’s response to imagery is important because images are 
information. The cliché is that a picture is worth a thousand words. Although an image 
may not say quite that much, it does constitute a metaphorical claim.  Pictures can convey 
ideas and feelings that may or may not be related to the verbal content of the message. 
When the images and verbal content convey the same message, the verbal content can 
form an “anchor point” that helps enhance the message contained in the image (Phillips 
2000).  Advertisements are ideal space for multi-tasking, however, and it may be 
advantageous to vary the messages conveyed verbally and visually in order to deliver 
more information. When words and pictures have divergent messages the visual message 
may overwhelm the verbal.  Smith (1991) found that when the imagery of an ad focused 
on a different message than the verbal content did, subjects responded more strongly to 
the message in the picture than the one in the verbal claim, often ignoring the latter.  On 
 22
 the other hand, there is some evidence that attractive visuals can enhance verbal 
messages, even when those visuals are unrelated to the message.  McQuarrie and Phillips 
(2005) showed “that the use of metaphorical claims [like those made in pictures] in ads 
appears to make consumers receptive to multiple, distinct, positive inferences about the 
advertised brand (i.e., weak implicatures), while still conveying the main message of the 
ad (i.e., the strong implicature). Furthermore, metaphors presented in pictorial form are 
able to elicit these multiple inferences spontaneously at the time of ad exposure” (17). 
Images, then, convey information to a respondent. Many investigations into 
persuasion through the use of imagery focus on commercial advertising; however, the 
distinctive effects of imagery should carry over from commercial advertising to political 
advertising because the evaluative system respondents use to deal with commercial 
messages should be similar to the pathway taken by persuasive political messages.  The 
images contained in a political ad should be received by individuals in the same manner 
as images in a Coca-Cola commercial.  An individual’s low involvement with the Coke 
ad makes her unlikely to engage cognitively with the pictures of happy people drinking 
soda.  Similarly, most individuals are unlikely to be highly engaged with political 
television commercials, and so political ads may be able to effectively persuade voters 
with images. 
In that sense, images may be considerably more effective than explicit verbal 
messages would be in a political ad.  While many voters are remarkably good at filtering 
out the verbal messages (Rahn 1993), they may not do as well when the message is not 
explicitly articulated. In processing the verbal message the voter brings to bear all of his 
or her prior experiences and knowledge. The partisan stereotypes, previous knowledge 
 23
 and past experiences are all ingrained in the voter and used to evaluate and sometimes 
counter the explicit content of the advertisement. Viewers do not passively accept all of 
the messages they see in an advertisement; they think about them and use their own 
knowledge of politics to make sense of the messages. In her experiments Rahn (1993) 
found that voters relied on their beliefs about Republicans and Democrats and used those 
beliefs to reject campaign messages that contradicted the stereotypical reputation of the 
party.   Candidates often have trouble successfully trespassing on issues because voters 
tie them to their partisan identity (Norpoth and Buchanan 1992). In order to process that 
message and reject (or accept if) a viewer has to cognitively engage with the message and 
go to the effort of placing that message into context with his or her beliefs.  
However, peripheral messages bypass these defenses. The voter may not be 
motivated enough about the ad to process the visual message in the same way they would 
contextualize the verbal content of an ad. In effect, peripheral messages like the 
background images in campaign ads make an impression with the voter because he or she 
may lack sufficient motivation to pay attention to the visuals and cognitively engage with 
their message. The magnitude and direction of the effect of background imagery, 
therefore, should be the same across different partisan groups, and the effect should be 
consistent regardless of education, political knowledge, or overall cognitive ability.  
In fact, political candidates often try to use subtle cues to push voters into making 
judgments about them. For example, Valentino, Hutchings and White (1999) showed 
how appeals on crime could often evoke racial feelings among white voters. Ads that 
mentioned crime could make whites engage in racial thinking without doing so 
consciously. White candidates who made explicit racial appeals often received 
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 ambivalent responses from whites who may have shared those views, but were conflicted 
because of their own desire for social acceptability. When processing subtle racial 
appeals, however, voters did not use central or systematic processing, and therefore did 
not evaluate the message in the context of social desirability. Subtle cues on race or 
gender (McDermott 1997) can have a substantial impact on voters without ever drawing 
explicit attention to racial or gender issues. 
Because campaign images also enter the peripheral or heuristic processing 
system, they should not be subject to partisan bias or any other cognitive defense that 
could alter the impression left by the imagery. From a strategic standpoint, this also 
means that the candidate should not feel bound by the restrictions that often limit what he 
or she might say in a television ad.  Typically, candidates stick with issues where they 
have a strong personal or legislative record (Sellers 1998; Sides 2006).  Candidates worry 
about making statements on issues where they have little or no credibility because, 
presumably, voters would punish them.   On the other hand, if voters process a visual 
message without cognitively engaging with those messages, then they will be incapable 
of using any of their pre-existing knowledge of a candidate’s record or partisanship in 
order to judge the message.  They would be passive receivers accepting whatever 
message the candidate chooses to send. 
 
2.3: Three aspects of visual appeals 
What exactly does an image in a political ad tell the voter? Images might be 
information, but the metaphorical claim in a political image might be interpreted in a 
number of ways. In this dissertation I focus on ten demographic and occupational groups: 
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 children, senior citizens, African-Americans, Latinos, farmers, blue-collar workers, 
teachers, soldiers, police officers and businessmen. I am particularly interested in the 
people pictured in an advertisement (as opposed to setting or some other visual aspect) 
because of the affective ties that exist among and across members of groups. A 
considerable amount of research, across a number of disciplines, has documented that 
people’s identities with groups strongly influence how they view and react to their 
worlds. According to social identity theory, an individual identifies with a group if she 
recognizes her objective membership in a group and has a strong sense of group 
attachment (Tajfel 1981), and the groups that a citizen identifies with can have a dramatic 
impact on how he or she views the political world. Converse (1964) argued that a large 
segment of the voting public had no real political ideology, but simply relied on social 
identity groups to make sense of politics. So farmers, for example, make political 
judgments based on issues that affect farmers, union members make judgments based on 
the interests of labor unions, etc.  Social identity can have a strong effect on political 
attitudes (Price 1989), and group membership may encourage individuals to participate in 
the political process when their own individual incentives would lead them to opt out 
(Huddy and Khatib 2007; Fowler and Kam 2007). 
Moreover, candidates can take advantage of social identities to craft their appeals 
to different groups. The issues that a candidate highlights can have a dramatic impact on 
voting choices, particularly for groups that are immediately affected by the issue being 
primed (Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004; Hernson and Patterson 2000).  For 
example, in their experiment on priming racial attitudes, Valentino, Hutchings and White 
(2002) showed that running ads on crime and welfare, which are closely associated with 
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 negative black stereotypes, had a strong impact on white voters. Schaffner (2005) 
recently used advertising in the 2000 U.S. Senate elections to show that priming on 
women’s issues (education, childcare, etc.) can have a dramatic effect on how women 
vote.  
All of these studies, though, focus on the verbal message within the political 
advertisement, and candidates are limited in how much they can say in an ad. Playing the 
race card can be an effective tactic, but only if it goes unnoticed (Mendelberg 2001). 
Candidates caught talking about issues in order to play on racial tensions face a harsh 
backlash from the electorate.  Even making positive issue statements can prove 
problematic if a candidate (or his party) lacks a strong reputation on an issue (Rahn 1993; 
Sellers 1998). 
On the other hand, making a visual appeal to a social identity group may require 
little in the way of campaign resources and does not require any special background or 
partisanship. Obviously, not all groups lend themselves to visual appeals, however. It is 
not clear how one would visually identify a middle-class person or a Christian, for 
example. The groups I examine in this study (seniors, children, African-Americans, 
Latinos, teachers, farmers, blue-collar workers, businessmen, police officers and military 
personnel) are all visually recognizable. Therefore, a member of one of these groups can 
be inserted into an ad without the ad calling attention to or verbally identifying the person 
as a member of a group. The voter may infer a metaphorical claim from the image (as I 
hypothesize in the next chapter), but there is no verbalized message that the candidate 
must justify. Studies in advertising and psychology have shown that respondents are 
more likely to respond favorably to advertisements featuring people who “look like” 
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 them than ads that do not (Chang 2002).  The 30-second political ad is not a good format 
for explaining nuanced positions; however, it is a perfect opportunity to picture a 
candidate alongside particular groups.  This leads to my first hypothesis about the impact 
of political ad imagery: 
The Identity Hypothesis: When a candidate pictures a visually recognizable 
member of an occupational or demographic group, voters who are members of 
that group will notice and respond more favorably to the candidate than when the 
candidate does not picture such a member.  
 
If candidates want to make a connection to the voter, then it seems clear that they 
might try to appeal to voters using images that remind the voters of themselves.  
Essentially, they are building an affective tie with the constituency and building the idea 
that the candidate understands them and people like them. In theory, by using an image 
that reflects the voter, the candidate increases the chance that the voter will notice and 
remember the candidate’s message in the same way that commercial advertisers use self-
congruent images to try and reach consumers (Chang 2002).  When appealing to a group, 
candidates frequently try the “I am one of you” tactic (Fenno 2007), but may have 
problems using this tactic with all of their constituents. A candidate obviously cannot 
change her racial identification; however, she can gain a substantial advantage by 
picturing Latinos in her ads in order to reach out to that constituency. Wrapping her arms 
around Latino voters sends the message that she cares about those voters and stands with 
them. It also sends the message that Latinos support her, so that Latino voters viewing the 
ad will have a reason to identify themselves as a member of the candidate’s constituency.  
In fact, this is how many political operatives use campaign imagery.  Campaign 
professionals tend to design ads with the idea of creating an image that the audience 
identifies with (Kern 1989; Perloff and Kinsey 1992).  Kern found that many campaign 
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 operatives implemented training from advertising research and focused their efforts on 
building an affective tie with the audience.  Though most of the scholarly research on the 
identity hypothesis was born from commercial advertising research, there was little doubt 
among operatives that it could be adapted for political campaigns. As I will explore in 
Chapter 3, the Identity Hypothesis still forms the core of the dominant paradigm among 
campaign strategists. The campaign’s focus on emotion and generating affective ties 
often leads to the use of images that reflect the demographics of the constituency. This is 
a very simple view of imagery effects based around the notion of identity politics.  The 
Identity Hypothesis suggests that voters simply want to see a candidate who looks like 
them or at least supports people who look like them.  It also suggests that voters do not 
necessarily infer a political message from political imagery.  Instead, voter reactions 
come from a basic affective identification with the image shown. 
However, imagery may not only affect members of a group but could also have a 
substantial impact on people who support or oppose that group. When a candidate 
embraces a recognizable identity group, he is trying to say “I am one of you,” but he may 
also be sending the message, “I support your group and the things it stands for.” Social 
identity groups often have strong political associations (Price 1989; Dawson 1995). The 
group organizes politically and takes stands on issues or mobilizes for certain causes. 
Indeed, one of the reasons that many individuals view politics through the prism of group 
identities is that their groups actually take political stands.  
 Picturing a group can signal that the candidate cares about that group and that he 
or she supports the group’s political views. There has been some research (usually linked 
to racial issues) that attempts to connect visual messages with substantive politics. For 
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 example, Tasha Philpot (2004) used the 2000 Republican National Convention as a case 
study in shaping a party’s image on race.  She pointed out that the GOP, contrary to the 
party’s reputation, went out of its way to feature African-American speakers during the 
convention.  The result was that those who watched the convention came away believing 
that the Republicans were making a strong effort to reach out and appeal to minority 
voters. The implication of Philpot’s work and the research on commercial advertising is 
that candidates should be able to use their ads to communicate with voters through the 
images they choose.  Yet, there has been little follow-up on this kind of research, even 
though it seems that this finding could be applied to a variety of social identity groups, 
beyond just African-Americans. 
The Group Support Hypothesis: When a candidate pictures a visually 
recognizable member of an occupational or demographic group in his or her 
political ad, voters will interpret that image as a message that the candidate 
favors that group. 
 
Further, although members of a group may be more likely to react to an image of 
the group, that does not necessarily imply that they must respond positively, and this 
effect should not be limited only to voters who are members of the group being shown.  If 
the Group Support Hypothesis is correct and an image of a group sends a message of 
support for that group, then that message should have an impact on all voters. Anyone 
viewing the ad might come away with the impression that the politician supports the 
group being pictured.  Of course, unlike many heuristics, the effects of imagery may not 
necessarily be a conscious process. In Lupia’s (1994) work on heuristics, voters took 
what they knew of interest group activities and (presumably) consciously applied that 
knowledge to their voting decision. It should be no surprise that politically sophisticated 
individuals often make better use of heuristics (Lau and Redlawsk 2001) since they have 
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 more experience and a better understanding of how to make political decisions. In the 
case of campaign imagery, however, the voter may not cognitively engage with the 
images and use them in the same way he or she would explicitly apply a heuristic. It 
should also be noted that all voters, regardless of their level of political knowledge should 
be equally capable of grasping the visual metaphor. Understanding the Group Support 
Hypothesis is not something that should require cognitive attention or prior knowledge of 
politics. 
Whether or not those voters like the candidate more or less will vary depending on 
whether or not they support the group, but all voters could come away with the same 
substantive impression. Images, therefore, can be a way to reach out to a wide range of 
voters, not just one particular group. There may be a great deal of overlap between 
members of a group and voters who support that group, but the two are hardly 
synonymous.  For example, many voters who support workers’ rights and labor unions 
are neither blue-collar workers nor members of a union.  Many people outside of a group 
may still have sympathy for that group and its aims. As Hutchings (2004) argued, support 
for a group is often offered in order to draw in voters who are outside the immediate 
group but who may nevertheless hold policy positions that favor the group. Hutchings 
contended that Republican appeals on race were meant to target female voters, who might 
be more sympathetic to helping disadvantaged populations. Women were more 
susceptible to these appeals because their own experiences with sexism made them more 
likely to empathize with minorities. He specifically focused on race, but many groups in 
American politics may generate a similar reaction from individuals outside the group for 
similar reasons.  
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 Unlike the Identity Hypothesis, the Group Support Hypothesis suggests that there 
is a substantive message conveyed by the images a candidate chooses.  Voters are not 
responding simply based on affective identification, but as a result of a substantive 
impression left by the image.  It is possible that members of a group may be more likely 
to notice their group in an ad.  If that is the case, then we would expect to see stronger ad 
effects among members of a group than those outside the group.  For example, if an ad 
pictures African-Americans, it may have a stronger impact on African-Americans than 
whites.   
In fact, visual messages can be much stronger than similar verbal messages of 
support.  The Republican Party may have had little success softening its image on racial 
issues through verbal comments because voters have been conditioned by the party’s 
traditionally conservative stance on race (Petrocik 1996), and voters bring that knowledge 
to bear when judging verbal messages (Rahn 1993). Regardless of a candidate’s sincerity, 
unless he or she has a strong, personal reputation on a particular issue (Sellers 1998), the 
candidate often cannot convince voters to look beyond party label using verbal appeals. 
Campaign imagery is simply a faster, more efficient way of conveying a message of 
support.  In this case, the viewer may actually be getting an accurate picture of the 
candidate. Sulkin and Swigger (2008) compared images used in Congressional 
campaigns to subsequent legislative behavior and found significant correlations between 
picturing a group during the campaign and supporting that group in office. 
In addition to signaling a candidate’s support for a particular group, showing 
images of a group in a political ad may convey an even deeper message about the 
candidate’s ideological position.  Many segments of American society are strongly linked 
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 with a particular party or ideology because of a long association between certain groups 
and political parties (Petrocik 1996).  Voters typically come to associate parties with 
certain stereotypes and use them to make inferences about parties’ candidates. For 
example, voters associate African-Americans with the Democratic Party and liberalism 
because of the longstanding alliance between the party and black voters (Mendelberg 
2001; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Valentino, Traugott, and Hutchings 2002; Valention 
and Sears 2005).  Race may be a strong signal of ideology, but it is undoubtedly not the 
only one.  Many groups have strong political ties to one of the major parties and could 
serve as powerful ideological cues.  
In order to gain a better understanding of the ideological content of images, I 
surveyed Illinois residents about different groups. Using the Illinois sample from the 
Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project9, I surveyed respondents and asked them to 
place various groups on a 7-point liberal–conservative scale.  Table 2.1 shows how 
respondents viewed each group.  The first column shows the mean placement (with 
standard deviation in parentheses) of each group; the other columns show the percentage 
of the sample that placed that group on the liberal (1-3) or conservative (5-7) sides of the 
scale.10
ng 
d 
                                                
  
The results indicate that these occupational and demographic groups have stro
ideological reputations. Respondents saw African-Americans, teachers, Latinos, an
 
9 The Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project is a multi-university study conducted by You Gov / 
Polimetrix under the direction of Simon Jackman of Stanford University and Lynn Vavreck of UCLA. 
While the surveys contained content common to all respondents, individual institutions were allowed to 
place their own surveys and experiments within each wave of the study. Full details are available from the 
author. 
10 I am not suggesting that all members of a particular identity group share the same political ideology or 
even that a majority of a particular group does.  It is just that the public, in general, views the group a 
certain way.  There are, undoubtedly, many politically liberal senior citizens, for example, but the general 
public perception equates seniors with conservatism. 
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 labor unions as liberal groups.  On the other hand, police officers, soldiers, senior 
citizens, businessmen and farmers were all seen as conservative groups.11  In every case,
a majority of respondents placed the group on one side of the ideological spectrum, and 
in 7 out of 9 cases, more than 60% of respondents identified the group as liberal or 
conservative.  Since these groups have ideological reputations it would make sense t
picturing a member of one of those groups wi
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ion of the ideology of that candidate. 
The Ideology Hypothesis: Picturing groups widely perceived as conservative
c
perceived as liberal should make voters view the candidate as more liberal. 
Of course, just because candidates can send a message with advertising imagery 
does not necessarily mean that they should.  This connection between groups and
ideology presents a strategic complication for political candidates.  Commercial 
advertisers do not have to worry about the political implications of a group.  When Ford, 
for example, pictures ranchers and farmers driving trucks the company is merely trying to
give the impression that ranchers and farmers like Ford trucks.  In contrast, if a political
candidate pictures a farmer she may not only be signaling support for farmers, but also
signaling that she is more conservative 
ters and the Republican Party.  
The effect of picturing a group on voter preferences for a candidate should var
size and direction according to the individual viewing the image. Voters will favor a 
candidate more when they see what they want to see.  When the visual message of the ad 
coincides with the voter’s political beliefs, he or she will be more inclined to support th
 
11 A similar survey run through the University of Illinois subject pool found virtually identical results using 
only a student population. 
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 candidate.  In this respect, voters should use visual statements in the same manner that 
they would use verbal issue positions to assess a candidate.  In fact, because the visual
message is likely to bypass cognitive filters, it should make more of an impact than a 
verbal message would because the voter is more likely to accept it without evaluation
add it to his or her impressions of the candidate. As noted before, a voter’s political 
beliefs should not affect the message they receive from the image because that visual 
message may not be processed cognitively, but those pre-existing beliefs should inte
with the visual message and have an impact on the voter’s ultimate judgment of t
candidate. Voters’ preferences for a candidate should be mitigated by their own 
predispositions.   If they support the group shown in the ad, then they have a more 
favorable judgment of the candidate; if they oppose the
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 they should employ a similar 
method
sh the candidate for expressing that allegiance. 
From a strategic viewpoint, candidates have to build a winning coalition on 
Election Day.  That may mean reaching out and sending a message to certain groups 
within the electorate; however, they would be wise to consider how that message might 
be received by opposing groups.  Candidates in districts heavily populated by organize
labor and blue-collar workers could receive benefits by picturing workers within their 
ads, but candidates with more constituents on the other end of the economic scale would 
be foolish to try the same tactic. Candidates often craft their verbal appeals to match their 
constituents’ desires (Kahn and Kenney 1999), and
ology when deciding what images to use.   
Of course, in some cases it may be advantageous for a candidate to send a 
conservative or liberal signal to voters.  By sending an ideological signal, a candidate 
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 could ramp up support among her own party base, or reach across the aisle. Undoubtedly
Republican voters would be more responsive to a message of ideological conservatism,
while Democrats would react more favorably to liberal political signals. Median voter 
theory (Downs 1957) suggests that, all else being equal, Republicans have a strategic 
incentive to try to appear more liberal than their records would indicate, while Democrats 
should try to appear more conservative.  The ideological c
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to the overall political disposition of a candidate.  
The ideological dimension also means that candidates face important trade-off
trying to reach out to their constituents and must consider the full implications of th
messages that they send through their ad imagery.  Although the trade-off may be 
practically complicated, the strategic calculation boils down to basic decision theory:
either a candidate would benefit from appearing more liberal or she would not.  She 
either gains votes by picturing blue collar workers, or endures such a backlash that sh
hurts herself. This calculation does not require accounting for her opponent’s image 
choices.  One of the main advantages of visual appeals is that candidates do not have to 
engage or debate their opponents verbally. A campaign usually starts out with a number 
of issues and themes in mind, all of which are chosen because they are advantageou
the candidate (Bradshaw 1995). However, candidates frequently have to alter their 
message over the course of the campaign, often in response to their opponent, even 
though bringing up an issue may not be to their advantage (Simon 2002).  Usually, the 
candidate feels that he has to answer his opponent and talk about an issue because the 
issue has become important over the course of the campaign. In fact, they are much mor
likely to engage their opponent on issues when the race is more competitive (Kahn and 
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 Kenney 1999).  As the race gets tighter, many candidates end up employing ineffective 
strategies that actually hurt them on Election Day.  The visual message, by contrast, does 
not have to respond to the opponent or even acknowledge the opponent.  A candida
appeal to a group, or send an ideological message visually regardless of the verb
content of the ad or the candidate’s record. Moreover, because there is nothing 
te can 
al 
substan    
 
t 
 
n 
 
een as pandering, candidates could use images to make a 
onnection with the voters.  
tive to fight, the opponent cannot challenge the credibility of the visual message.
It is obvious, then, how valuable campaign imagery can be as part of an overall
strategy, but the strategic choice is complicated by the ways that imagery could affec
voters. Candidates could use images to show their constituents that they are “one of 
them” by running images that reflect the demographics of the electorate. They could also
appeal to voters by showing images as a way to demonstrate support for groups and wi
backing from voters who also substantively support the group being pictured. Finally, 
they could use images to adjust the perception of their own general political ideology.  
The challenge for political candidates is to consider the effects of these three dimensions
on the voter and incorporate images into their campaign ads that maximize their appeal 
among the electorate. In order to maximize the effectiveness of their campaign appeals, 
candidates have to balance group appeals and take their constituents’ political views into 
account. This is not necessarily an easy task, but it is one that could be accomplished with 
sufficient polling resources, which would generally be available to any quality 
congressional candidate (Burton and Shea 2003). Without making overt promises or 
verbal appeals that could be s
c
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 all, I 
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re vulnerable to elite manipulation and 
visual a
mmary 
The role of imagery that I propose in this chapter suggest that television ads ca
be a crucial element of any political campaign and have a strong impact on the voter, 
even if the voter hits the mute button the second the commercial appears. In order to h
an accurate understanding of campaign effects we need to look beyond the emot
generated by ad imagery and account for the substantive messages that may be 
transmitted. If my hypotheses are correct, images encourage voters to identify with t
candidate, transmit signals about the candidate’s support for groups, and tell voters 
something about the candidate’s ideology. This
on how the voters act on Election Day. 
At one level, the hypotheses in this chapter are somewhat disturbing.  After
am suggesting that the images a candidate uses can have a strong impact on voter 
impressions because, essentially, they bypass the normal cognitive evaluation of politica
messages.  Voters are typically somewhat immune to campaign manipulations because 
they can engage with verbal appeals and judge the merit of the appeal based on their pre-
existing knowledge.  They would not be expected to engage visual appeals with the same 
cognitive vigor. This means that they would be mo
ppeals which may or may not be sincere.  
On the other hand, campaign imagery can be a powerful communication tool.  
Voters’ tendency to filter out campaign messages means that they also have a tendency to 
filter out new information.  I argue that the images a campaign uses in its ads, which at 
first glance could be considered the least substantive part of a political campaign, may 
actually have the most substantive impact on voters. Campaign imagery may affect voters 
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 on an emotional level by playing on social identities, but it may also convey a substantive
impression. Individuals have a tendency to bring their own preconceptions to bear w
judging new political information.  Candidates who genuinely wish to break free o
partisan constraints or advance a new issue agenda could use their ad imagery to 
communicate with an electorate that might not be receptive to a verbal message. 
Campaign ads may serve primarily strategic purposes, but that does not mean that they 
are insincere. If one of the goals of a campaign is to force voters to learn and react to ne
information, then visual a
 
hen 
f 
w 
ppeals may be a fast and efficient way to make the electorate 
learn about a candidate. 
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 Chapter 2 Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1: CCAP ideological placement of groups 
Group Mean 
Placement 
Liberal 
placement 
Conservative 
placement 
Midpoint 
placement 
N 
African-Americans 
 
Labor unions 
 
Teachers 
 
Latinos 
 
Police officers 
 
Farmers 
 
Senior citizens 
 
Military personnel 
 
Businessmen 
 
 
2.39 
(1.27) 
2.41 
(1.38) 
2.72 
(1.30) 
3.26 
(1.37) 
4.79 
(1.30) 
4.83 
(1.29) 
4.77 
(1.38) 
5.37 
(1.25) 
5.46 
(1.52) 
81.0 
 
79.1 
 
71.7 
 
53.7 
 
12.6 
 
12.1 
 
15.1 
 
5.7 
 
10.4 
5.4 
 
7.3 
 
7.1 
 
16.7 
 
60.2 
 
62.8 
 
57.7 
 
78.3 
 
77.6 
13.6 
 
13.6 
 
21.6 
 
29.5 
 
27.2 
 
25.1 
 
27.2 
 
16.0 
 
12.0 
1099 
 
1097 
 
1102 
 
1099 
 
1096 
 
1098 
 
1098 
 
1101 
 
1101
The first column displays mean placements with standard errors in parentheses. “Liberal placement” 
refers to the percentage of respondents who placed the group between 1 and 3. “Conservative placement” 
refers to the percentage of respondents who placed the group between 5 and 7. “Midpoint placement” is 
the percentage of respondents who placed the group at 4. 
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 Chapter 3: Campaign Imagery in Practice 
3.1: Introduction 
In this chapter I present evidence from a survey of political consultants and in-
depth phone interviews.  My focus throughout this dissertation is primarily the kinds of 
people included in political advertisements.  If images of a particular type of person 
deliver a message to the voter, then it would seem that campaigns should use that 
message strategically. With a wealth of experience at their disposal, political consultants 
have strong expectations about how ad imagery should affect voters, and are largely 
responsible for how political candidates use imagery in campaigns. In the survey and in 
subsequent interviews I tried to answer 3 basic questions: (1) What do campaigns try to 
do accomplish with ad imagery? (2) How do consultants think imagery affects voters? (3) 
How does imagery fit in with the overall campaign strategy and the verbal messages in 
the campaign?  
Not surprisingly, the consulting field does not answer all of these questions with 
one voice, though there is considerable agreement on several issues. Consultants strongly 
agree that campaigns influence voters and that images are at least as important (and 
usually more important) than the verbal content of the ad.  The consensus from campaign 
professionals seems to be that imagery has a strong impact on voters because it helps 
voters connect with candidates on an emotional level. In the terminology of the last 
chapter, political campaigns rely heavily on the identity hypothesis. Consultants believe 
that using images of certain groups helps voters see themselves as part of a candidate’s 
constituency (Kern 1989). Though there is a belief that images transmit more substantive 
messages, the consultants seem primarily interested in encouraging the voter to identify 
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 with the candidate.  On the other hand, there is little agreement on the best way to employ 
images and combine them with verbal appeals in order to maximize a candidate’s appeal, 
and the multitude of opinions on how visual and verbal appeals can work in concert 
suggests that campaign strategists may not have a clear theoretical understanding of the 
effects of imagery. 
The validity of consultants’ opinions of campaign effects may be debated, of 
course, but the data presented in this chapter offer a rare insight into how professionals 
think about campaign tactics. In order to understand the impact of campaign ad images it 
is important to understand how campaigns actually choose images and how those images 
are believed to affect voters. It seems that campaigns largely focus on generating 
affective bonds, and that ad imagery provides a powerful opportunity to generate those 
bonds. By not accounting for the affective ties generated by images in campaigns, 
political researchers may have missed one of the most crucial persuasive elements of the 
campaign.  To be fair, campaign professionals have been reluctant to share their expertise 
and offer insights about political strategy, and we know far more about them than we do 
about the campaigns they produce. 
 
 
3.2: The “Ballot Box Warriors” 
 
“Last night we learned that the people who make political attack ads actually have 
their own awards ceremony, which is reassuring since previously they’ve worked 
for nothing other than large checks and disproportionate political influence.” –Jon 
Stewart, The Daily Show, May 6, 2008 
 
Campaign consultants may be one of the most maligned groups in American 
politics, even more disliked than the elected politicians they serve.  Over the past three 
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 decades, a rise in campaign coverage has resulted in more and more media attention for 
the consulting industry (Panagopoulos 2006), though this attention has not brought 
political consultants much love or respect.  As Americans have become more fascinated 
with the inner workings of campaigns, they have also become more disgusted with 
consultants. Panagopoulos and Thurber (2003) found that 51% of Americans blamed 
political consultants for the campaign tactics they found unappealing, such as negative 
ads and character attacks.  When asked about their effectiveness only 23% of those polled 
ranked consultants as good or excellent, meaning the public finds political consultants 
both distasteful and incompetent.  The public loves to beat up the straw man of the 
pollster or public relations consultant concerned only with spin and dressing up a 
candidate while subverting democracy and substantive policy discussions. 
While the public sneers at campaign consultants, there is also a healthy 
professional rivalry between academics and campaign professionals.  The relationship is 
reminiscent of the conflicts between statisticians and baseball scouts.  The former group 
believes in empirical observation, large sample sizes and generalization of findings, and 
the latter favors first-hand observation and experience while often dismissing numbers as 
an incomplete (or inaccurate) description of reality. One pollster I spoke with mentioned 
a sibling, a political scientist working at a university, who often teased that professional 
pollsters spend their time barely scratching the surface, polling without actually engaging 
in systematic research or stopping to consider the underlying causal mechanisms.  At the 
same time, professional consultants can be contemptuous of academics.   Consultants 
tend to view academic scholarship as a poor substitute for experience.  As Jim Barnett, 
director of John McCain’s political operation in the 2008 New Hampshire primary, said, 
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 "…anything you can learn in a classroom is something that you can learn faster and better 
on the ground” (D'Aprile 2007). 
Despite public animosity and academic skepticism, however, political consultants 
are, for the most part, dedicated, highly trained, and well paid professionals who spend 
their entire professional existence trying to win elections (Friedenberg 1997).  They build 
their reputations (and their client lists) by getting people elected to public office.  Most 
consulting firms advertise a list of successful candidates (or issue campaigns) and point 
to their won-lost record in order to attract potential clients.12 With the millions spent on 
campaign fees, it is fair to say that campaign consultants may have more at stake in an 
election than anyone other than the candidates themselves. While the public may not 
acknowledge their effectiveness, consultants actually have a strong impact on a 
candidate’s electoral fortunes. Medvic and Lenart (1997) studied non-incumbent 
candidates in the 1992 Congressional elections and found that hiring polling, media or 
direct mail consultants had a positive, significant impact on a candidate’s vote share even 
after controlling for candidate quality and campaign spending. In other words, the more 
professionalized a challenger’s campaign, the better he or she did on Election Day. At the 
same time, there is little evidence that consultants are the bogeymen that the public 
imagines. Most consultants claim to adhere to strict professional standards and profess a 
strong reluctance to use unfair personal attacks in a campaign (Thurber, Nelson, and 
Dulio 2000; Francia and Hernson 2007).  
The Medvic and Lenart article is remarkable because it actually attempts to 
quantify the impact of strategists on a campaign outcome, but it does so only because of 
                                                 
12 Note that while many firms offer a won-lost record on their websites, there is no easy way of verifying 
the validity of those records. 
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 an enormous effort spent on data collection.  The researchers had to pore through 
campaign finance reports to identify when a candidate hired a consultant, and, separately, 
determine what that consultant had been hired to do. Other quantitative studies of 
consultants’ strategic beliefs are hard to come by. Most works on campaign strategy take 
the form of how-to case studies (see Burton and Shea, 2003, and Magleby, Monson and 
Patterson, 2007), which provide a broad overview of successful tactics in some 
campaigns, but are susceptible to the methodological limitations commonly found in case 
studies.  There are always questions about case selection and generalizability of the 
findings.13 Given the considerable difficulties in gathering systematic data on political 
consultants, it is not surprising that most scholars try to focus on one or two campaigns. 
As a group, consultants are used to working behind the scenes, and, more importantly, 
make their living selling their expertise and are not necessarily inclined to share it with 
curious scholars.  Our lack of knowledge about these tactical decision-makers leaves a 
gaping hole in our understanding of campaign strategy.  There have been attempts to poll 
campaign consultants in the past, but these have tended to focus on how consultants view 
the state of democracy (opinions on media, campaign finance reform, quality of 
candidates, etc.).  These studies are useful for showing who consultants are and what they 
think about representation, but they do not tell us what consultants think about campaign 
tactics (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000; Magleby and Patterson 1998).  
                                                 
13 Memoirs and insider accounts from campaigns also suffer drastic limitations.  Not only are these 
accounts limited in the kind of campaigns they study, but the retrospective accounts often suffer from a 
lack of objectivity, and many of the participants undoubtedly worry about speaking publicly.  For example, 
Harvard University hosts an open discussion among campaign managers following every presidential 
campaign (The Institute of Politics, Harvard University 2006).  The discussion often reveals less about 
campaign tactics than it does about individual post-hoc rationalizations. 
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 The work on political consultants, though, does show some important tendencies 
in campaign strategy. Kern (1989) researched political consultants during the 1980’s and 
found that the industry had been overtaken by an advertising paradigm, which 
emphasized making emotional connections with voters. Perloff and Kinsey (1992) 
conducted a survey of political consultants on various ad strategies in 1990.  They found 
that consultants overwhelmingly felt that ads affect evaluations of candidates, and 
consultants believe in the power of emotional appeals and negative advertising.  They 
also found that consultants believed visuals could be more powerful than verbal 
messages, though they explicitly equated visuals with emotional responses.  The mean 
response to the item, “Making a strong visual statement creates a feeling about a 
candidate that counts for more than a verbal statement about the issues,” was just over 2 
(the response scale ran from 1-Strongly agree to 5-Strongly disagree).  On the other hand, 
Perloff and Kinsey found little agreement on whether or not voters learn anything from 
ads, and on whether or not verbal and visual messages could be effectively separated. 
Like the consultants they interviewed, their survey asked about the emotional power of 
images, without really investigating whether or not images might also provide substantive 
cues. The authors seem to accept the view that appeals have to be verbalized in order to 
have issue content. Still, this is one of the few studies to investigate how political 
consultants use political tactics, and how they view the impact of those tactics. 
 
3.3: Polling political consultants 
 In order to investigate consultant views on campaign imagery I began by 
assembling a list of political consultants.  Unfortunately, a complete database listing 
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 every political professional in the country does not exist, and so I began in December 
2007 with the membership directory from the American Association of Political 
Consultants (AAPC), and used this directory to compile the bulk of the list.14  I then 
followed links from the AAPC website to individual consulting firms, as well as using 
Internet communities like Linkedn in order to add as many names as possible to my list 
of political consultants.  The vast majority of campaign consultants work to make 
themselves visible, and they make it easy for potential clients (or researchers) to find and 
contact them.  I included all types of consultants: pollsters, general consultants, media 
consultants, direct mail firms, and grassroots organizers.  For each consultant, I recorded 
the name as well as the name of the firm, gender, office address, office phone number 
and email address.  While the task was labor intensive, I was able to compile a list of 731 
names. 
I sent an email to each consultant inviting him or her to take the survey online 
through the University of Illinois Webservices.  The email included a brief description of 
my research, a link to the survey and instructions.15 Each consultant was given a unique 
identification number to use in order to log in and complete the survey, which ended by 
asking the respondent to participate in a follow-up interview.  In order to elicit open, 
honest responses, all participants were guaranteed anonymity for both their survey 
responses and for any answers they gave during the follow-up interview. In all, 130 took 
the online survey, and 25 participated in a follow-up interview.  
                                                 
14 Since the goal of this chapter was to get the views of campaign professionals (as opposed to academic 
analysts), I omitted any individuals who have academic memberships with the AAPC or a current position 
at an academic institution. 
15 The full survey can be found in the Appendix A. 
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 Although the sample is not a randomly selected group of political consultants it 
does constitute a broad range of experience, partisanship and expertise (see Table 1).  Of 
the 130 who took the survey, 53% were Democrats, 41% were Republicans, and most 
had worked on a variety of campaigns ranging from presidential efforts to local city 
council elections.  Everyone in the sample had worked professionally in politics for at 
least one year and the vast majority had more than 5 years of experience.  The sample is 
overwhelmingly white and male (93.8% and 71.6%, respectively), though this seems to 
be true of political consultants in general.16 
 Not surprisingly, more than a quarter of the sample is based in Washington, DC or 
the surrounding area. The majority of the rest of the sample comes from the west coast or 
the south, and many of the consultants in the sample live or work in some of the most 
heavily contested political battlegrounds in the country such as Florida, Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, Ohio, etc.  Geographically, demographically and experientially, then, the 
sample seems to be a close representation of political consultants in general.17 
 
3.4: Imagery and campaign strategy 
The first thing many professionals told me is that every campaign is different, and 
that there is no such thing as a “silver bullet” campaign tactic.  As one consultant put it: 
“What’s important to remember is that each election is different, each 
candidate is different, and what worked last year will – almost by rule – 
not work again this year.  Political consultants (at least smart ones) don’t 
follow hard and fast rules about ads and the images used in them.  So as an 
example: to ask whether or not I find it important to have a celebrity on 
camera vs. an average American on camera the answer will always be: it 
                                                 
16 Perloff and Kinsey found similar racial and gender imbalances in their survey of political consultants. Of 
the names that I gathered on the original list of 731 consultants, 74.1% were male. 
17 The demographic breakdowns in this survey are actually quite similar to Perloff and Kinsey’s (1992) 
study, although they did not separate out DC consultants from other areas. 
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 depends on the election, the candidate, the district, the survey research, 
and the national mood, etc.” 
 
To some extent, this belief in the uniqueness of campaigns is self-serving.  After all, if 
every campaign were the same, then every candidate could use the same strategy and the 
need for professionals (and their rather steep fees) would be greatly reduced. Political 
consultants do seem to sincerely believe in the uniqueness of campaigns, though.  As I 
spoke with them, their answers were often preceded by caveats like, “It depends,” or, “it 
changes all the time.” One told me, “There are many times when one approach works 
well for one and not the next even within the same campaign.” It is true, of course, that 
every campaign is different, at least in some respects: issues change, demographics 
change, and candidates change, but that does not imply that beliefs about what does and 
doesn’t work, and what does and doesn’t appeal to voters, necessarily change with each 
new election cycle. Indeed, it seems unreasonable to suggest that consultants have no 
core beliefs about how to appeal to voters. 
 In fact, despite the belief that all campaigns are different, there was actually quite 
a lot of agreement on most of the survey items.  The first few questions in the survey 
dealt with the importance and general impact of ads.  I asked the respondents to rate the 
influences that campaign advertising, issues within campaign ads, and images within 
campaign ads exert on the voter using a 7-point scale (1-Not at all influential, 7-Very 
influential).  I also asked consultants how much time should be spent scripting and 
designing the images in ads (1-None at all, 7- A great deal of time and attention).  In 
doing so, I hoped to get a sense of where consultants believe the campaign’s priorities 
should be: on the visuals or the verbal message.  Overall, in all of these questions, there is 
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 a surprising lack of variation.  For all of the consultants’ talk about how each campaign is 
different, responses were remarkably consistent. 
Not surprisingly, campaign consultants believe in the effectiveness of campaign 
ads. Like Perloff and Kinsey, I find that consultants strongly believe that campaigns 
matter and that campaign ads influence voters.  On the question of ad influence the mean 
response was 6.05 on the 7-point scale.  The consultants rated the influence of imagery 
within advertising at 6.07 and the influence of the issues mentioned at 5.48.18  For most 
candidates seeking office above the level of school board (and in some areas, even then) 
television ads are the primary method of communicating with the electorate.  Most 
candidates do not have time to introduce themselves to each potential voter, so most 
communication must be done through mass media.  Consequently, several consultants 
spoke of the money spent on television ads, which is frequently the single largest expense 
in a campaign (Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio 2000), as a necessary evil.  Indeed, only three 
respondents in the entire sample gave an answer of 2 or 3 on the question of ad influence. 
More importantly, although both verbal and visual elements are considered 
important, consultants rated the images as more influential.  On both the question of 
influence on the voter, and the amount of time spent on ads, there was a statistically 
significant (mean differences of .6 and .22, respectively, p<.05) difference in favor of the 
visuals. When talking about influencing the voter, only one person rated the images 
presented in an ad as unimportant (placing the influence of images below 4), whereas 13 
respondents rated the issues discussed in an ad as unimportant. One person summed it up 
this way, “Words don’t work.  Pictures work…Words lead to arguments.” Though the 
                                                 
18 In the original survey, the scale ran from 1-Very influential to 7-Not at all influential.  I have reversed the 
values here for ease of interpretation. Larger numbers mean that something was rated more important or 
more influential. 
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 difference between the importance of verbal and visual content is small, it is statistically 
significant.  This is particularly surprising given the ceiling effect in place on responses.  
Campaign consultants are clearly predisposed to think that strategic elements of the 
campaign (like campaign ads) are more important.  It is part of their livelihood, after all.  
They earn their money by producing ads and creating campaign strategies.  They are, 
therefore, not likely to believe that campaign tactics do not influence voters.  With that in 
mind, the small differences between the perceived importance of verbal and visual 
content become much more important. Even within a very narrow range of variance, 
images still outranked words in terms of perceived influence. 
This difference also shows up consistently across race, gender, region, and 
partisanship.19 Figure 3.1 compares the mean value on the importance of verbal visual 
appeals within ads. The level of agreement is remarkable (though not shown in Figure 
3.1, the same differences exist on the issue of time spent crafting verbal and visual 
appeals).  One could imagine very different strategic beliefs between Republicans and 
Democrats, or those consultants inside Washington vs. the rest of the county, but this is 
not the case. In every subgroup the difference is always in the same direction:20 images 
are always rated as being more influential than verbal issue statements, and designing the 
look of an ad should always take priority over scripting its verbal content. 
In some ways, the notion that pictures are more important than words is somewhat 
surprising given the amount of time and effort spent on choosing those words.  
                                                 
19 In this case, partisanship refers to the party whose candidates the consultant works with, not necessarily 
the partisanship of the consultant.  Most political consultants serve only one party or only one ideological 
group. 
20 The differences are not statistically significant in all groups, which is to be expected considering that 
some of these groups are quite small.  For example, there are only 13 political consultants in the survey 
based in the Midwest.  Still, even in these cases, the difference is in the expected direction. 
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 Professional campaigns begin every election cycle by taking a benchmark poll and 
choosing issues to emphasize based on what they find to be important to the voters 
(Hernson and Patterson 2000). Remember, though, that the survey results presented do 
not indicate that words are completely unimportant; just that they matter less than the 
visual elements of the ad.  What is said seems to be less important than how it is said. I 
asked consultants whether or not they agreed with the statement that “Voters pay more 
attention to what is said in a campaign ad than they do to the visuals in an ad,” and here 
there was a strong level of disagreement.  Though the mean was close to neutral (3.34), 
overall a majority of respondents (68) actually disagreed with the statement while less 
than a quarter of the sample agreed (30), and no one strongly agreed. During the 
interviews, consultants often referred to imagery as a way of making the voter pay 
attention to an ad or to the verbal statements in an ad.  Though no one I spoke with 
believed voters to be foolish or unintelligent, many referred to them as uninformed or 
unengaged.  One of the main tasks of the ad is to draw the attention of the voter and make 
him or her listen.  A direct mail consultant told me that images are important because 
campaigns are constantly competing for attention: 
“Especially when it comes to mail, you’re competing with Victoria’s 
Secret and the gas bill, and the kid’s report card so you have to put 
something that jumps out.  So if you have nice pictures, images that say 
something, hopefully something deeper [than Mom and apple pie], most of 
the people tune in and read the issue positions because you’ve got them.” 
 
 The words, presumably, have been chosen specifically because polling suggests 
that the voter will find the issue important and the candidate’s position appealing; 
however, the voter will never learn that if he doesn’t pay attention. What is true of direct 
mail may also be true of television ads.  There is little reason to believe that viewers pay 
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 close attention to commercials (political or otherwise), so campaigns try to use engaging 
visuals to capture attention. Moreover, if a voter is not paying close attention, there is a 
chance that he will not listen to the verbal portion of an ad, but, at the very least, he may 
still catch the visual message on screen.  It is important, therefore, that the visual be 
engaging and transmit an appealing message on its own. 
 
3.5: Who is pictured? 
Of course, this still does not address the question of what images are chosen by 
campaign consultants and why.  Based on my survey results and subsequent interviews, 
consultants see images as an important tool for forging affective connections with voters, 
and they choose images that help to achieve that purpose.  I asked consultants the 
following questions: 
In general, do you think it is better for a candidate to appear alone in an ad, or do 
you prefer to have the candidate appear alongside other people? 
1. Prefer candidate alone 
2. Prefer candidate with other people 
3. No preference 
 
Is it more effective to have an ad with “average” Americans or an ad with well-
known public figures and celebrities? 
  1. Ordinary Americans 
  2. Celebrities and public figures 
  3. No preference 
Both of these questions would seem likely to elicit shrugs and “I don’t know” 
answers.  A reasonable person could say (as the consultant earlier in this chapter 
responded) that the answer is entirely dependent upon the campaign.  Yet even on these 
two questions, where I expected a great deal of variance, there was still widespread 
agreement.  On the first item only 6 people answered that they would picture the 
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 candidate alone, while a solid majority (70 people) replied that they preferred to picture 
the candidate with others. For the second item, 71.1% of respondents felt that it is more 
effective to picture an ordinary American and only 5 people preferred to use a celebrity 
or public figure.  
Picturing a candidate alone (or with another politician) does not signal warmth 
and caring from the candidate.  One consultant told me, “I do believe that a candidate 
standing alone creates distance—a larger than life figure,” and she did not mean this in a 
good way.  Larger-than-life figures, after all, can’t understand your problems or relate to 
your situations.  Many consultants seem to feel that distance and objectivity are enemies 
to be fought in a campaign ad, and placing a candidate in isolation implies distance from 
the voter. “The guy with his family in the church or the soccer field says something 
different from the guy standing there alone in a suit.  The guy with his family says, ‘I am 
like you.’” Another consultant explained, “When the candidate is by himself…it’s hard to 
make a personal connection in modern campaigns so you want to convey that this is 
someone who works well with other people…Logic has very little to do with this.  We 
can overstate the rationality of voters.  So much of what you’re doing is creating an 
emotional connection.” 
 Every political consultant I talked to used the word emotion when describing how 
a campaign should appeal to the voter.  It was the most consistent topic of discussion 
during my post-survey interviews.  With a little probing, however, I discovered that these 
professionals were not talking about emotion as a political psychologist would 
understand it. Though a few mentioned fear appeals of the type that Brader (2006) 
discussed in his study of campaign imagery, most consultants focused on what political 
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 scientists would deem an affective connection. Rather than making a voter feel 
enthusiastic or anxious, they seemed focused on making the voters feel that the candidate 
was one of them.  One consultant described how he tried to shape a candidate’s image: 
“Voters don’t want candidates who look like candidates.  I want the candidate to be 
listening, talking, learning, being part of the community.”  It is a concept much more in 
line with Fenno (1978, 2007) and the idea of appealing to constituents on the basis of 
being part of a community, rather than an out of touch Washington figure.  Essentially, 
the images in the ad are designed to manufacture authenticity.  One campaign strategist 
said that he judged the effectiveness of an ad by asking, “Does the voter visually get it 
immediately that I understand him and his problems?  If you get that far you’re likely to 
at least get to a neutral point.” This affect-driven campaign strategy came into wide usage 
in the 1980’s (Kern 1989), and the consultants I spoke with often referred to campaigns 
as an exercise in building voter-candidate connections. 
 Because it is used to create an affective connection, campaign imagery is chosen 
in a similar manner as the campaign’s verbal appeals.  Namely, the strategists decide, 
based on pre-election polling, how to create a winning coalition, and then set about 
appealing to those voters. This is a process that is frequently described in the campaign 
literature (Baer 1995; Bradshaw 1995; Burton and Shea 2003; Hernson 2004). Oddly, 
though, while images are chosen for the affective connections they create and verbal 
appeals are chosen based on the preferences and priorities of the voters, they are both 
ultimately a product of the same process.  With each tactic, campaigns try to “connect” 
with the voter by talking about issues important to the voter and showing images that 
remind the voter of him or herself. Table 4 shows the number of consultants who agreed 
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 with the statements, “When targeting a specific group, a campaign ad should talk about 
issues important to that group,” and, “When targeting a specific group, a campaign ad 
should include images of the people in that group.” In each case, I found an 
overwhelming consensus that images and verbal appeals both work better when they are 
tailored to a particular part of the electorate (mean agreement of 1.33, and 1.51, 
respectively).  Only two respondents disagreed with the idea of targeting a group with 
issues, and none disagreed with the notion of targeting a group with images. 
 Targeting different parts of the electorate through television ads can be somewhat 
problematic, of course.  Unlike direct mail, which is usually tailored to specific groups, 
television ads reach a wide audience.  Though cable advertising has become more 
prevalent in recent years, it is only starting to match the ad buys that go out through 
network television (Capone 2006; Blair and Biggs 2005).  Still, campaign ads can show 
different types of people and make the ad look like the electorate, or at least that part of it 
that the campaign wishes to reach.  Consultants stressed, repeatedly, that the ad had to 
make the candidate seem in touch with the community, and the visuals had to be an 
accurate reflection of the voters.  In simple cases, consultants were quite blunt—“If the 
district is 98% white voters that will decide the visuals” —and even in more complex 
ways, campaigns try to match up the ad with the audience.  Over and over again, 
campaigns stress that they have to make the candidate seem close to the voter, because, 
as one tired campaign manager said, “If nothing else, you do it just to show that you’re 
part of the community.” 
This belief in the importance of affective connections persists, and actually 
dominates the discussion of the campaign, even when talking about substantive issues. 
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 Nearly every consultant surveyed agreed that imagery transmits substantive information.  
There was consensus in the survey that ad imagery provides a signal to the voter about 
the candidate’s overall ideology, and several consultants I spoke with mentioned the 
connection with various images and policy priorities.  For example, “[C]andidate with 
cop equals tough on crime, candidate with children equals good on education, candidate 
with seniors good on healthcare.” 
 However, when pressed on the subject consultants still brought the subject back to 
emotion and creating affective ties with voters. A strategist discussing how to get across a 
candidate’s issues said, “[I]f the issue is education you may want to put the candidate in a 
classroom reading to grade school kids to convey that the candidate cares about 
education.  Whether or not he supports school choice, or teacher testing, or more money 
or whatever.  Part of television is driving home an emotional connection between the 
candidate and the voter.” Even in cases where the point of the image is to create an 
impression of the candidate’s issue priorities, that impression is only important because it 
creates a connection between the candidate’s and the voter’s priorities. The issue stance 
reflected in the image does not seem to be important by itself, nor is there much 
consideration given to how the image affects the overall ideological perception of the 
candidate. Everything in the ad campaign is geared toward creating affective ties with the 
electorate.  Whether or not images of African-Americans, for example, make the 
candidate seem more liberal is irrelevant.  If the image makes the candidate look more 
personable, more connected to the community, then it is useful, regardless of anything 
else the voter may glean from the image. Consultants do not seem to deny that voters can 
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 take away substantive information from ad imagery, but the images in an advertisement 
may not be chosen for the substantive message they contribute. 
It is also possible that (at least according to political consultants) voters should 
not be taking substantive messages from political images. I asked the consultants to rate 
their agreement with two items designed to tap into the sincerity of verbal and visual 
appeals. Table 3.6 shows the results. On the statement “Candidates, in general, believe 
the things they say in their campaign ads,” there was widespread agreement.21 
Consultants were less enthusiastic about the statement, “Candidates, in general, use the 
images in their ads to paint an accurate picture of themselves.” While a majority of the 
respondents agreed with the statement, most did so only slightly, and the number of 
disagreements doubled compared to beliefs about the sincerity of verbal statements.  
Undoubtedly, consultants had trouble believing in the sincerity of images because 
they, generally, do not seem to see images as a signal about policy. If images only exist to 
form an emotional connection, then there is little reason to believe they reflect a sincere 
policy belief on the part of the candidate. Based on the survey and interviews I 
conducted, I doubt many of them even considered whether or not an image honestly 
portrayed a candidate’s issue positions because they focused so much on the affective 
impacts of images. Many of the consultants I spoke with were terrified of having a lie 
exposed during a campaign, particularly since the rise of the Internet, bloggers, and 
numerous political watchdog groups, but these lies related primarily to things the 
candidate said during the campaign.  
                                                 
21 The differences in sincerity of visual and verbal appeals are particularly notable because of the response 
bias in both of these items. Despite promises of anonymity, professional campaign operators may have felt 
it necessary to overestimate the sincerity in campaigns, and may not have been comfortable admitting to the 
amount of truthiness in the average campaign. As such, I expected the agreement on both items to be very 
high, limiting the possibility of a seeing a statistically significant difference. 
 58
 In contrast, most seemed comfortable with the idea that the images of the 
campaign might be somewhat dishonest by their very nature. Because campaign images 
are often chosen to evoke images or look visually interesting, they often show candidates 
in action: talking to people, moving around in the world, being part of the community. 
When asked about the discrepancy in the poll results, one consultant responded acidly, 
“Most Congressmen don’t spend their time reading to kids. The truth is, most of the job 
of a politician involves sitting behind a desk.” There seemed to be a general sentiment 
among the professionals I spoke with that campaign imagery should attract attention and 
incite emotion. They seemed to take it for granted that these images would be somewhat 
disingenuous. 
 
3.6: Verbal and visual appeals 
The substantive content of the image can create strategic opportunities.  Even if 
campaign imagery is primarily a tool for attracting attention or building an affective 
connection, it would still seem to have potentially tremendous tactical value.  Visually, 
candidates can behave strategically, and face fewer limits in which groups they can reach 
out to in a campaign.  This is the main advantage of using visual appeals versus verbal 
issue statements. Campaigns are often reluctant to bring up certain issues, even though 
they may be important to the electorate.  The candidate’s record or beliefs about an issue 
may put him or her at a disadvantage (Simon 2002; Sellers 1998) or a candidate’s party 
may have a poor reputation on an issue that the candidate cannot overcome (Petrocik 
1996; Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Sides 2006).  Hypothetically, a candidate could 
use images to reach out to the electorate or whichever subset is useful to the campaign 
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 while talking about any issue that the candidate may prefer to highlight (for either 
strategic or sincere reasons). 
 In practice, though, there seems to be little agreement on whether or not verbal 
and visual messages can be separated so easily. Moreover, there are a variety of 
explanations as to why verbal and visual content should or should not be separated, and 
these explanations tell us how consultants view the effects of visual and verbal content, 
how each is processed by the voter, and how the messages interact as part of the 
campaign’s strategy.  I have divided respondents into four groups based on how they 
view the connection between visual and verbal content: 
Disciplinarians: “The visual message will reinforce what you say and 
reinforce the message in general…Everything I do will tie into that…If 
you think about how much the average voter pays attention to politics, it’s 
barely there at all.  You have to find one message and hammer it hard to 
get any kind of impact.” 
 
Fabulists: “You typically try to get visuals to work with the message, but 
it’s not necessary.  You may have a great visual and if it doesn’t work, you 
go ahead and use it.” 
 
Vulcans: “Always match visual and verbal.  Say social security is the 
issue.  Last thing you want is a young candidate talking to people his age.  
If the issue is education we need pictures of the candidate in the classroom 
with schoolkids.  It’s logical to have the visual back up the message.” 
 
Multi-taskers: “If you’re talking about social security, and you picture 
senior citizens, then only send that to senior citizens.  The middle-age 
voters, the under-25 voters don’t care…What is effective are the AARP 
ads where they have children talking about social security.  That makes 
the parents think about it.  It’s a way to get people who don’t care to care 
about it.  The image does set the tone.  Does it have to go along with the 
message? Not necessarily.”22 
 
 
                                                 
22 In other cases I have removed mentions of specific candidates or campaigns in order to protect the 
anonymity of the respondents.  I have left the mention of the AARP intact here because the consultant did 
not actually work on the AARP campaign and merely referenced it as an example. 
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 The consultants I spoke with in post-survey interviews were split roughly equally 
between these four camps.  First, the Disciplinarians strongly believed in matching the 
visual and verbal elements on the grounds of creating a more powerful message.  Kern 
(1989) referred to this tactic as dovetailing. The idea is that the ad is the campaign’s one 
shot to get across some persuasive message to the voter.  In order to make that as 
powerful as possible the visuals must reinforce the issues being discussed. These 
consultants tended to emphasize message discipline in general and supported the idea that 
a candidate can only make an impact with one message or issue.  Everything in the 
campaign, then—the verbal and visual content of the ad as well as all of the candidate’s 
speeches and public appearances—should center on that one theme. 
The Fabulists cared little about connecting verbal issues discussed with the 
images on screen.  The point of the image is to attract attention and make a connection.  
Once you have the attention of the voter you can say anything you need (or want) to say, 
but the image is really what drives the influence of the ad.  The verbal content is linked to 
the campaign’s overall message (which comes from polling, candidate priorities, etc.), 
and there is no need to design special verbal content to match an image for a particular 
ad. Fabulists worry about attracting attention so that the voter will pay attention long 
enough to hear the verbal message. The question is not what image helps sell the verbal 
message of the ad; the question is what image will grab the voter.  
The Vulcans believed that visual and verbal elements had to be linked, not in 
order to create a stronger message, but in order to create a coherent one.   Some of these 
strategists referred to the credibility of the message and argued that a candidate could not 
talk about social security without seniors or crime without police officers.  Voters would 
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 see the ad and simply dismiss it.  All of the Vulcans believed that an ad with separate 
visual and verbal messages would ultimately confuse the voter.  Not only would the 
message of the ad be diluted by competing visual and verbal themes, but the voter would 
be incapable of receiving any coherent message from the ad.23   
The Multi-taskers held exactly the opposite belief.  They argued that an ad 
reaches many different groups within the electorate and should, therefore, seek to engage 
all of those groups whenever possible.  Bringing children into an ad about social security 
is a perfect example of how an ad could verbally target one group (by talking about an 
issue important to senior citizens) while visually targeting another (by including images 
that appeal to young parents).  Notice, too, that the Multi-taskers talked about reaching 
out to constituencies and making them pay attention using imagery.  Though the image 
may send a substantive signal in its own right, the Multi-taskers believed the image’s 
primary import would be to create affective connections with groups who might 
otherwise be turned off by the verbal message of the ad. 
The Vulcans and Disciplinarians are similar in that they both believed that the 
visual and verbal content of the ad should match; however, their reasons for this belief 
were very different and reflect different conceptions of how visual and verbal content 
interact.  The Disciplinarians had no trouble with the idea that a voter could receive 
different messages from visual and verbal content in an ad, and believed that the voter 
could successfully receive those different messages.  For this group, the problem is that 
the campaign shouldn’t have two different messages, or be about more than one issue.  
                                                 
23 There is a great deal of subjectivity in the Vulcans’ worldview.  Whether or not an image and verbal 
appeal go together often seems to depend on the consultant’s beliefs.  For example, one Republican 
operative scoffed at ads calling for withdrawal from Iraq that made use of images of soldiers and veterans, 
believing that these soldiers could not be reasonably associated with an anti-war position.  It is not clear 
why an ad featuring an Iraq War veteran calling for an end to the war in Iraq is inherently illogical. 
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 The Disciplinarians believed that the candidate should find the most effective message 
and hammer that message repeatedly in order to increase the odds that the voters would 
associate the candidate with that message.  They would view the Multi-taskers as 
inefficient.  In contrast, Vulcans would view the Multi-taskers as incompetent.  They 
believed that verbal and visual content have to be coordinated because the viewer is 
incapable of processing those messages independently and using both of them to 
synthesize a view of the candidate. 
Here again, notice that Vulcans, Disciplinarians and Multi-taskers each seem to 
proceed from the belief that images carry a substantive message to voters, and that a 
substantive visual message exists independent of the verbal content of the ad.  Despite 
their emphasis on the affective attachments created by campaign imagery, each group 
seemed to indicate (or at least it can be implied) that the image does carry substance as 
well as emotion. After all, if the image did not carry any substantive connotation, then it 
would not matter to any of them whether or not the image connected to the verbal 
message. 
The problem is that each of these four views about the verbal-visual connection 
could be correct.  None of these groups’ suppositions seem unreasonable.  In fact, though 
the Disciplinarians, Fabulists and Multi-taskers would take different approaches, they all 
seem to assume the same things about how voters receive visual and verbal stimuli.  
Disciplinarians only differ because they think the campaign ad is better off with one 
message, whereas Multi-taskers think the campaign ad should contain multiple themes 
and Fabulists simply don’t put much emphasis on content consistency. 
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 3.7: Summary 
The evidence in this chapter paints a clear picture of the importance of campaign 
ad imagery and the strategic thinking that dictates image choices within a campaign.  
Verbal issue appeals are certainly not relegated to the dumpster, but they are clearly 
considered a secondary and much more rigid tool of the campaign.  Professional 
consultants argue that campaigns can’t be dishonest without facing blowback from 
voters, and often focus on only a handful of issues (Burton and Shea 2003; Thurber and 
Nelson 2000). This tendency is consistent with the survey findings presented here. The 
campaign is limited in how much it can control the substantive information, because 
verbal appeals are restricted by concerns about sincerity and believability.  
On the other hand, consultants see imagery as a primary tool for grabbing the 
voter’s attention and creating an affective connection between the candidate and voter.  
The purpose of the image is to deliver the message that the candidate shares the voters’ 
values, is part of their community, and will look out for their interest. What is striking is 
the lack of interest in the substantive issue content of political images. The consultants 
who create these ads did not disagree with the idea that images convey information, but 
they clearly focused on the emotional and affective content of the image, to the point of 
virtually ignoring the substance. In part, this inattention might be due to a general 
preoccupation with affective attachments. Certainly, few professionals seem to doubt the 
importance of campaign images, or the idea that images send a message to the voter. It is 
strange that political consultants would focus so tightly on the affective appeal of 
imagery if they believe that the picture tells the voter something about the candidate’s 
issue positions. 
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  Difficulties can arise, however, because images also transmit a substantive signal.  
Most consultants espouse that belief, but there is considerable dissension as to whether or 
not the image signal needs to coincide with the verbal message.  Despite the near-
universal agreement that images provoke feelings, many consultants believed that those 
images should be tied to the issues discussed in the ad, either because it helped the voter 
make sense of the campaign message, or because it augmented the strength of the verbal 
message. This plethora of beliefs about the connection between verbal and visual 
messages may be partially attributed to a lack of interest in the underlying causal 
mechanism.  Campaign consultants believe that voters react to verbal and visual appeals, 
but they don’t necessarily understand why. Most of the consultants I spoke with 
mentioned that they liked to test out campaign themes and messages in focus groups or 
polls, but they also mentioned that time and financial constraints often made this testing 
an unaffordable luxury. The idea of running controlled experiments did not come up 
during our discussions.  Nearly all competitive candidates conduct polling throughout the 
campaign in order to track their progress and determine if the campaign’s message is 
getting through to voters (Hamilton 1995).  Campaigns can usually observe whether a 
message succeeds or fails by tracking a candidate’s standing in the polls and how viewers 
see the candidate; however, they lack the empirical evidence to investigate why a 
message succeeds or fails.24  
Of course it is hard to blame consultants for focusing on results instead of 
developing a broader theoretical understanding.  After all, they are paid to produce for 
their candidates, not spend their time investigating the psychological causes of individual 
message reception.  In fact, since their primary goal is to find a message that works, it 
                                                 
24 This might also feed the perception, discussed earlier in this chapter, that every campaign is unique.  
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 may be more cost effective for them to simply test a variety of visual and verbal appeals, 
see which one sticks in a particular campaign, and not worry about whether or not the 
tactic can be generalized. 
In the next chapter I turn to Congressional campaigns and show how candidates 
apply imagery in actual ads and follow the instincts of their consultants.  I also show how 
ad imagery affects election results. Later in the dissertation I will investigate, through 
experimental and observational methods, the issue of how verbal and visual messages 
combine within an ad in order to shed some light on this dispute.  In addition, I will 
attempt to separate affective connections and substantive issue and ideological messages 
within imagery. While political consultants often neglect the ideological impact of 
imagery, they may not be right to do so.   
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  Chapter 3 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.1: Type of Campaign Experience for Consultant Sample 
Type of campaign Percentage of respondents with 
experience with campaigns for 
that office 
Presidential 
Senate 
Congressional 
Gubernatorial 
State legislature 
Other state office 
Local office 
Ballot initiative 
59.4 
69.5 
87.5 
90.6 
75.8 
75.8 
92.2 
82.8 
 
Table 3.2: Importance of television advertising 
Item Mean (with SD in parentheses) 
Overall influence of TV ads 
 
Influence of issues 
 
Influence of images 
 
Amount of time on verbal script 
 
Amount of time on image design 
6.05 
(1.03) 
5.48 
(1.37) 
6.07 
(.99) 
6.26 
(1.05) 
6.48 
(.91) 
 
 
Table 3.3: Voters pay more attention to what is said in a campaign ad than they do 
to the visuals in an ad 
Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither agree nor disagree Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
0 32 30 60 8 
Cell entries are the number of respondents who gave each answer 
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 Table 3.4: Agreement on targeting groups with ads 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree
Target groups with 
verbal issue appeals 
93 33 2 2 0 
Target groups with 
images of that group 
71 51 8 0 0 
Voters respond more 
to people who look 
like themselves 
39 68 15 5 1 
Cell entries are the number of respondents who gave each answer 
 
 
 
Table 3.5: Campaign ad images send voters a signal about the candidate’s ideology 
Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
59 62 5 4 0 
Cell entries are the number of respondents who gave each answer 
 
 
Table 3.6: Agreement on targeting groups with ads 
 Strongly 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree
Candidates believe 
the things they say 
in their campaign 
ads. 
 
56 54 11 7 2 
Candidates use the 
images in their ads 
to paint an 
accurate picture of 
themselves. 
22 76 14 14 4 
Cell entries are the number of respondents who gave each answer 
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 Figure 3.1: Perceived influence of verbal and visual appeals across groups 
 
Figure shows the mean response with 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69
 Chapter 4: Images in Congressional Campaigns 
4.1: Introduction 
In this chapter I continue to investigate campaign strategy and examine how 
images are used in campaigns.  Expanding on the results from Chapter 3’s survey of 
campaign professionals, I look at Congressional campaign data from 2000, 2002 and 
2004 and analyze how House candidates used ad images during those election cycles, and 
how those images altered the results on Election Day. I begin by looking at the 
relationship between campaign imagery and constituent demographics and find strong 
evidence that the images in campaign ads reflect the demographics of the district. There 
is little indication, however, that candidates consider the ideological content of their 
visual messages. There is little association between the ideology of a district and the 
images used in the campaign. I then move to an analysis of aggregate election results that 
indicates candidates may benefit from having their ads reflect the demographics of their 
district, but they may hurt themselves by not considering the ideological content of 
campaign imagery. 
Of course, some images may be less politically charged than others. While the 
nine groups I have listed carry strong ideological connotations, another group 
prominently featured in political ads does not.  The stereotype of the baby-kissing 
politician is often overplayed in popular media, but surrounding a candidate with images 
of children is one of the more popular tactics in political advertising.  Children make for a 
positive image.  In fact, Brader (2005) used images of children in his experiments with 
emotional imagery to evoke positive, enthusiastic responses. Candidates who picture their 
bright, shiny faces may send the message that they love children and support education or 
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 childcare initiatives (Sulkin and Swigger 2008), but children are not associated with 
liberalism or conservatism in general.  As a contrast to ideological images, they make an 
excellent test case for a group that should elicit an affective response, but not elicit a 
response based on ideological predispositions. In fact, I find that the positive effects of 
picturing children do not change with the ideology of the district; however, images of 
children have a significant impact only in moderate districts.  Images of children do not 
seem to help candidates in extremely liberal or conservative districts. 
For most of the subsequent findings on campaign strategy, my unit of analysis is 
the congressional candidate within a particular election year.  When I shift and examine 
the impact of ads on voters, I use House districts within election years, and restrict my 
analysis to only those districts where both Republican and Democratic candidates ran 
ads.  To begin with I explain how I compiled data on Congressional campaigns and 
district demographics. 
 
4.2: Data and Methods 
In order to examine the strategy behind candidate ads, I gathered data from 
Congressional races during the general election campaigns. The Campaign Media 
Analysis Group (CMAG) collected all political ads run in the top 75 media markets 
during the 2000 election and all political ads in the top 100 markets in 2002 and 2004.  
The ad data and storyboards are organized and made publicly available through the 
Wisconsin Ads Project,25 which provides a storyboard for each ad as well as data on the 
                                                 
25 The data was obtained from a project of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, under Professor Kenneth 
Goldstein and Joel Rivlin of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and includes media tracking data from 
the Campaign Media Analysis Group in Washington, D.C. The Wisconsin Advertising Project was 
sponsored by a grant from The Pew Charitable Trusts. The opinions expressed in this article are those of 
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 sponsor of the ad, the number of times the ad ran, and when and where it aired.  The 
archive is, therefore, an ideal source for gathering information on campaign content. 
Not every Congressional candidate runs television advertisements, of course.  In 
the campaigns I examine, 428 House races featured at least one candidate who ran 
political ads on television, for a total of 521 candidates and 2570 distinct television 
commercials. This is not a random sample of House candidates, and they differ from 
typical House members in a number of important ways.  Most importantly, the House 
candidates I examine all had the means (both technical and financial) and the motivation 
to run television ads.  We can assume that Congressional candidates run advertisements 
to win support among voters, but there is no way of quantifying why, exactly, some 
candidates choose to run ads while others do not.  
Nevertheless, the candidates in this sample compose a wide cross-section of 
American politics.  There are 235 Democrats and 286 Republicans split roughly between 
challengers and incumbents from every region in the United States.  These candidates, 
ranging from uncontested incumbents to long-shot challengers, received an average of 
54.9% of the two-party vote on Election Day with a high of 100% and a low of 28%. At a 
minimum, the incumbents in these districts felt some motivation to act as though they 
were in a competitive race and ran campaign advertisements, and the challengers 
mustered the resources to air ads of their own.  While the sample from the Wisconsin Ads 
Project favors House members in large media markets, I am confident that there is 
enough variation to make generalizable claims.  Most importantly, while there is strong 
reason to believe that campaign effects differ depending on the demographics of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Wisconsin Advertising Project, Professor 
Goldstein, Joel Rivlin, or The Pew Charitable Trusts.” 
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 district, there is no reason to suspect that campaign effects should change based solely on 
the size of a media market.  
My data contain information on every ad run by a Congressional candidate in the 
2000, 2002, and 2004 general elections in the sampled markets.26  Two separate content 
analyses were conducted in order to determine the visual and verbal messages within 
campaign ads. The goal was to get an accurate measure of what issues were talked about 
and what kind of people were pictured within the ad. First, I coded the images that 
candidates used to determine whether or not the ad pictured children, seniors, African-
Americans, Latinos, blue-collar workers, farmers, businesspeople, police, and military 
personnel, both active and retired.  In order to assess the reliability of my image coding 
scheme, two coders looked at the storyboards for 819 ads from the 2000 election. In the 
first round of coding, they went through the ads to determine whether or not the ad 
pictured anyone other than the sponsoring candidate, members of his or her family, the 
opponent, or other elected officials. 
 I used this first step to weed out individuals who are political figures rather than 
representatives of groups.  For example, Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts is a 
senior citizen; however, it is unlikely that viewers would instantly associate him with 
senior citizens.  Candidates may find it useful to feed off of the status and celebrity of a 
respected figure like Kennedy, but because he is a famous figure viewers are more likely 
to react to him as an individual.  On the other hand, if a candidate wanted to send a 
message of support to senior citizens in general, he or she could simply pack the ad with 
                                                 
26 While both interest groups and parties may run ads on behalf of a candidate, federal election laws 
prohibit coordination between those groups and the candidate’s campaign.  Since I’m interested in 
analyzing candidate strategy in this section, it was important to limit the ads to only those that a candidate 
had direct control over.  Moreover, many interest groups produce cookie cutter ads that are shown 
nationwide, and merely substitute in the name of the local candidate. 
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 average seniors and interact with them on screen.  Ordinary people may bring a note of 
authenticity to a campaign appeal because (presumably) the constituents watching the ad 
can identify with the people on screen.   
For the ads that pictured at least one ordinary citizen, the coders identified those 
people who fall into one of the social identity groups mentioned above. Coders simply 
indicated whether or not someone from a particular group was pictured in an ad. 
Individuals may belong to several groups, and within the coding scheme one person 
within an ad could count toward multiple categories. For example, if an ad pictured a 
senior citizen who was also a blue-collar worker, the ad would be coded as picturing both 
seniors and blue-collar workers. Similarly, if an ad pictured children who were African-
Americans, the ad could count as picturing children and African-Americans. Although 
the coders relied on their judgment in determining whether a person from a given group 
was pictured, intercoder reliability was very high, ranging from 90-100% raw agreement, 
with high reliability even after correcting for chance agreement (Cohen’s kappa statistic 
between .7 and .9).  
Once all of the ads were coded, I aggregated up to the level of individual 
candidates and calculated how many of their ads featured each group.  The vast majority 
of candidates produced multiple ads, but those ads were rarely run in equal numbers.  I 
determined the percentage of actual air time that a candidate devoted to picturing a group 
in his or her ads.  For example, a candidate may have pictured blue-collar workers in only 
one ad, but that one ad may have comprised half of her total ad-buy.  If she ran that ad 
300 times, out of a total of 600 ads run, then she would receive a score of .5 for the blue 
collar image variable. 
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 In order to control for the verbal messages within campaigns, I also needed data 
on the issue content of the ads.  While I am not primarily interested in the substantive 
content of these ads, the issues discussed are, obviously, an important factor in 
determining the impact of the Congressional ads on the electorate.  Also, it is important 
to differentiate between candidates who send messages through visual appeals, those who 
do so verbally, and those who combine their verbal and visual appeals.  For the 2000 and 
2002 elections I used Tracy Sulkin’s data on Congressional campaigns.  For her work on 
promise-keeping and campaign/policy congruence, Sulkin created a coding scheme to 
describe all of the issues mentioned within a particular ad.  Her scheme was similar to the 
issue coding used in the Policy Agendas Project, and categorized verbal content under 18 
broad areas: agriculture, budget and spending, campaign finance reform, crime, national 
defense, education, the environment, healthcare, energy and infrastructure, jobs, 
Medicare, business regulations, morality (including issues such as abortion, gambling and 
gay marriage), civil rights, social security, taxes and welfare. 
Sulkin’s issue coding covers the 2000 and 2002 campaigns.  In order to include 
the final year of House campaign ads, I replicated her coding scheme for the 2004 
election.  To ensure reliability, I drew a random sample of 100 ads from Sulkin’s original 
dataset and recoded them using the coding rules.  Our issue coding matched on each issue 
between 94 and 100 percent of the ads, depending on the issue in question.  Even 
correcting for chance agreement, our reliability was still remarkably solid (with Cohen’s 
kappa statistics ranging from .65 to 1.0).27 Given our high degree of reliability, I am 
                                                 
27 The lone exception to this level of reliability was found on the issue of welfare.  Very few Congressional 
ads ever mention welfare explicitly, and none of those ads made it into the reliability sample.  Though our 
coding agreement was 100%, a kappa statistic could not be computed because of the lack of variation. 
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 confident that the issue coding in the 2004 campaigns is comparable to the content 
analysis of the 2000 and 2002 campaigns.   
 Finally, I used information from the 2000 census to compile data on the 
demographics of House districts.  I gathered data on the urban/rural split of the district, as 
well as the percentage of senior citizens, blue-collar workers, children, military veterans, 
African-Americans and Latinos living in the district. I use the Democratic share of the 
two-party presidential vote as a proxy for the ideological makeup of the district.  While 
this is an imperfect measure of ideology, it does capture the general ideological bent of a 
district.  The higher the Democratic share of the presidential vote, the more liberal the 
district. 
 
4.3: What do Congressional ads look like? 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of candidates who pictured each group.  Overall, 
86.6% of candidates pictured at least one ordinary person in at least one of their ads.  
Unsurprisingly, seniors and children are pictured by more candidates than any of the 
other groups.  These two categories, of course, encompass a wider demographic than any 
other category and, indeed, often include members from several other categories.  Image 
use varied over time, but only rarely varied between parties.  There are very few 
significant differences in image use between Democrats and Republicans.  Democratic 
candidates pictured African-Americans more often (7.8% more Democrats pictured 
blacks, p<.05); otherwise, the parties are remarkably similar. 
There are, however, differences that emerge across time.  Most importantly, there 
is a significant increase in the number of Republicans who picture military personnel 
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 between the 2000 and 2002 elections.   In 2000 only 5.7% of Republican candidates 
pictured a soldier in uniform in any of their ads.  In the next election cycle, the number of 
candidates using soldiers almost doubled to 10.5%, and it doubled again in the next 
election cycle when 21.1% of Republican candidates used soldiers in their ads.  This 
undoubtedly reflects the party’s emphasis on national security following September 11th, 
but there is no corresponding increase in the 2002 cycle for Democratic candidates.  
Democrats do not use more martial imagery until the 2004 campaign, when they “catch 
up” to Republicans. By the same token, you can see statistically significant increases in 
both parties in the use of workers between the 2000 and 2002 elections.  The corporate 
scandals of the early part of the decade appear to have moved both parties’ candidates to 
put themselves next to blue-collar workers. These differences over time suggest that 
candidates are responding to changes in the political environments and molding their 
images to appeal to voters on the salient issues of the day. 
Like the visual content, the verbal content of advertising does shift somewhat 
over time. As you can see in Figure 4.2, the changing political landscape did change the 
way some issues are discussed within campaigns during the period from 2000-2004.  
Notably, as with the comparison of images, the attacks of September 11th and the opening 
of the Iraq War fundamentally altered the way candidates discuss national defense within 
campaign advertisements.  Terrorism became a major campaign issue in 2002, whereas it 
had almost never been mentioned before.  Significantly more candidates in both parties 
mentioned the issue of national defense in 2002 and 2004, although there is a 
significantly larger increase on the Republican side.   Similarly, business regulation 
became a hot topic in 2002 because of the collapse of Enron and other corporate 
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 accountability scandals. Other issues tend to remain in the political dialogue over time.  
For example, social security and Medicare are frequently mentioned in Congressional 
advertising.  I have combined these issues into one category (labeled “senior issues”) in 
order to simplify later analyses, but the two are often mentioned together in the same ad, 
and many candidates feature this issue appeal to senior citizens. 
On the other hand, verbal content seems more influenced by partisanship. Enough 
has been written on verbal messages in campaigns that strategies and tendencies tend to 
be clear.  Candidates usually eschew specificity and controversy in their verbal appeals 
unless the race is highly competitive (Kahn and Kenney 1999).  They also tend to focus 
on issues where their party has a strong reputation, unless they have a personal history on 
an issue that will make them credible (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994; Sides 2006).  
Some patterns of issue ownership emerge when looking at verbal campaign messages.  
Overall, more Democratic candidates talk about Medicare, healthcare, and civil rights.  
This divergence suggests that strategic choices about images may be separate from 
choices about verbal messages.  While candidates may use their party’s reputation to gain 
credibility with their verbal message, they do not seem to be so constrained when it 
comes to the visual cues they provide to the electorate. 
In fact, there is little evidence of an absolute connection between the issues 
discussed and the images used in a campaign ad. There are several weak, but statistically 
significant, correlations between the amount of time candidates spend talking about 
issues and the amount of time they show images related to those issues.  For example, 
there is a significant correlation between talking about Medicare or Social Security and 
picturing seniors (r=.17, p<.05).  However, it is not uncommon for the issue content of 
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 the ad and the imagery to be completely unrelated.  Candidates frequently picture soldiers 
without discussing national defense, or show farmers without talking about agriculture.  
Less than half of the congressional ads featuring farmers mentioned an agricultural issue.  
Overall, almost one-third of the candidates in the sample pictured an African-American 
in at least one ad; however, only 2% actually talked explicitly about civil rights and race 
related issues.  The indication is that the image content of an ad and the explicit content 
are often created with separate goals in mind. 
As my discussions with political consultants revealed, there is no widespread 
agreement on whether or not a campaign’s visual and verbal content should converge on 
a single message. The weak correlations between visual and verbal content reveal that 
some campaigns are run by Disciplinarians and Vulcans, while others are run by 
Fabulists and Multi-Taskers.  At the very least, the disjuncture between visual and verbal 
content is a strong indication that what to show and what to say in an ad are distinct 
strategic decisions, and it provides further evidence that visual choices are an important 
part of the campaign. 
 
4.4: Imagery and Campaign Strategy 
Issue ownership and questions of future commitments may constrain the verbal 
messages that candidates use, but those concerns would not seem to apply to visual 
messages.  If, as was the case in the last chapter, images are primarily used to create an 
affective bond between the candidate and his or her constituency, then the images should 
reflect the demographics of the district.  To a certain extent, using district demographics 
makes for a weak test of image strategy.  Campaigns routinely target specific groups in 
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 an election (Baer 1995; Bradshaw 1995; Burton and Shea 2003; Hernson 2004). Just 
because a group is well represented in a district, however, does not necessarily mean that 
the group will be targeted by a political campaign.  One can easily imagine a Republican 
candidate, for example, choosing not to target the 20% of his district that identifies as 
African-American, and instead only concentrating on white voters.  It may, therefore, be 
difficult to see relationships between the constituency and image choices emerge.  
In order to investigate image strategy I gathered data on candidate and constituent 
characteristics,28 and examine a pooled cross section of the House campaigns.  Not all of 
the candidates in the Wisconsin Ads data set use the same images, of course.  To 
investigate image strategy, it is first necessary to weed out a few campaigns where non-
strategic factors exert an unusual amount of influence on image choices. First, using 
images other than that of the candidate and his or her family is not necessarily a strategic 
decision; it is also a question of means.  In order to use ordinary people a candidate has to 
have studio space, or the ability to shoot on location, and the ability to hire actors, or 
available b-roll footage and the means to edit it.  Simply producing an ad like this 
requires capabilities (both technical and financial) that not all candidates possess.   
Almost all of the political consultants I spoke with prefaced their remarks on campaign 
strategy by saying something along the lines of, “Ideally, you have the money to do…” I 
therefore restrict my analysis to those candidates who had the means to produce ads that 
had at least one other person.  I have also left out candidates who did not have a major 
party opponent.  Several Democrats and Republicans ran ad campaigns in spite of the fact 
                                                 
28 All demographic data comes from the 2000 Census.  I obtained data at the Congressional district level 
based on the 2000 lines, as well as updated information for areas that underwent redistricting prior to the 
2002 and 2004 Congressional elections. 
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 that they had no opposition.  It is highly probable that these candidates’ motivations, 
whatever they were, did not come from the campaign at hand.29 
Finally, I have restricted this analysis to white Congressional candidates.  In 
principle, minority candidates may also use imagery to build an affective tie with their 
constituents, or transmit a message about their policy positions.  However, minority 
candidates present a different visual message when they appear in an ad themselves.  
Voters simply respond differently to black or Hispanic candidates versus white 
candidates (McDermott 1998), and minority candidates may need to use different visual 
strategies to take those reactions into account.  
To begin, I looked at the bivariate relationship between the size of a group within 
a candidate’s district and the amount of time a candidate pictures that group. I also 
examine the ideological makeup of the district and look at correlations between district 
ideology and image choices. At first glance, it seems that candidates are highly motivated 
to produce ads that “look like” their constituency.  Table 4.3 shows that, for 7 of the 10 
groups that I examine, there is a significant correlation between the size of a group and 
how often the group is pictured within the campaign.  Candidates with higher 
concentrations of African-Americans, Latinos, seniors, veterans, and blue-collar workers 
in their districts ran more ads picturing these groups.  Candidates in rural areas, as 
expected, tended to picture farmers more often, and candidates in urban areas pictured 
police officers more often. I should also note that the strong connection between group 
demographics and image choices appears to be bipartisan.  When sending verbal 
                                                 
29 Unopposed candidates may have run ads in order to dissuade future challengers, in which case their 
campaign strategy should closely mirror of opposed candidates.  Both sides would be attempting to build 
support in the electorate.  However, many unopposed House candidates went on to run in subsequent 
statewide elections, meaning that their campaign ads may have been intended for a wider audience than 
their own district. 
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 messages candidates may be inhibited by their prior record or their party’s reputation.  
Hence, differences in verbal issue content across parties often emerge in campaigns.  It 
does not appear, however, that candidates are restricted by party reputation in the images 
they show.  Republican candidates may not wish to talk about racial issues, but those 
with high minority populations in their districts are clearly comfortable running ads with 
images of minorities. 
On the other hand, the link between ideology and image choices seems virtually 
non-existent.  There is little indication of an association between running for office in a 
liberal district and picturing liberal groups more often, or running in a conservative 
district and picturing conservative groups more often. For Republican candidates, the 
only significant correlation between ideology and image choices (for blue-collar workers) 
is in the wrong direction. Republicans seem more likely to picture this left-leaning group 
in districts that have a more conservative make-up. Democratic candidates do slightly 
better at matching images and ideology, but not by much. Candidates in liberal districts 
tend to run more images of blacks and blue-collar workers, but these are the only 
significant results for Democratic congressional candidates that are in the correct 
direction.  There is a significant correlation between images of teachers and ideology.  
Democratic candidates in more conservative districts tend to picture teachers more, which 
seems to be the opposite of what they should do if picturing teachers makes a candidate 
seem more liberal.  At the same time there is a significant correlation between ideology 
and picturing children for Democratic candidates, even though there does not seem to be 
any obvious reason that children would be more appealing to a liberal constituency. 
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 Compare the results in Table 4.3 with the results in Table 4.4.  There are more 
significant bivariate relationships between visual messages and demographics than 
between verbal messages and constituencies.  In theory, it would seem less likely to see 
significant relationships between demographics and verbal appeals. With campaign 
imagery, the candidate can focus on making the ad look like the constituent with few 
restrictions on who can reasonably be pictured, but verbal choices may be constricted by 
the candidate’s party or reputation or personal beliefs. When choosing which issues to 
talk about in their ads, candidates are far more likely to choose issues where their position 
is close to the median voter (Kahn and Kinney 1999; Simon 2002), or focus on issues 
with higher salience among the electorate.  Those issues may not necessarily be the ones 
most closely associated with large demographic groups.  For example, a candidate may 
have a large number of seniors in his district, but if he holds an unpopular position on 
Medicare he would be unwise to bring it up during his campaign.  Still, there are actually 
a number of significant bivariate relationships between demographics and verbal ad 
content. Once again, though, the differences between Table 4.3 and Table 4.4 lend 
credence to the idea that visual messages are an independent factor in campaigns, and not 
merely a by-product of the verbal content of the campaign.  If images were merely a 
result of verbal messages, then there should not be any observable differences between 
the two. Any correlation between verbal choices and demographics would be matched by 
correlations between images and demographics. 
The results from these simple analyses are informative; however, it may be 
argued that the correlation between constituency and ad imagery is merely an artifact of 
other factors.  If, for example, female candidates are more likely to picture children or 
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 senior citizens and more likely to come from districts with more seniors or a larger 
population of children, then the correlation between the district demographics and 
campaign images could be a spurious result.  If images are, indeed, a strategic decision 
directly related to a candidate’s audience, then the relationship between the two should 
remain significant even after controlling for other factors.  At the same time, if image 
choices are related to the ideology of the candidate or the district, then it should be 
possible to see a relationship emerge. 
To investigate this possibility I estimated a series of regression models.  In each 
case, the dependent variable was the percentage of ads in which a candidate pictured a 
particular group.  I controlled for the verbal messages that a candidate used on issues that 
are relevant to the group, and included indicator variables for the gender of the candidate, 
whether or not the candidate was an incumbent, and the year of the election.  Female 
candidates do have a tendency to emphasize different issues and present themselves 
differently in campaigns (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993).  At the same time, incumbent 
candidates tend to picture more people in their ads (possibly as a result of experience or 
simply having more resources and/or communications consultants).  This undoubtedly 
reflects a better understanding of how to create affective ties with their constituents 
gained from experience, and increased capabilities and better fundraising in their 
campaigns.  I include indicator variables for the year 2002 and 2004 in order to account 
for any year-to-year variation in image use.  Finally, I estimated separate models for 
Democratic and Republican candidates in order to account for any differences in how 
candidates from each party use imagery. 
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 In Table 4.5 you can see as summary of the results of this regression analysis, 
which confirms the relationship between imagery and constituency make-up while also 
shedding light on some of the more puzzling results of the bivariate analysis.30  For 7 out 
of the 10 groups there is a statistically significant relationship between the constituency 
demographics and the amount of time the group is pictured, and all of these significant 
results are in the expected direction.  Overall, candidates from both parties use imagery to 
reflect the make-up of their district.  The demographics of the district are statistically 
significant and, in most cases, substantively large. At the same time, the results from 
Table 4.5 show that there is a consistent distinction between verbal and visual messages.  
Candidates’ verbal messages have some impact on imagery (and, really, it would be 
bizarre for the two to be completely separate), but a number of factors beyond what an ad 
says play into the decision about what an ad looks like.  The verbal content alone does 
not drive the visual content.  Instead, it seems that candidates make a conscious effort to 
mirror the demographics of their district, whether or not they are talking about an issue 
specifically related to a group. 
Ideology, in contrast, is almost never a significant factor in image use. 
Congressional candidates seem to employ liberal and conservative images with no regard 
for whether the district leans more or less toward Democratic presidential candidates. In 
only one case is the ideology of the district a significant factor and in the expected 
direction.  Democratic candidates in more liberal districts have a tendency to picture 
Latinos more often.  The other two cases where ideology has a significant impact actually 
seem to undermine the argument that candidates use ideology to determine their 
campaign imagery. Ideology is a significant factor for both Democratic and Republican 
                                                 
30 The full regression table is available in Appendix B. 
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 candidates in picturing children and blue-collar workers.  In both cases, though ideology 
is in the opposite direction for candidates of the opposite party.  For Democratic 
candidates, ideology is positive and significant, meaning that the more liberal the district, 
the more often the candidate pictures children and workers.  For Republicans, ideology is 
negative and significant.   
Taken together, these results do not seem to indicate that candidates use imagery 
to make an ideological appeal that their constituents will find appealing.  Instead, it seems 
that Democrats and Republicans picture children and workers more often when they 
come from safer districts.  It could be that political candidates view children and workers 
as non-controversial, non-ideological images that will resonate with their whole 
constituency.  Although the public views blue-collar workers as a liberal group, 
candidates may not share that view, or believe that images of workers send a liberal 
message.  There is ample evidence that candidates from safe districts have a tendency to 
choose non-controversial verbal appeals (Kahn and Kenney 1999). It would appear that 
safe candidates take the same view with their image appeals and strive for wholesome, 
non-threatening campaign images. 
It seems, at least at the House level, that there is little evidence that candidates 
think of their imagery in terms of the ideological signal they might send.  If they 
considered ideological factors, then there should be a significant relationship between 
their district’s position and their own image use.  All else equal, candidates in 
conservative districts should show more images of conservative groups, but there seems 
to be no evidence that candidates view images as ideological signals.  This does not mean 
that groups such as blacks and farmers do not send an ideological signal to voters; 
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 however, it may be that candidates concentrate on the demographics of their district and 
ignore the ideological aspects of some images. 
 
4.5: Imagery and election results  
 The question remains: does using imagery that mirrors the constituency actually 
affect Election Day totals?  There have been a number of arguments in recent years about 
the normative democratic value of campaigns (Sulkin 2005; Geer 2006), but, 
fundamentally, campaigns are about winning votes, and (hopefully) altering election 
outcomes.  In order to assess the value of image strategies I ran a series of regressions 
using an interaction between how often a group was pictured, the ideology of the district, 
and the size of that group within the electorate. I deal first with children, seniors, farmers, 
teachers, police officers, workers, businesspeople, Latinos and African-Americans, and 
then follow that with a look at images of soldiers and how their impact has changed over 
time. 
 First, I constructed an estimate of the normal Democratic share of the 2-party vote 
in each district.31 I estimated the normal vote using a regression model with fixed effects 
for time and congressional district.32 I created three variables to capture the effects of 
incumbency and challenger quality: inceo (Incumbent × Experienced Opponent) indicates 
races where a Democratic or Republican incumbent faced an experienced opponent, incio 
(Incumbent × Inexperienced Opponent) indicates races where a Democratic or 
Republican incumbent faced an inexperienced opponent, and dexad (Experienced 
                                                 
31 My thanks to Brian Gaines for suggesting this method and also for providing the data on incumbency, 
challenger quality and electoral outcomes. 
32 In estimating the normal vote for the year 2000 I used indicator variables for time effects: y1=1992, 
y2=1994, y3=1996, y4=1998. For 2002 and 2004 I used indicators: y1=2004, y2=2006. 
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 Democratic Challenger × Experienced Republican Challenger) covers open races, 
indicating the comparative experience of two challengers. Each of these is scaled from 1 
to -1, with higher numbers representing a Democratic advantage. By looking at multiple 
elections within the same district over time and accounting for factors like incumbency 
and year-to-year party performances, I can use the coefficients on the district indicator 
variables as an estimate for the normal Democratic vote:33 
Normal vote=  β1(AL1) + β2 (AL2) + β3 (AL3)… +β434 (WV2) + β436 (Inceo) + β437 
(Incio) + β438(dexad)+ β439 (y1)+ β440 (y2)+ β441 (y3)+β442 (y4)+e 
Once I had an estimate of the normal vote, I subtracted the actual Democratic 
share of the 2-party vote in order to get a measure of how much a particular race deviated 
from the norm. This deviation is the dependent variable that really interests me. I use a 
deviation from the normal estimate rather than simply using election totals in order to 
estimate how much the campaign changed the election outcome from what it would have 
been had it simply been a “typical” year for the district. In this case, positive values for 
the dependent variable indicate the Democrat did better than expected and negative 
values indicate that the Democrat’s vote total was lower than expected. 
I modeled deviations from the normal vote using a three way interaction between 
the image used, the size of the group and the ideology of the district.  In order to control 
for the effects of having two candidates in the race, I limited my analysis to only those 
districts where both candidates ran ads, and where both candidates pictured at least one 
other “regular” person. Both conditions are imposed in order to avoid conflating the 
effect of campaign imagery with a different cause.  If I included all districts, regardless of 
                                                 
33 Redistricting, unfortunately, meant that I could not estimate a normal vote for any of the Congressional 
districts in Texas for the year 2002 because that state redrew Congressional lines following that election. A 
handful of other districts which were never contested were also dropped from this analysis. 
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 whether or not both candidates ran ads, then image effects might appear inflated.  
Presumably, if only one candidate ran ads, that candidate probably had greater resources, 
and what appeared to be image effects would only reflect that resource advantage.  
Similarly, I restrict my analysis to only those ads where both candidates pictured another 
person in order to avoid conflating the effect of picturing a group with the effect of 
picturing anyone.  When a candidate’s score for a group equals zero, that score should 
reflect that the candidate chose not to picture a particular group, not that the candidate 
failed to picture any other type of regular person. Even with these conditions, there are 
still 164 districts across three campaigns in the sample. 
I have also controlled for a few other factors that might affect the race in a given 
election.  I included indicator variables for the gender of each candidate as well as an 
indicator for the 2002 midterms, in which Democrats, in general, underperformed.  I 
included information on the verbal content of the ads as well, in order to distinguish 
between the effect of picturing a group and talking about an issue.  The percentage of the 
candidate’s ads that mentioned an issue was interacted with the size of the group in the 
district.  So, for example, I included the percentage of ads mentioning senior issues 
interacted with the percentage of seniors in the district. I also included the natural log of 
the number of ads run by each candidate to account for the effect of advertising volume 
on the race. I estimated the effect of each type of imagery separately using the model: 
Deviation from normal vote =  β1 (% of Dem ads picturing group) + β2 (% of group in 
district) + β3 (district ideology) + β4 (Dem ads × group) + β5 (Dem ads × ideology) + β6 
(ideology × group) + β7 (Dem ads × ideology × group) + β8 (% of GOP ads picturing 
group) + β9 (GOP ads × group) + β10 (GOP ads × ideology) + β11 (GOP ads × ideology × 
group) + β12 (% of Dem ads mentioning issue) + β13 (% of Dem issue mentions × group) 
+ β14 (% of GOP ads mentioning issue) + β15 (% of GOP issue mentions × group) + β16 
(Dem female) + β17 (GOP female) + β18 (Dem ads) + β19 (GOP ads) + β20 (midterm) + 
β0+ e 
 89
  Though it might appear unwieldy, this model allows me estimate the effect of 
picturing a group for each candidate, and how those effects change depending on the 
district. The results indicate that imagery has a significant effect on election results while 
all of the control variables act in the expected direction.34  Republican women tend to do 
slightly better than expected, and the number of ads run by each candidate affects the 
deviation from the normal vote as expected. More importantly, the imagery that 
candidates use has a strong, significant impact on deviations from the normal vote. For 
Democratic candidates, picturing children, seniors, police officers, workers, 
businesspeople, African-Americans and Latinos can have a strong impact on election 
results.  I also find significant results for Republican candidates who use teachers, police 
officers, workers, businesspeople and Latinos. The results of the three-way image 
interactions can be difficult to interpret directly from the regression model.  Both the 
coefficients and the standard errors can be somewhat misleading (Kam and Frazese 
2005).  In order to interpret the results of the model I took a derivative of the regression 
equation with respect to the imagery run by Democrats (and repeated the process for 
Republicans) in order to find the conditional effect of picturing a particular group.   
 Picturing children helps Democratic candidates perform better than the expected 
normal vote (for Republicans, picturing children never has a statistically significant 
impact).  That impact only exists in a small range of districts, though.  Politicians 
surrounding themselves with children may be one of the most prevalent and time-honored 
traditions in American politics, but that does not mean that it is always effective.  The 
results of the three-way image interactions can be difficult to interpret directly from the 
regression model.  Both the coefficients and the standard errors can be somewhat 
                                                 
34 The full regression table as well as a table of conditional effects of imagery can be found in Appendix B. 
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 misleading (Kam and Frazese 2005).  In order to interpret the results of the model I took 
a derivative of the regression equation with respect to the imagery run by Democrats (and 
repeated the process for Republicans) in order to find the conditional effect of picturing a 
particular group.  For nine of the ten groups (children, senior citizens, farmers, blue-
collar workers, businesspeople, soldiers, African-Americans, Latinos, and teachers), the 
imagery of the candidate for at least one party and the ideology of the district combined 
to produce significant deviations from the expected Democratic vote. 
Table 4.6 shows the conditional effects for picturing children. For the top half of 
the table, I have held district ideology constant at its mean and entered the effect of 
imagery for different sizes of the demographic group.35 The bottom half shows the effect 
of imagery as ideology changes and the size of the demographic group is held constant. 
The results in Table 4.6 show that Democrats benefit from picturing children to a 
significant degree. Provided that the population of children in the district is near the mean 
and the ideology of the district is between .45 and .52, then picturing children can have a 
positive impact for Democratic candidates.  The effect of picturing children does not 
change based on the district’s ideology.  As expected, children are appealing regardless 
of the liberal or conservative bent of the district.  It is only in this middle range, though, 
that the effect is statistically significant.  These conditions may sound extreme, but really 
it simply means that Democrats benefit from picturing children only in swing districts.  
These are, of course, exactly the type of districts where campaign effects have the most 
substantive impact since a change of 2 or 3 points on Election Day will mean the 
difference between winning and losing.   
                                                 
35 Table 4.7 shows the effects of image within the range of each group’s size in the sample.  So, for 
example, I have not displayed the effect of picturing senior citizens in a district with 50% seniors or in a 
district where the Democratic share of the presidential vote was less than 30% or more than 60%. 
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 However, these are also the races where candidates are less likely to picture 
children. As I showed earlier in the chapter, both Democrats and Republicans picture 
children more often when they are in extreme liberal and conservative districts, 
respectively. This trend may reflect the tendency for candidates to become more 
substantive or more negative in close elections (Kahn and Kenney 1999). Images of 
children rarely appear in negative ads (Brader 2006), and candidates may resist showing 
children in close elections for fear of looking vapid. Whatever the cause, it seems that 
candidate strategy is exactly the opposite of what it should be.  Candidates in extreme 
districts derive virtually no benefit from picturing children.  On the other hand, 
candidates in swing districts, who truly need every edge they can get, don’t picture 
children as often. Moreover, candidates cannot make up a deficit by simply talking about 
education and childcare issues.  For both Republicans and Democrats, the percentage of 
ads mentioning education and childcare never has a significant impact on deviations from 
the normal vote. 
Indeed, it seems that candidates do not use an efficient advertising strategy in 
general.  Though it can be difficult to make causal generalizations from aggregate data, 
the trend seems to be that the ideology of the district, not the demographic makeup, alters 
the impact of campaign imagery. Earlier I showed that the ideology of the district had 
little impact on the image choices of the candidate.  While it may not affect candidates’ 
strategic choices, there is a significant interaction between imagery and ideology that 
suggests candidates should consider the ideological content of their ad imagery.36  
                                                 
36 For a full layout of the conditional effect of imagery by ideology of district and demographic makeup, 
see Appendix B. 
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 For example, Democratic and Republican candidates both benefited from 
picturing soldiers in conservative leaning districts.37 Figure 4.3 shows the effect of 
picturing soldiers for Republican and Democratic candidates (when viewing these 
figures, keep in mind that the dependent variable on the Y-axis is deviation from the 
normal Democratic vote, so for Republican candidates negative effects actually represent 
an improved electoral performance). The beneficial effects of picturing soldiers only 
existed, however, in districts with an ideological rating less than .5. In more liberal 
districts the effect of picturing soldiers was harmful for both candidates, although the 
effect was not statistically significant. This pattern held for every type of image: the 
direction of the effect of imagery depended on the ideology of the district. Images of 
conservative groups helped candidates in conservative districts and images of liberal 
groups helped candidates in liberal districts. 
In contrast, the demographics of the district seem to modify the effect of images 
in unexpected ways, and no obvious pattern of effects emerges. In one case, images of 
white-collar businesspeople, the relationship between images and demographics is 
exactly as anticipated, when the ideology of the district is held constant. For both 
Democratic and Republican candidates, there is a positive effect of picturing 
businesspeople in areas with a low percentage of blue-collar workers. As the number of 
blue-collar workers increases, the effect of picturing businesspeople goes from positive to 
negative.  
For three other groups, police officers, Latinos and African-Americans, there is a 
positive effect of picturing the group for one or both parties’ candidates; however, only 
                                                 
37 This was especially true following the events of 9/11 and the subsequent Iraq War. Although images of 
soldiers played a minimal role in the 2000 campaign, they increased in frequency beginning in 2002, and 
were subsequently effective in conservative districts in the 02 and 04 campaigns. 
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 the size of the effect changes with the demographics, not the direction. For example, 
Republican candidates get a strong boost from picturing police officers in urban districts, 
and, though this effect diminishes substantially in rural areas, the images still have a 
positive, statistically significant impact. While these results indicate that the 
demographics may have some effect on the impact of campaign imagery, they do not 
really fit with the hypothesis that ads that mirror the demographics of the district are 
more likely to be effective. Even in cases where Latinos made up 5% of the population, 
candidates from both parties seemed to get a boost from picturing Latinos. 
Other types of images also indicate that any explanation of the effects of ad 
imagery needs to go beyond the demographics of the district. For example, Republican 
candidates gain or lose ground by picturing teachers, depending on the nature of the 
district. When the percentage of children in the district (and, presumably, the percentage 
of teachers) is low, the effect of picturing teachers is negative for Republicans. As it 
increases, the effect of picturing teachers becomes positive for Republicans. However, 
the pattern is reversed among Democrats, who only seem to benefit from picturing 
teachers in districts with low levels of children. There does not seem to be an obvious 
reason for a partisan difference in the effects of images. The effects of picturing blue 
collar workers reflect a similar pattern. Democratic candidates gain ground by showing 
workers in areas with a high percentage of blue-collar workers and perform worse when 
they show these images in areas with few workers. Republicans, on the other hand, 
benefit from showing workers only in areas where less than 20% of the population is 
blue-collar. They actually perform worse in districts where they show workers and the 
concentration of blue-collar labor exceeds 20%. 
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 Finally, some types of images seem to defy the expected results for both parties’ 
candidates. For candidates from both parties, the effect of picturing senior citizens and 
farmers appears to be inversely correlated with the size of these groups within the 
electorate. Though the effects are not always significant, in these cases candidates benefit 
from showing the group in their ads only when the group makes up a small portion of 
their constituency. Republicans and Democrats benefit from showing farmers in urban 
areas, but actually seem to do worse when they show farmers in their ads in rural areas. 
Overall, then, the evidence on the relationship of images and demographics is muddled. 
In some cases image effects seem dependent on demographics, but this relationship is 
inconsistent across image types, and in some cases is exactly the opposite of what was 
expected.  
 
4.6: Summary 
As in Chapter 3, the evidence suggests that Congressional candidates make a 
strong effort to have their campaign commercials reflect the make-up of their 
constituency. Unlike direct mail or phone-banking, television ads are targeted to a more 
general audience (Thurber and Nelson 2000). Not surprisingly, it appears that candidates 
try to match the “look” of their constituents as much as possible as they try to make an 
attachment with the general audience. The correlation between demographics and 
campaign imagery holds constant across a number of campaign environments. 
Also, as expected, though there is some correlation between verbal and visual 
appeals, this correlation is far from perfect or absolute. Across three different campaign 
years and many different regions and candidates, there were undoubtedly Vulcans, 
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 Fabulists, Disciplinarians and Multi-taskers designing campaign ads with their own 
beliefs and goals in mind. There is enough disconnect between verbal and visual content 
in campaigns that it seems clear that campaign imagery is designed with certain goals in 
mind that may or may not be related to the verbal content. While concerns about sincerity 
or the necessity of concentrating on a handful of issues (see Chapter 3) may drive the 
design of verbal appeals, visual appeals appear to be more strongly influenced by the 
need to attract favor from certain social identity groups. 
 Although Congressional candidates clearly try to make their ads look like their 
constituents, it is not clear that they always should. In the aggregate, there seems to be 
little evidence to support the notion that voters respond positively to self-congruent 
imagery in campaign ads. This view is a core belief among professional consultants, and 
it seems to be generally held in Congressional campaigns, but the aggregate evidence 
does not support that notion. Making campaign ads that look like the district either hurt 
the candidate or had no effect for a number of different groups. Any explanation of image 
effects, it seems, must go beyond the idea that campaign imagery should mirror the 
demographics of the constituency. 
On the other hand, the ideological content of the campaign’s ad imagery seemed 
to have a significant effect on candidates’ fortunes. In the aggregate, it seems that 
candidates have more success matching the ideological deportment of their constituents 
and putting aside demographic considerations. It seems that candidates would do well to 
think about the policy signal that their images send. To the extent that images can change 
the expected outcome of an election, they appear to do so only when the images send an 
ideological signal acceptable to the voters. 
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 The lack of attention to the ideological substance of campaign imagery is a 
surprising oversight among campaign strategists.  There is ample evidence in advertising 
research to suggest that pictures can convey substantive information to the audience 
(Phillips 2000; McQuarrie and Phillips 2005).  In fact, over 92% of the consultants I 
surveyed in Chapter 3 agreed that images can send a signal about the candidate’s 
ideology. As I showed in Chapter 2, many groups are strongly associated with a 
particular political ideology.  The public, in general, associates senior citizens, 
businesspeople, soldiers, police officers and farmers with conservative political ideology, 
while placing African-Americans, Latinos, teachers, and blue-collar workers on the left 
side of the ideological spectrum. Images are a fast, economical way to deliver 
information, and deliver it in such a way that it bypasses many of an individual’s 
cognitive filters (Petty and Cacioppo 1986). It might seem that candidates would jump at 
the chance to use these groups to send an ideological signal to their constituents. Yet, as 
the previous chapter detailed, campaign strategists appear to focus only on the affective 
impact of picturing a particular group. 
This disconnect between strategy and results is strange, to say the least. Making 
inferences about individual-level responses using this aggregate data risks the Ecological 
Fallacy; however, voters as a whole seem to respond to the substantive message of 
campaign ad imagery. At the same time, most consultants espouse the belief that images 
do transmit a substantive signal. Yet, when it comes time to actually construct the ad and 
launch the campaign, these substantive concerns are cast aside in favor of an affective, 
identity based approach. The information contained in an image is forgotten and any 
influence that information signal might have as part of the ad campaign seems largely 
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 ignored. If the aggregate evidence in this chapter is any indication, it seems that 
Congressional campaigns have approached their campaigns with a strategy that is 
inefficient at best and disastrous at worst. The evidence here indicates that more than a 
few Congressional candidates have spent a large portion of their resources to run ads that 
ultimately hurt them on Election Day. 
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 Chapter 4 Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1: Candidate characteristics 
Democrats Republicans  
Challengers Incumbents Challengers Incumbents 
Overall: 
White 
Latino 
African-American 
Female 
Winners 
Ideology38 
 
183 
156 
15 
10 
47 
37 
-- 
 
132 
116 
4 
10 
16 
120 
-.34 
162 
145 
8 
8 
33 
63 
-- 
194 
156 
2 
1 
24 
185 
.47 
 
Table 4.2: District characteristics 
 Overall average Minimum Maximum 
Pct. Urban 
 
Pct. Over 65 
 
Pct. African-American 
 
Pct. Latino 
 
Pct. Blue-collar 
 
Pct. Veteran 
 
Pct. In school 
 
Ideology39 
 
 
74.5 
(20.1) 
12.5 
(3.2) 
10.1 
(11.9) 
9.8 
(14.0) 
20.2 
(8.8) 
12.2 
(2.6) 
21.1 
(2.2) 
47.5 
(9.5) 
4.0 
 
5.0 
 
0.1 
 
1.0 
 
4.0 
 
3.0 
 
13.0 
 
10.0 
100 
 
28.0 
 
64.0 
 
78.0 
 
42.0 
 
22.0 
 
30.0 
 
91.0 
 
                                                 
38 Ideology here is the average of all candidates as measured by the incumbent’s common-space nominate 
score in the Congress just prior to the election, as compiled by Poole and Rosenthal. 
39 Ideology at the district level is measured as the Democratic share of the two-party vote in the presidential 
election. 
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 Table 4.3: Correlations between constituents and imagery 
  Demographic 
correlations 
Correlations with 
district ideology 
Group pictured Demographics DEM  GOP DEM GOP 
Seniors 
Children 
Farmers 
Police 
Teachers 
Military 
Blue-collar 
workers 
Businesspeople 
Latinos 
African-Americans 
 
% over 65 
% enrolled in school 
% rural 
% urban 
% enrolled in school 
% veterans 
% blue collar 
 
% blue collar 
% Latino 
% African-American 
 
.12* 
.09 
.17** 
.11* 
.02 
.10 
.19** 
 
-.04 
.49** 
.43** 
 
.12** 
-.05 
.16** 
-.03 
.01 
.13** 
.15** 
 
-.05 
.17** 
.27** 
 
.05 
.15** 
-.10 
.05 
-.14** 
-.02 
.17** 
 
.01 
.10 
.19** 
-.03 
-.07 
-.05 
-.08 
-.06 
-.03 
-.13** 
 
.06 
.08 
-.02 
Entries are pairwise correlation coefficients, *p<.1, **p<.05. 
Table 4.4: Correlations between constituents and verbal messages 
  Demographic 
correlations 
Issue mentioned Demographics DEM  GOP 
Senior issues 
Education 
Agriculture 
Crime 
Defense 
Jobs 
Business regulation 
Civil rights 
Civil rights 
 
% over 65 
% enrolled in school 
% rural 
% urban 
% veterans 
% blue collar 
% blue collar 
% Latino 
% African-American 
-.00 
.03 
.12* 
.09 
.23** 
.17** 
.02 
.21** 
-.04 
.14** 
-.01 
.14** 
.10* 
.27** 
.16** 
.03 
.07 
.02 
Entries are pairwise correlation coefficients, *p<.1, **p<.05 
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Table 4.5: Summary of effect of demographics and ideology on image choice 
Group Pictured Demographics Ideological Impact 
Children 
 
 
Senior citizens 
 
 
Farmers 
 
 
Teachers 
 
 
Police officers 
 
 
Workers 
 
 
Businesspeople 
 
 
Soldiers 
 
 
Latinos 
 
 
African-
Americans 
 
Dems--(β=2.32; SE=1.18) 
 
 
Dems--(β=1.10; SE=.62) 
GOP--(β=.72; SE=.44) 
 
Dems--(β=.09; SE=.05) 
GOP--(β=.11; SE=.04) 
 
-- 
 
 
Dems--(β=.05; SE=.02) 
 
 
-- 
 
 
Dems--(β=-.05; SE=.03) 
GOP--(β=-.14; SE=.08) 
 
-- 
 
 
Dems--(β=.96; SE=.21) 
GOP--(β=.21; SE=.08) 
 
Dems--(β=1.14; SE=.20) 
GOP--(β=.66; SE=.17) 
 
Dems--(β=.44; SE=.21) 
GOP--(β=-.44; SE=.25) 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
Dems--(β=.54; SE=.19) 
GOP--(β=-.32; SE=.16) 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
Dems--(β=.24; SE=.13) 
 
 
-- 
 Table 4.6: Conditional effect of picturing children 
  Children 
 % of children within district DEM GOP 
Ideology of district 
held constant at .50 
 
.10 
 
.15 
 
.20 
 
.25 
 
 
.13 
(-.03, .3) 
.09 
(-.01, .17) 
.04 
(.01, .08) 
-.00 
(-.1, .09) 
 
-.04 
(-.31, .22) 
.01 
(-.04, .06) 
.01 
(-.03, .06) 
.06 
(-.16, .29) 
 
 Ideology of district DEM GOP 
Pct. of children held 
constant at 20% 
.35 
 
.40 
 
.45 
 
.50 
 
.55 
 
.60 
 
.65 
 
.07 
(-.00, .14) 
.06 
(.00, .11) 
.05 
(.01, .09) 
.04 
(.00, .08) 
.03 
(-.01, .08) 
.02 
(-.04, .09) 
.01 
(-.07, .10) 
 
-.00 
(-.06, .05) 
.00 
(-.04, .04) 
.01 
(-.03, .04) 
.01 
(-.04, .06) 
.01 
(-.05, .08) 
.02 
(-.06, .10) 
.02 
(-.08, .12) 
Entries in each cell are the effect of picturing a particular group given the ideology and 
demographic make-up of the district with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses.  
Note that the dependent variable in the regression is deviations from the normal 
Democratic share of the 2-party vote. When interpreting effects, therefore, Republican 
candidates actually benefit when the effect is negative, since this implies that the image is 
lowering the Democratic vote. 
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 Figure 4.1: Percentage of candidates picturing each group, by year and party 
Republican Candidates 
 
 
Democratic Candidates 
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 Figure 4.2: Percentage of candidates mentioning each issue, by year and party 
Republican candidates 
 
 
Democratic Candidates 
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 Figure 4.3: Effect of picturing soldiers on normal Democratic vote 
Democratic candidates 
       
 
Republican candidates 
 
Figure shows effect of picturing soldiers bounded by 95% confidence intervals 
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 Chapter 5: Observed Impact of Imagery at the Individual Level 
5.1: Introduction 
The evidence from congressional campaigns strongly indicates that campaigns are 
run with an eye toward identity politics, building affective ties with voters by picturing 
groups that the voter identifies with.  Congressional candidates shape their ads to look 
like their constituencies in order to build up the idea that they are in touch with their 
constituents’ needs and problems. The question remains, however, how do voters actually 
use campaign imagery? Do they simply respond positively to self-congruent imagery or 
do they use images as information and attempt to draw inferences about the candidate 
based on the candidate’s campaign images? In Chapter 2 I outlined three hypotheses of 
campaign image effects: 
1) The Identity Hypothesis: When a candidate pictures a visually recognizable 
member of an occupational or demographic group, voters who are a member of 
that group will notice and respond more favorably to the candidate than when the 
candidate does not picture such a member.  
 
2) The Group Support Hypothesis: When a candidate pictures a visually 
recognizable member of an occupational or demographic group, voters will 
interpret that image as a message that the candidate favors that group. 
 
3) The Ideology Hypothesis: Picturing groups widely perceived as conservative 
will cause voters to view the candidate as more conservative and picturing groups 
perceived as liberal should make voters view the candidate as more liberal. 
 
The evidence from chapters 3 and 4 suggests that campaign ads are designed to 
appeal to identity groups by using congruent imagery to build affective bonds between 
the candidate and the voter. Campaign strategy, for the most part, assumes that the 
Identity Hypothesis actually works. Campaign consultants, in general, believe that 
individuals react positively to self-congruent images: Latinos like to see Latinos, farmers 
like to see farmers, etc. At the end of the last chapter I looked at the effect of advertising 
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 on aggregate election returns.  There was strong support for the Ideology Hypothesis, but 
little support for the Identity Hypothesis, despite the professional belief in the importance 
of the latter. On the whole, it seems that the effectiveness of campaign images was 
strongly linked to the ideology of the district, rather than the district’s demographics. 
Though it is not conclusive, the aggregate evidence suggests that voters react to campaign 
visuals as though they were substantive messages and they supported (or opposed) a 
candidate based on how they viewed those messages.  
In this chapter, I investigate reactions to congressional campaign advertising at 
the individual level using survey data and campaign data from the 2000 House elections. 
The aggregate analysis could conceal a number of important relationships at the 
individual level. Of course, cross-sectional survey analysis cannot definitively prove the 
causal story I am investigating. Campaigns are a dynamic process, and the process I 
describe involves voters viewing campaign ads and learning about the candidate over the 
course of several months worth of ads. However, the observational data in this chapter 
helps shed light on those how identity, partisanship and policy beliefs affect individual 
reactions to campaign imagery. Though these data are not without limitations, they 
provide evidence that voters use images to make judgments about candidates, and that the 
effects of ad imagery may make it a critical tool within the campaign. 
 
5.2: Imagery in Congressional campaigns 
In order to determine how voters responded to these ads, I used data from the 
2000, post-election National Annenberg Election Study and the Congressional data from 
2000 described in the previous chapter.  I matched respondents from the NAES with their 
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 Congressional district, and the media market in which they lived. This survey is ideal for 
campaign effect research because it has a large national sample with respondents from 
every district where a candidate ran campaign ads in 2000.  The NAES is also useful 
because it asks questions about a wide range of attitudes and opinions which cover the 
interests of the groups I am interested in.  I have used the demographic and issue 
questions in the survey in order to estimate the partisan and issue positions of the voter, 
as well as the groups that he or she might identify with.  The attitude and identity 
variables are laid out in Table 5.1.  In each case, the issue variables are measured on a -1 
to 1 scale where positive values represent support of the group and negative values 
represent opposition to the group. Most of these questions deal specifically with spending 
or direct benefits that favor a group, though a few items are more oblique.40 Items 
tapping support for senior citizens, children, teachers and soldiers all relate directly to 
support for government spending on programs for these groups. Similarly, support f
African-Americans is measured as a respondent’s support for preferential hiring 
practices. While there is no survey item directly capturing benefits for workers, t
feeling thermometer capturing a respondent’s support for labor unions. Final
businesspeople, police officers and Latinos, I have used items that ask whether or not a 
respondent is concerned about a particular problem.  
or 
here is a 
ly, for 
                                                
While the Annenberg survey was primarily designed to look at effects from the 
presidential campaign, it does include several questions about Congressional candidates 
as well.  While it does not ask respondents about candidates’ issue positions it does make 
them rate candidates on a 0-100 feeling thermometer, which will be the primary 
 
40 Unfortunately, there were no items on the survey about agricultural issues. In the ensuing analyses I have 
used an interaction between images and partisanship to analyze the effect of picturing farmers. 
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 dependent variable for all the analyses in this chapter. I am primarily interested in 
determining how a candidate’s campaign images affect respondents’ feelings toward the 
candidate.  If my hypotheses about the effect of images are correct, then I should be able 
to see a measurable difference between reactions from different respondents, based on 
their identity and political predispositions.   
While there is no direct measurement of how a respondent interprets images, the 
message of the image can be inferred based on the respondent’s reaction.  All else being 
equal, respondents should like a candidate more when his visual message matches the 
respondent’s political predispositions. So Republican respondents, all else being equal, 
should respond more favorably to images of conservative groups, Democrats should 
respond favorably to images of liberal groups, and individuals, in general, should respond 
favorably when they support benefits for the group being pictured. The favorability scale 
is an indirect measure of substantive inferences, but it is also a fairly difficult standard to 
meet. In order to see significant effects from images, respondents will have to use the 
images to make an inference about the candidate’s positions and those positions will have 
to be important enough to the respondents to see differences in favorability across 
respondents beyond what might be expected from partisanship and issue beliefs. 
Moreover, there should be a ceiling effect when examining the effect of campaign images 
on partisan respondents. Democratic (or Republican) respondents should rank 
Democratic (or Republican) candidates high on the feeling thermometer on the basis of 
partisan identification. There is a strict limit, then, on how much more the respondent can 
like the candidate based on the campaign. Following a procedure outlined by Ridout, et 
al. (2004), I have separated the sample based on an approximate measure of ad exposure.  
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 This measure is simply the natural log of the product of the number of ads run by a 
candidate in a respondent’s district multiplied by the number of days per week that the 
respondent watched local and network news coverage.  In their paper, Ridout, et. al. find 
that measuring ad exposure as a function of the respondent’s television viewing habits is 
a far more effective measure than self-reported interest or simply the raw number of ads 
run in the respondent’s area.  Unfortunately, the Annenberg survey does not contain 
information on all of the programs that those authors suggest using; however, I can 
approximate ad exposure using local and network viewing habits.  In 2000, almost two-
thirds of House ads ran during local and network news.  In addition, programs saturated 
with ads (such as Jeopardy and Wheel of Fortune) generally air either just before or just 
after local news programming.  I used news viewing habits as a proxy for campaign 
exposure. After computing the respondents’ exposure scores, I grouped all respondents 
by quartile and labeled the lowest quartile as the minimal exposure group.  The difference 
between the minimal exposure group and the rest of the sample is a dramatic drop in the 
number of significant ad effects, which is to be expected.  In the results section, I drop the 
minimal exposure group from the analysis and concentrate on the reactions of 
respondents who had a medium to high level of ad exposure.  
 
5.3: Imagery’s effect on Congressional candidates 
To begin, I calculated a simple correlation between use of a particular image and 
favorability ratings of congressional candidates. I examine the effect of campaign 
imagery separately for Republicans and Democrats in order to determine any partisan 
differences in the efficacy of images or issues.  I also limited my analysis to white, male 
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 candidates in order to avoid conflating the race and gender of the candidate with effects 
from the campaign ads.41  Female and minority candidates present a different image than 
their male counterparts and voters respond differently to women and minority candidates 
(McDermott 1998), and it is important to keep the candidates in this analysis as uniform 
as possible. Theoretically, campaign imagery should have similar effects for all 
candidates regardless of race or gender, but I felt it important to eliminate a potential 
confound. 
Table 5.2 shows the results of the raw correlation.42  Each entry in the table is a 
pairwise correlation coefficient.  As the table shows, there is little evidence of a simple 
correlation between image use and favorability. Out of the 36 correlations, only 6 are 
statistically significant. More importantly, there is little evidence of a simple affective tie 
between respondents and campaign imagery.  Members of a group do not appear to like a 
candidate simply because he or she pictures that group.  In fact, for Republican 
candidates the only significant correlations between image use and favorability occur 
among respondents who are not members of the group being pictured.  
 Of course, the simple correlation analysis is limited in many ways.  A number of 
factors may play into a respondent’s evaluation of the candidate, and many of those 
factors may be correlated with social identities.  However, the lack of a simple 
                                                 
41 This does cull the sample quite a bit. There were roughly 2200 respondents who actually lived in a 
district where a House candidate from either major party ran television ads. Looking only at races with 
male candidates also meant dropping more than 800 respondents, and more respondents were dropped to 
negligible levels of ad exposure. Fortunately, the NAES post-election data carries enough respondents to 
eliminate a substantial number of respondents and still be left with a reasonably large sample.  
42 Unfortunately, the Annenberg survey does not contain a variable for whether or not the respondent or 
anyone in the respondent’s family was a police officer. Though this is included in some of the larger 
occupation codes, the category for police officers includes a wide variety of service jobs (including waiters 
and hairdressers) and it would be inappropriate to use this variable as a measure of group identity. Hence, 
images of police are excluded from Table 5.2. In the subsequent regression analysis, the estimates of the 
effect of police imagery are modeled alongside other ingroup models, but actually include all respondents. 
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 relationship suggests that something more subtle than just group identification is taking 
place. 
In order to investigate the impact of imagery, I estimated a series of regression 
models using each type of group imagery as the main independent variable and the 
favorability rating scale as the dependent variable.43  I model a respondent’s feeling 
toward a candidate as a three-way interaction between the amount of time a candidate 
pictures a group, the respondent’s predisposition toward that group and the respondent’s 
partisan identification.  I assume that respondents who favor benefits for a group will 
react positively to seeing images of that group in a candidate’s ad.  By the same token, 
partisans should react to ideological signals that connect with their party identification. 
Republicans should feel more warmly toward candidates who run conservative images, 
and Democrats should favor candidates who run liberal images. For example, I interact 
the percentage of ads where a candidate pictures seniors, the respondent’s attitude toward 
Medicare and Social Security and the respondent’s party. Moreover, I model the results 
separately for members within the group and those outside the group.  In theory, those 
within the group will react differently because they have an affective connection with 
similar images. At the same time, visual images are almost always accompanied by some 
kind of verbal message, and these messages may add to, or detract from, the impact of the 
visual cues. As with the visual messages, I interacted verbal messages with the 
respondent’s beliefs about an issue and his or her partisan identification. 
                                                 
43 In a separate analysis, I modeled favorability with all images and interactions in the same equation, with 
no substantive change in results. 
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 I also want to control for several factors that may influence a respondent’s 
feelings about a candidate including: incumbency, gender, ideology44 of the respondent, 
whether or not the respondent lives in the south and how much the respondent reads the 
newspaper.45  I have also included a measure of the difference between the sizes of the 
candidates’ ad buys.  I subtracted the number of Republican ads from the number of 
Democratic ads within a given Congressional district. A positive value, then, indicates 
that the Democratic candidate ran more ads.  For Democratic candidates there should be a 
direct relationship between this variable and the favorability of the candidate; while there 
should be an inverse relationship between favorability and the ad difference for 
Republican candidates. In other words, when the Democrat runs more ads he or she 
should be viewed more favorably, and when the Republican candidate runs more ads he 
or she should receive higher favorability ratings. In addition to capturing an advertising 
gap that may allow one candidate’s message to resonate with voters, the ad gap variable 
also serves as a proxy for campaign spending so it is not surprising that the variable 
indicates that those who spend more on advertising ts are viewed more favorably by the 
voters. So, for example, to find the effect of picturing seniors I estimated the model: 
(1) Favorability= β0 + β1 × % of ads with seniors + β2 × disposition towards 
seniors + β3 × respondent’s party identification + β4 × dispositiontowardseniors × 
%seniorimage+ β5 × dispositiontowardseniors × partisan id+ β6 × 
dispositiontowardseniors × %seniorimage × partisan id+ β7 × % of ads mention 
senior issues + β8 × disposition towards seniors× +β9 × dispositiontowardseniors 
× %seniorissuemention× partisan id + β10 × incumbency + β11 × respondent’s 
ideology + β12 × south + β13 × female+ β14 × newspaper habits + β15 × relative 
number of Democratic ads + e 
 
                                                 
44 Partisanship is measured using the standard 7 point scale, while ideology is measured using a five point 
scale.  The scales in the Annenberg study are constructed such that liberal is on the high end of the ideology 
scale, while Democrats are on the low end of the partisan scale, hence the coefficients on these variables 
have opposite signs in the regression models that follow. 
45 Newspaper habits are included as a proxy for general interest in current events. 
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 Unfortunately, the only Democratic candidates who ran images of businesspeople in 2000 
were either women or minorities, which means that I cannot estimate the impact of white-
collar images in Democratic ads.  At the same time, no Republican Congressional 
candidate mentioned civil rights or explicit racial issues during the 2000 campaign.  
Accordingly, I have dropped the verbal measures when looking at the effects of racial 
imagery in Republican ads. 
 Tables 3a and 3b show the results of the regression analysis.  For 9 out of the 10 
groups that I examine, the images have a significant conditional effect given the 
predispositions of the respondent, although the images are not significant for candidates 
of both parties in some cases.  The lone exception seems to be police officers, where I 
found no significant effects from imagery.  It should be noted that this is also the only 
group where I was unable to control for the affective connection that members of a group 
might feel.  In general, it seems that membership in a group enhances the impact of 
showing that group in a campaign ad.  For all 9 groups where group membership could 
be established, there is a significant effect of imagery for at least one party’s candidate.  
There is also some evidence to indicate that images had a substantively larger 
impact on members of the group, though simply being a member of group does not 
guarantee a positive response.   Within groups the partisanship and issue positions of the 
respondent mitigated the effect of campaign imagery.  While members of a group may 
have been generally predisposed to respond to an image, their overall response to the 
image depended on their own political views.  Interpreting results from a three-way 
regression can be difficult, and the standard errors of regression coefficients in such a 
model can actually be misleading (Kam and Franseze, 2005).  In order to explain the 
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 impact of images, I have calculated predicted values for each image type, varying the 
images used in the campaign, partisanship and issue position of the respondent while 
holding all other values at their mean. I have calculated values as image and party vary, 
while holding the issues position at its neutral point (0), and then calculated predicted 
values varying images and issue positions while holding party identification constant at 
an independent value (4) and all other variables at their mean.46 
 To begin with, consider the only group I examine that has no obvious ideological 
affiliation: children.  Images of children are ubiquitous in campaign advertising.  The 
baby-kissing politician is a cliché for a reason (see Chapter 4).  Obviously, children 
cannot vote, but their parents can, and the parental designation is a strong social identity 
(Hoffman and Hoffman 1973). I find that candidates can benefit from picturing children, 
but only if the respondent is a parent with children at home, and even then the 
individual’s reaction varies according to his or her beliefs.  Figure 5.1 shows predicted 
feeling thermometer values for Republican candidates picturing children.  The first two 
graphs show the predicted feeling thermometer scores for non-parents.  Whether varying 
the issue position or the partisanship of the respondent along with the imagery the result 
is basically a flat plane. Partisanship and attitudes on education may affect attitudes 
toward the candidate, but the campaign images of children seem to have no effect.   
Turning to parents, on the other hand, there is a significant difference in the 
feelings toward the candidate, depending on the predisposition of the parent and the use 
of children. As I hypothesized in Chapter 2, campaign images do have a stronger effect 
on members of the group.  However, picturing children does not necessarily benefit the 
                                                 
46 In all of the subsequent figures, the x axis represents the percentage of time that the group was pictured 
in a candidate’s ads, the z axis represents the predicted value of the feeling thermometer, and the y axis 
represents either the respondent’s partisanship or the respondent’s issue position. 
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 candidate.  Parents may be more likely to be influenced by imagery of children, but their 
reactions to a candidate who pictures children are based on their own political 
predispositions. Simply picturing members of the group, then, is no guarantee of support 
from the group itself, even with a group as innocuous and inoffensive as children.  
Children represent a policy signal of spending government resources on aid to children, 
and parents responded based on their views of those types of programs.  A candidate who 
pictured children in 100% of his ads would see a 22 point drop in support among 
independent parents who opposed increases in education spending, although this would 
be offset somewhat by an 11 point increase in support among independent parents who 
support education spending. The results in Figure 5.3 demonstrate a rational response 
from voters to an inference made about the candidate based on the images the candidate 
used in the campaign, not merely an affective one. 
Oddly, there is also an apparent partisan effect among parents.  When support for 
education spending is held at 0, the neutral point, Democratic parents react seem to 
punish candidates for picturing children, while Republicans reward candidates.  This 
partisan result does not seem to be evidence that children provide an ideological signal, 
though.  When the candidate is a Democrat, the partisan pattern for picturing children is 
reversed.  It seems that members of a candidate’s own party respond well to the non-
ideological, happy image of children (all else being equal), but punish candidates of the 
opposite party.  Democrats like to see Democratic candidates picture children, and 
Republicans like to see Republican candidates doing the same, but neither type of 
partisan wants to see the other side picturing children. This may be evidence of an 
emotional response to imagery. In some ways this is evidence that images of children do 
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 elicit enthusiasm (Brader, 2005), and Brader found that enthusiastic emotional responses 
often strengthened pre-existing views. Though there is only a significant impact among 
parents, in the case of an obviously positive image like children it seems there is an 
emotional, enthusiastic response. The positive image re-enforces an existing partisan 
connection between the voter and the candidate.   
In the last chapter I demonstrated that, in the aggregate, candidates seemed to 
benefit from picturing children in swing districts.  At the individual level, however, it 
seems that it is partisans, not necessarily swing voters, who are most affected by images 
of children.  Independent voters may respond favorably or unfavorably to images of 
children, depending on their own political views. In fact, campaign commercials tend to 
include children when the candidate is running in a favorable ideological environment. In 
the previous chapter I showed that both Republicans and Democrats pictured children 
more often in more conservative and more liberal districts, respectively. To the extent 
that individual partisans respond favorably to their party’s candidate using children, it 
seems that candidates may be correct in using this approach. For candidates in more 
heavily contested districts, the decision to picture children or not is more complex and 
depends a great deal on the political predispositions of the voters the candidate is trying 
to reach. Candidates who need support from independent voters in order to win an 
election must consider where those voters stand on issues like education spending before 
deciding whether or not to picture children in their ads. 
Of course, children are unique because they are an ideologically neutral group. 
Groups with an ideological reputation yielded somewhat different results. Images of 
senior citizens, farmers, teachers, workers, businesspeople, soldiers and African-
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 Americans provoked positive and negative reactions based on the political views of the 
respondent. Two important trends stand out for these groups.  First, members of a group 
generally had more extreme reactions to images of the group than non-members, though 
these reactions were not necessarily positive.  Members of a group only reacted positively 
to self-congruent images if they had a partisan or issue belief in line with the group. 
Reactions among voters who were not a member of the group being pictured were often 
statistically insignificant. Second, some voters had a significant reaction to campaign 
imagery that did not reflect their own identity, but this was almost always a positive 
reaction. Statistically significant, negative reactions to imagery came among respondents 
viewing self-congruent images were relatively common. Few respondents who saw an 
identity group that did not reflect their own identity punished the candidate for picturing 
that group.  
For example, Figure 5.2 shows the predicted values of Republican and 
Democratic candidates who pictured senior citizens. Seniors are viewed as a conservative 
group, and picturing this group sends an ideologically conservative signal.  As expected, 
both Republican and Democratic voters respond to a conservative signal by embracing or 
rejecting the candidate, respectively. For Democratic candidates who show seniors in all 
of their ads there is a predicted 23 point drop in favorability among strong Democratic 
seniors and a 16 point increase in favorability among strong Republican seniors.   
Those interactions, of course, account for the respondent’s partisanship and the 
ideological signal that the image represents.  The image also represents a message of 
support for the group.  For members of the group, the respondent’s support for group 
benefits strongly influences his or her response to an image.  To return to Figure 5.2, 
 118
 independent senior citizen voters who support increased spending on Social Security and 
Medicare reacted favorably to candidates who pictured seniors, but those who oppose 
increases actually punished candidates for picturing seniors.  Not surprisingly, most 
seniors in the NAES (62.4%) supported an increase in senior benefits; however, not all 
members of a group support selective benefits for the group.  Senior citizens did not 
simply respond and blindly identify with candidates who pictured seniors.  They 
responded based on their own policy beliefs. A Republican candidate who pictured senior 
citizens in all of his ads would expect to see a 22 point drop in favorability among seniors 
opposed to increased benefits when compared to a candidate who never pictured 
seniors.47 
On the other hand, non-senior independent voters maintained the same level of 
support for candidates who pictured seniors regardless of their own feelings about Social 
Security and Medicare spending.  While the interaction between the respondent’s 
partisanship and the ideological signal was significant, the interaction between feelings 
toward group benefits and the image was important only when the respondent was a 
member of the group. At that, images of seniors seemed to help candidates among non-
senior citizens, and never had a statistically significant negative impact on candidate 
favorability. There is only a 1 point decrease among strong Democratic non-seniors for 
Democratic candidates picturing senior citizens, and a 10 point increase among strong 
Republican non-seniors.   
 A similar pattern occurs in Figure 5.3, which shows the effect of picturing 
African-Americans. White strong Democrats reacted positively to Republican candidates 
who pictured African-Americans in their ads; otherwise, there was no statistically 
                                                 
47 A Democratic candidate would experience a similar 21 point drop in favorability. 
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 significant response among white voters. When Democrats pictured African-Americans, 
they received a small boost in favorability among white voters who support benefits for 
African-Americans, but otherwise there was no significant reaction. In other words, while 
candidates could benefit by showing African-Americans with some respondents, they 
never seemed to hurt themselves by doing so. Candidates who pictured blacks never saw 
a backlash from white voters. 
On the other hand, African-American voters responded to Republicans and 
Democrats picturing them in campaign ads in line with their partisan views and beliefs 
about government aid to blacks. Independent African-Americans opposed to programs 
like Affirmative Action had a strong negative reaction to images of blacks in campaign 
ads, while blacks who support government aid favored the candidate more when the 
campaign ads pictured blacks. Favorability also varied according to partisanship. 
Democrats who pictured blacks received a 35 point bump in favorability among strong 
Democrats by picturing African-Americans in all of their ads.  
This difference in reactions between members and non-members is puzzling. 
Either members of the group are interpreting images in a different manner (e.g. Senior 
citizens see images of seniors as a message about support for seniors, while non-seniors 
do not), or non-members may not view the visual signal as important enough to change 
their feelings about the candidate (e.g. Non-seniors view images of seniors as a message 
of support, but simply don’t care about the issues of Social Security and Medicare). 
While the significant interaction between issue positions and campaign imagery makes it 
possible to infer that voters used campaign images as a substantive cue, it is more 
difficult to interpret a null result. Unfortunately, because the NAES does not ask 
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 respondents them to rate the issue positions of Congressional candidates, it is impossible 
to determine whether voters failed to receive a message from campaign imagery, or 
simply failed to use it in their overall evaluations of the candidate.  
 For the most part, the pattern of results with senior and African-American 
imagery repeats itself with each group pictured: members of the group react to the 
ideological signal and the policy signal an image represents, while non-members tend to 
react in a positive manner, or not at all. Few respondents simply reacted positively to an 
image they identified with.  There was one exception to this pattern, however. Latinos 
responded positively to images that they could identify with regardless of their own 
political beliefs. In Figure 5.4 you can see the predicted favorability ratings for 
candidates who picture Latinos.   
Regardless of partisanship or political attitudes, Latinos responded favorably to 
Democratic candidates who pictured Latinos in their ads. Democratic candidates who 
pictured Latinos in all of their ads could expect a 30 points increase in favorability among 
Latino voters. Similarly, Latinos responded favorably to Republican candidates who used 
Latinos in their television ads. There is some indication that strong Democratic Latinos or 
Latinos with liberal view on immigration responded more to these images, but all Latinos 
responded positively. Strong Republican Latinos did not warm to Republican candidates 
who pictured Latinos (the differences in predicted values were not statistically 
significant), but there is no evidence of the backlash I found among other groups.   
Instead, some white respondents seemed to have a negative reaction to campaign 
images of Latinos. The interaction between images and partisanship is non-significant for 
both Republican and Democratic candidates, but some respondents had a strong negative 
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 response based on their attitudes on immigration. The interaction between attitudes on 
immigration and images of Latinos seems to be in the wrong direction for candidates of 
both parties.  Those with liberal attitudes on immigration tended to like the candidate less 
when the campaign ads pictured Latinos while those with conservative attitudes on the 
issue liked the candidate more. This odd pattern may simply indicate that attitudes on 
immigration are a poor proxy for support for policies that favor the Latino community. It 
may be that I have simply failed to properly identify respondents’ attitudes on benefits for 
Latinos, and therefore the estimates of the effect of Latino imagery should be somewhat 
suspect. Given that the pattern of responses among both Latinos and non-Latinos does not 
fit with other group responses to campaign imagery it seems the probability of error due 
to an invalid measurement seems somewhat high. 
While the pattern of effects from visual appeals is fairly straightforward, the 
verbal content of campaign ads seems to have a much higher variance both in terms of its 
influential power and its positive and negative results.  In the regressions in Table 5.3, 
few of the verbal messages show a significant impact on a candidate’s favorability, and 
many that did have a significant impact also carried substantial risk for the candidate.  In 
Figure 5.5, I calculated predicted values for Democratic and Republican candidates using 
mentions of Social Security and Medicare.  There are no statistically significant 
differences as a result of mentioning the issue for either seniors or non-seniors Each of 
the figures show flat planes, with changes in favorability due to partisanship or issue 
position, but not due to the issues mentioned by the candidate. Keep in mind that showing 
senior citizens had a significant effect on feelings toward candidates from both parties 
with both seniors and non-seniors.  On the other hand, merely talking about seniors’ 
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 issues had no real impact on most respondents.  The only significant result seems to be 
that Democratic candidates who talked about Social Security or Medicare lost ground 
among Republican voters under 65. It seems that while images of seniors are strongly 
associated with conservatism and, therefore, appealing to Republican respondents, the 
issues associated with seniors are actually unpopular with the same group.  
The results from the regression analysis on verbal appeals seem to support the 
consultant notion that “Pictures work…Words lead to arguments.” Unlike the visual 
messages, verbal appeals frequently elicited negative reactions from some voters. Though 
a handful of verbal issue appeals may have helped candidates in certain circumstances, 
many (such as Republican and Democratic appeals on national defense and education) 
led to a significant backlash among respondents, depending on their beliefs about a 
particular issue. This backlash extended beyond members of the immediately affected 
group. For example, Republican appeals on education had a negative effect on candidate 
favorability among those who oppose education spending, regardless of whether the 
respondents had children in school. 
 
5.4: Summary 
 In this chapter, I have presented evidence on the impact of campaign imagery at 
the individual level. The political attitudes and partisanship of the voter help determine 
how the voter reacts to an image.  At the same time, voters may be learning far more 
about the candidates than previous research focusing on verbal appeals has demonstrated. 
Voters view images of groups as an implicit message of support for that group.  When the 
voter likes the group, she rewards the candidate for supporting that group; when she 
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 opposes that group she is more likely to punish the candidate for implicitly supporting it.  
Images also tell the voter something about the candidate’s ideology and partisans respond 
to signals of liberalism and conservatism consistent with their party identification. Images 
in congressional campaign ads may actually send a sincere signal about behavior (Sulkin 
and Swigger 2008), and the results from this chapter indicate that voters use these signals 
to make judgments, which would indicate that a visual dialogue of sorts between voters 
and candidates is taking place in congressional campaigns. Intentionally or not, 
candidates deliver information to the voters in the ad images they use, and voters use that 
information to make decisions.  
 The evidence also suggests that campaign strategists have, at best, an incomplete 
view of how voters respond to campaign images.  Identity politics only goes so far.  
Campaign consultants choose pictures that look like a constituency in order to build an 
affective connection with the candidate based on group identity.  This tactic however 
could backfire and cost a candidate vote if the candidate does not take into account the 
political views of his constituents.  Congruent imagery may attract a voter’s attention, but 
that attention is only useful if the visual message actually appeals to the voter.  Parents 
may respond more to images of children than non-parents; however, large swaths of those 
parents (opposing partisans and parents opposed to education spending) will actually be 
turned off by images of children.  A careless candidate who does not account for these 
factors may baby-kiss his way to a loss on Election Day. 
 The results here are subject to some important limitations.  Most importantly, this 
chapter uses cross-sectional survey data and only looks at one election cycle.  Campaign 
messages, and views of candidates, may change over time within and between elections. 
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 The campaign is a process, and the post-election data presented here do not necessarily 
capture that whole process. More importantly, unobserved campaign activities or external 
factors may also affect voter perceptions of candidates. Ultimately, the regression results 
here cover a wide range of candidates and campaigns. Though I have restricted the 
analysis to a relatively homogenous group of candidates (white males), there is 
undoubtedly a great deal of variance within that group.  
With that limitation in mind, the size of substantive imagery effects across 
candidates and campaigns is substantial, and I am confident that the results here will be 
robust across subsequent campaign cycles. For most voters, Congressional candidates 
receive very little attention, and few have the opportunity to learn a great deal about the 
candidates they vote for (Valentino, Hutchings and Williams 2004).  For those voters the 
campaign images could have an even larger impact since they may very well form the 
bulk of the information a voter receives about the candidate. 
 At best, though, the data in this chapter suggests that campaign images affect 
voter feelings about candidates, and there is indirect evidence that voters are drawing 
substantive inferences from campaign imagery. It does not tell us, however, why there 
seems to be a difference in reactions among identity groups. Why would African-
Americans respond to self-congruent imagery while whites view images of blacks and 
only respond positively or not at all? Do different identity groups draw different 
inferences, or are these inferences just more important to members of the group being 
pictured?  
This seems to be a critical distinction and, unfortunately, the survey data are 
incapable of deciding the question. If all voters, regardless of social identity use images 
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 to make the same inferences, then the amount of information conveyed in campaign ads 
has been vastly underestimated in previous examinations of campaign effects. Assuming 
images convey substantive information to all voters then even relatively shallow positive 
ads that do not feature a candidate discussing policy issues may actually teach the voter 
something about the candidate. On the other hand, if different voters vary in how they 
interpret images, then this would imply that previous research has been correct to focus 
on the impact of images on social identity groups. If the only people who react to an 
image are the people represented in that image, then that implies the existence of a strong 
affective component to interpretations of campaign imagery. If that is true, then it would 
seem that self-congruence is a necessary condition in order to elicit responses to 
campaign imagery, though the evidence in this chapter suggests that such congruence is 
not sufficient on its own to guarantee a positive response from the voter. In the next 
chapter I present experimental data that investigates and tests the effect of images in a 
controlled environment in order to get a better sense of how the individual responds to 
campaign imagery and try to answer these lingering questions. 
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Chapter 5 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 5.1: measures for dispositions towards groups 
Group Attitude measure Group variable 
Seniors 
 
Children 
Farmers 
Teachers 
Police 
Soldiers 
 
Workers 
 
Businesspeople 
 
Blacks 
 
Latinos 
Spending on Medicare and 
Social Security 
Spending on education 
-- 
Spending on education 
Concern about crime 
Spending on national 
defense 
0-100: favorability of 
unions 
Concern about regulation 
of business 
Preferential hiring for 
blacks 
Concern about immigration 
Age 
 
Parents with children living at home 
Living in rural area 
Parents with children living at home 
-- 
Member of the family in military 
 
Member of the family in labor union 
 
White-collar management 
occupation 
African-American 
 
Latino 
 
  
Table 5.2: Correlations between images and favorability 
 Democratic candidates Republican candidates 
 Ingroup Outgroup Ingroup Outgroup 
Seniors 
 
Children 
 
Farmers 
 
Teachers 
 
Soldiers 
 
Workers 
 
Businesspeople 
 
African-Americans 
 
Latinos 
.03 
(149) 
-.03 
(277) 
-.02 
(232) 
-.03 
(277) 
.08 
(316) 
.01 
(143) 
-- 
 
.40** 
(30) 
.44** 
(33) 
 
-.00 
(584) 
.06 
(456) 
-.05 
(501) 
-.01 
(456) 
.03 
(417) 
.04 
(590) 
-- 
 
.03 
(703) 
.05 
(700) 
.03 
(142) 
-.00 
(293) 
-.04 
(218) 
.07 
(293) 
.05 
(431) 
.11 
(150) 
.10 
(65) 
-.05 
(41) 
.05 
(31) 
-.02 
(687) 
.08* 
(586) 
-.09** 
(661) 
.05 
(586) 
.05 
(448) 
.08** 
(720) 
.06 
(814) 
.03 
(838) 
.07** 
(848) 
Cell entries are pairwise correlation coefficients. *p<.1, **p<.05 with number of 
respondents in parentheses 
 
 Table 5.3a: Links between demographic groups and favorability-Ingroups 
(continued on next page) 
 Seniors Children Farmers Teachers Police 
 DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP 
% w/ Images 
 
Disposition towards group 
 
Partisan ID 
 
Images×Disposition towards 
group 
Images×Party ID 
 
Party ID×Disposition towards 
group  
Images×Disposition towards 
group×Party ID 
 
% w/ Issue 
 
Issue×Disposition towards 
group 
Issue×Party ID 
 
Issues×Disposition towards 
group×Party ID 
 
Incumbent 
 
Ideology 
 
South 
 
Newspaper habits 
 
Female 
 
Ad gap between Dem. And Rep. 
Candidates 
 
Constant 
 
N 
R2 
-29.77 
(24.12) 
4.53 
(15.70) 
-6.31** 
(2.91) 
36.24 
(30.20) 
6.51 
(4.97) 
-.56 
(3.86) 
-4.75 
(6.36) 
 
13.61 
(17.85) 
-64.13** 
(24.38) 
-7.00* 
(3.17) 
15.45** 
(4.94) 
 
9.97** 
(4.76) 
4.80** 
(2.62) 
-3.09 
(4.57) 
-.06 
(.84) 
3.66 
(4.54) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
64.40 
(14.45) 
149 
.37 
-35.78 
(30.57) 
-24.54 
(23.70) 
.76 
(3.94) 
58.12* 
(40.77) 
5.33 
(6.01) 
4.64 
(5.69) 
-9.56 
(8.38) 
 
-12.46 
(27.05) 
18.65 
(37.16) 
3.32 
(5.04) 
-5.95 
(8.21) 
 
2.29 
(5.43) 
-.13 
(3.33) 
-4.64 
(3.95) 
.86 
(.88) 
-3.56 
(4.11) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
 
59.28 
(22.77) 
192 
.13 
18.45 
(17.04) 
14.97 
(9.60) 
-2.10 
(1.58) 
-37.06* 
(18.85) 
-4.03 
(3.22) 
7.91 
(3.57) 
7.91** 
(3.57) 
 
6.94 
(11.63) 
-9.99 
(14.82) 
-2.70 
(2.67) 
3.33 
(3.17) 
 
6.86** 
(3.29) 
2.79 
(1.84) 
-4.15 
(3.09) 
.95* 
(.55) 
-1.41 
(3.03) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
46.03 
(10.91) 
277 
.22 
-33.62* 
(17.79) 
1.46 
(1.77) 
-7.65 
(10.67) 
31.75* 
(20.57) 
6.61** 
(3.22) 
.87 
(2.00) 
-4.29 
(3.85) 
 
11.94 
(17.65) 
-13.23 
(21.73) 
-2.66 
(2.97) 
-.61 
(3.78) 
 
-2.66 
(3.31) 
-5.41** 
(1.95) 
-2.90 
(3.10) 
-.45 
(.56) 
.45 
(3.03) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
 
74.63 
(12.59) 
293 
.21 
12.97 
(36.69) 
-- 
 
-2.35** 
(.98) 
-- 
 
-5.31 
(9.49) 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
58.26 
(57.94) 
-- 
 
-15.01 
(13.91) 
-- 
 
 
9.76** 
(4.20) 
4.37** 
(1.93) 
-7.72** 
(3.72) 
.88 
(.66) 
1.91 
(3.77) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
47.30 
(10.56) 
232 
.15 
3.78 
(19.00) 
-- 
 
2.27** 
(1.04) 
-- 
 
-1.47 
(3.84) 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
2.65 
(40.37) 
-- 
 
1.07 
(7.50) 
-- 
 
 
2.16 
(10.34) 
-5.12** 
(2.11) 
-1.45 
(3.55) 
-.69 
(.61) 
5.77* 
(3.41) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
68.56 
(14.44) 
218 
.10 
10.87 
(7.11) 
1.89 
(6.66) 
-3.46** 
(1.18) 
-12.49* 
(7.66) 
-17.28 
(12.20) 
.64 
(1.31) 
17.35 
(13.60) 
 
-6.75 
(14.30) 
2.52 
(3.84) 
-.89 
(2.94) 
3.11 
(3.84) 
 
8.15** 
(3.30) 
3.00 
(1.82) 
-4.09 
(3.14) 
.86 
(.55) 
-2.22 
(3.02) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
52.29 
(8.66) 
277 
.22 
-1.34 
(31.40) 
-.72 
(8.72) 
3.25** 
(1.39) 
29.13 
(36.84) 
.07 
(5.38) 
-.13 
(1.61) 
-1.11 
(7.25) 
 
-8.63 
(21.28) 
5.57 
(24.95) 
.72 
(3.57) 
-3.37 
(4.31) 
 
-2.29 
(3.26) 
-5.35** 
(1.96) 
-3.06 
(3.08) 
-.47 
(.57) 
.64 
(3.07) 
-.01 
(.00) 
 
65.52 
(10.68) 
293 
.20 
28.00 
(24.19) 
-10.15 
(6.68) 
-3.74** 
(1.58) 
34.38 
(26.43) 
-6.09 
(4.45) 
.56 
(1.59) 
-11.88** 
(5.84) 
 
-8.93 
(13.11) 
7.58 
(14.08) 
1.88 
(2.58) 
.71 
(3.24) 
 
6.75** 
(2.05) 
3.79** 
(1.18) 
-3.36 
(2.07) 
.77** 
(.33) 
2.49 
(1.93) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
45.80 
(8.53) 
733 
.20 
21.60 
(26.18) 
-20.39** 
(8.71) 
5.71** 
(1.71) 
30.32 
(22.15) 
-8.94 
(5.91) 
2.87 
(1.74) 
-8.16** 
(4.90) 
 
23.36 
(46.35) 
72.94 
(46.86) 
-1.77 
(9.79) 
-10.29 
(9.94) 
 
-.43 
(2.08) 
-4.67** 
(1.14) 
-2.29 
(1.75) 
-.02 
(.30) 
-.56 
(1.64) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
 
42.52 
(9.82) 
879 
.19 
Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<.1, 
**p<.05 
Each image group is paired with a verbal issue as follows: children and education, 
senior citizens and Medicare/Social Security, farmers and agriculture, teachers and 
education, police officers and crime, soldiers and national defense, workers and job 
creation/employment issues, businesspeople and business regulations, African-Americans 
and civil rights, Latinos and civil rights 
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 Table 5.3a: Links between groups and favorability-Ingroups (continued from 
previous page) 
 Soldiers Workers Businesspeople African-Americans Latinos 
 DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP 
% w/ Images 
 
Disposition towards 
group 
Partisan ID 
 
Images×Disposition 
towards group 
Images×Party ID 
 
Party ID×Disposition 
towards group  
Images×Disposition 
towards group×Party ID 
 
% w/ Issue 
 
Issue×Disposition 
towards group 
Issue×Party ID 
 
Issues×Disposition 
towards group×Party ID 
 
Incumbent 
 
Ideology 
 
South 
 
Newspaper habits 
 
Female 
 
Ad gap between Dem. 
And Rep. Candidates 
 
Constant 
 
N 
R2 
8.21 
(28.69) 
-3.28 
(4.78) 
-3.98** 
(1.14) 
30.07 
(37.88) 
5.10 
(16.63) 
.14 
(1.27) 
-11.09 
(19.25) 
 
-17.98 
(16.48) 
7.98** 
(3.28) 
4.57** 
(2.92) 
-13.41** 
(6.22) 
 
6.93** 
(3.39) 
2.91 
(2.07) 
-.47 
(3.43) 
1.35** 
(.59) 
-1.03 
(3.23) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
51.86 
(9.32) 
316 
.18 
9.55 
(3.95) 
9.35 
(5.51) 
5.06** 
(.97) 
-9.15** 
(4.17) 
-1.93** 
(.78) 
-1.15 
(1.10) 
1.90** 
(.80) 
 
-5.39 
(9.55) 
7.54 
(11.76) 
1.70 
(1.90) 
-23.67 
(22.16) 
 
-1.64 
(3.75) 
-2.35 
(1.96) 
1.98 
(2.71) 
-.35 
(.45) 
-1.05 
(2.45) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
 
46.60 
(8.82) 
431 
.19 
-11.37 
(24.84) 
10.89 
(7.35) 
-4.08** 
(1.25) 
-40.39 
(42.57) 
7.27 
(6.67) 
-1.33 
(2.59) 
-9.97 
(11.21) 
 
13.31 
(38.85) 
75.49 
(83.13) 
1.69 
(10.53) 
-.19 
(23.91) 
 
3.76 
(5.34) 
6.64** 
(2.76) 
-5.63 
(4.83) 
1.33* 
(.69) 
-4.12 
(4.41) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
49.71 
(12.16) 
143 
.32 
14.97 
(24.89) 
21.96** 
(10.25) 
4.74** 
(1.14) 
-61.10 
(54.54) 
-2.13 
(5.68) 
-7.19** 
(2.38) 
19.95* 
(14.39) 
 
77.07* 
(39.76) 
82.42 
(106.44) 
-12.38* 
(6.89) 
3.44 
(27.74) 
 
-5.23 
(4.80) 
-6.99** 
(2.81) 
-4.68 
(5.86) 
-2.01** 
(.67) 
4.28 
(3.94) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
64.24 
(11.48) 
150 
.38 
 -5.50** 
(2.09) 
9.06 
(13.31) 
5.69** 
(1.57) 
1.90 
(1.98) 
.81** 
(.29) 
-.95 
(2.37) 
2.93 
(2.69) 
 
10.25 
(8.97) 
1.43 
(1.90) 
-1.96** 
(.85) 
3.05 
(4.71) 
 
1.93 
(8.44) 
-5.06 
(3.92) 
-7.02 
(7.24) 
.27 
(1.02) 
.28 
(6.28) 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
49.59 
(18.05) 
65 
.43 
11.12* 
(5.23) 
3.55* 
(1.68) 
5.77* 
(2.77) 
-11.09* 
(5.24) 
-1.79* 
(.86) 
-.58* 
(.28) 
1.79* 
(.86) 
 
-.72 
(.76) 
8.50 
(9.63) 
7.52* 
(3.57) 
-6.61* 
(3.25) 
 
-4.72 
(20.62) 
1.03 
(7.82) 
.65 
(19.48) 
3.30 
(2.43) 
16.44 
(19.84) 
-.00 
(.02) 
 
35.24 
(16.71) 
30 
.60 
-28.75 
(61.98) 
-2.46 
(9.61) 
2.42 
(1.67) 
-4.04 
(69.78) 
-10.31 
(55.46) 
-1.98 
(2.29) 
42.07 
(56.71) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
12.10 
(9.45) 
-13.34** 
(5.85) 
-16.88 
(10.47) 
1.45 
(1.99) 
-8.21 
(8.73) 
.00 
(.01) 
 
65.31 
(25.00) 
41 
.53 
64.65 
(65.22) 
12.10 
(15.23) 
-13.39** 
(3.11) 
-33.90 
(31.47) 
4.38 
(21.27) 
-8.18* 
(4.02) 
9.93 
(16.14) 
 
-7.91 
(6.03) 
10.70 
(14.08) 
1.49 
(2.21) 
.76 
(1.49) 
 
10.42 
(12.76) 
-.79 
(8.07) 
-1.83 
(14.61) 
3.87 
(2.25) 
-10.44 
(9.12) 
.01 
(.02) 
 
76.09 
(22.64) 
33 
.69 
4.48 
(4.86) 
0.99 
(21.90) 
5.86 
(5.09) 
-1.07 
(1.45) 
-.93 
(1.03) 
-3.24 
(5.82) 
13.50 
919.24) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
1.50 
(9.13) 
15.49** 
(5.99) 
-15.49 
(19.30) 
-4.96** 
(1.84) 
-7.57 
(11.37) 
.00 
(.01) 
 
12.44 
(39.22) 
31 
.47 
Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<.1, 
**p<.05 
Each image group is paired with a verbal issue as follows: children and education, 
senior citizens and Medicare/Social Security, farmers and agriculture, teachers and 
education, police officers and crime, soldiers and national defense, workers and job 
creation/employment issues, businesspeople and business regulations, African-Americans 
and civil rights, Latinos and civil rights
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 Table 5.3b: Links between groups and favorability-Outgroups (continued on next 
page) 
 Seniors Children Farmers Teachers Soldiers 
 DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP 
% w/ Images 
 
Disposition towards 
group 
Partisan ID 
 
Images×Disposition 
towards group 
Images×Party ID 
 
Party ID×Disposition 
towards group  
Images×Disposition 
towards group×Party ID 
 
% w/ Issue 
 
Issue×Disposition 
towards group 
Issue×Party ID 
 
Issues×Disposition 
towards group×Party ID 
 
Incumbent 
 
Ideology 
 
South 
 
Newspaper habits 
 
Female 
 
Ad gap between Dem. 
And Rep. Candidates 
 
Constant 
 
N 
R2 
-2.49 
(12.30) 
-12.92 
(8.99) 
-6.00** 
(1.31) 
13.80 
(16.24) 
1.72 
(2.38) 
6.07** 
(1.91) 
-5.45 
(3.37) 
 
-12.72 
(9.89) 
13.10 
(13.81) 
1.29 
(1.99) 
-3.92 
(2.71) 
 
5.52** 
(2.35) 
1.91 
(1.33) 
-4.54** 
(2.28) 
1.10** 
(.37) 
1.81 
(2.12) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
64.70 
(8.01) 
584 
.22 
-14.36 
(9.70) 
2.49 
(8.81) 
3.15** 
(1.25) 
.99 
(12.59) 
1.90 
(1.81) 
-1.05 
(1.75) 
.99 
(2.61) 
 
-1.20 
(12.48) 
-6.58 
(16.35) 
-.27 
(2.32) 
-1.18 
(3.18) 
 
1.39 
(2.46) 
-5.27** 
(1.23) 
-.39 
(1.96) 
-.23 
(.32) 
1.11 
(1.80) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
63.66 
(8.44) 
687 
.23 
-.17 
(11.15) 
-7.97 
(6.01) 
-5.67** 
(1.00) 
12.18 
(13.19) 
1.24 
(2.17) 
2.86** 
(1.23) 
-2.69 
(2.64) 
 
-13.22 
(9.53) 
13.30 
(11.68) 
.93 
(1.95) 
-1.14 
(2.50) 
 
6.48** 
(2.69) 
1.97 
(1.57) 
-2.17 
(2.71) 
.82** 
(.42) 
4.90** 
(2.47) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
62.24 
(8.03) 
456 
.24 
10.98 
(8.27) 
4.96 
(6.10) 
3.16** 
(.94) 
-22.55** 
(10.56) 
-1.60 
(1.62) 
-2.60** 
(1.15) 
5.48** 
(2.04) 
 
-42.03** 
(9.51) 
22.85** 
(10.57) 
6.79** 
(1.78) 
-3.68* 
(1.94) 
 
1.09 
(2.68) 
-3.69** 
(1.43) 
-1.86 
(2.15) 
-.07 
(.35) 
-.52 
(1.95) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
59.87 
(7.76) 
586 
.23 
38.06 
(44.32) 
-- 
 
-4.54** 
(.58) 
-- 
 
-6.62 
(8.62) 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
-54.99 
(41.61) 
-- 
 
9.31 
(8.31) 
-- 
 
 
4.74* 
(2.49) 
2.85* 
(1.51) 
.92 
(2.60) 
.61 
(.39) 
3.19 
(2.27) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
57.39 
(6.30) 
501 
.22 
-35.64 
(14.35) 
-- 
 
3.63** 
(.54) 
-- 
 
4.34* 
(2.78) 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
1.13 
(13.46) 
-- 
 
.58 
(2.29) 
-- 
 
 
.65 
(2.21) 
-4.93** 
(1.34) 
-.80 
(1.99) 
.21 
(.33) 
-1.97 
(1.85) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
56.77 
(5.90) 
661 
.23 
2.65 
(28.34) 
-4.41 
(4.48) 
-5.45** 
(.81) 
6.18 
(34.92) 
1.83 
(5.11) 
2.10** 
(1.00) 
-1.37 
(7.03) 
 
-15.15 
(10.27) 
14.85 
(13.11) 
1.10 
(2.04) 
-1.66 
(2.65) 
 
6.10** 
(2.71) 
2.07 
(1.58) 
-2.40 
(2.74) 
.80 
(.42) 
5.08 
(2.49) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
62.67 
(7.41) 
456 
.24 
-9.57 
(35.20) 
-2.03 
(4.99) 
2.71** 
(.77) 
.66 
(44.05) 
1.36 
(5.74) 
-.64 
(.93) 
-1.66 
(7.19) 
 
-39.81** 
(9.16) 
16.53 
(10.21) 
6.36** 
(1.68) 
-2.01 
(1.83) 
 
1.91 
(2.69) 
-3.83** 
(1.47) 
-2.01 
(2.16) 
-.03 
(.36) 
-.71 
(1.97) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
62.94 
(7.09) 
586 
.22 
-47.19* 
(25.66) 
3.43 
(3.51) 
-3.80** 
(.80) 
50.96 
(33.25) 
12.47** 
(5.22) 
-1.01 
(.93) 
-12.09 
(7.69) 
 
-34.64** 
(16.98) 
18.36 
(16.09) 
12.22 
(8.54) 
-11.23 
(7.54) 
 
3.79 
(2.72) 
3.33** 
(1.48) 
-3.46 
(2.70) 
.39 
(.40) 
3.92* 
(2.43) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
59.41 
(5.99) 
417 
.24 
63.85 
(97.23) 
.07 
(4.46) 
2.18** 
(.89) 
-91.92 
(139.29) 
.47 
(29.06) 
.66 
(1.04) 
4.97 
(33.71) 
 
-90.90 
(67.94) 
137.75 
(84.37) 
8.29 
(13.21) 
-16.65 
(16.26) 
 
1.12 
(2.67) 
-6.04** 
(1.45) 
-6.03** 
(2.61) 
.16 
(.41) 
2.21 
(2.26) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
63.07 
(6.91) 
448 
.21 
Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<.1, 
**p<.05 
Each image group is paired with a verbal issue as follows: children and education, 
senior citizens and Medicare/Social Security, farmers and agriculture, teachers and 
education, police officers and crime, soldiers and national defense, workers and job 
creation/employment issues, businesspeople and business regulations, African-Americans 
and civil rights, Latinos and civil rights 
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Table 5.3b: Links between demographic groups and favorability-Outgroups 
 Workers Businesspeople African-Americans Latinos 
 DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP DEM REP 
% w/ Images 
 
Disposition towards group 
 
Partisan ID 
 
Images×Disposition towards group 
 
Images×Party ID 
 
Party ID×Disposition towards group  
 
Images×Disposition towards 
group×Party ID 
 
% w/ Issue 
 
Issue×Disposition towards group 
 
Issue×Party ID 
 
Issues×Disposition towards 
group×Party ID 
 
Incumbent 
 
Ideology 
 
South 
 
Newspaper habits 
 
Female 
 
Ad gap between Dem. And Rep. 
Candidates 
 
Constant 
 
N 
R2 
-6.01 
(11.12) 
9.83* 
(5.24) 
-3.91** 
(.59) 
72.66* 
(39.93) 
1.35 
(3.13) 
-2.31* 
(1.19) 
-10.87 
(8.50) 
 
31.44* 
(16.07) 
-17.69 
(33.82) 
-2.16 
(3.98) 
9.15 
(5.24) 
 
6.47** 
(2.32) 
2.45* 
(1.31) 
-3.79 
(2.32) 
.47 
(.37) 
3.62 
(2.23) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
56.44 
(5.89) 
590 
.21 
1.30 
(11.33) 
12.11* 
(6.44) 
3.45** 
(.56) 
18.86 
(27.67) 
.42 
(2.29) 
-.66 
(1.21) 
-3.86 
(5.68) 
 
43.13** 
(11.21) 
-45.77* 
(24.98) 
-4.65* 
(2.47) 
9.35 
(5.88) 
 
1.29 
(2.29) 
-3.24** 
(1.22) 
-.62 
(1.89) 
.02 
(.32) 
-1.42 
(1.73) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
52.54 
(5.47) 
729 
.21 
 37.03 
(15.01) 
-.08 
(3.11) 
3.40** 
(.48) 
-23.91 
(24.42) 
-5.48* 
(3.26) 
.39 
(.60) 
4.83 
(4.93) 
 
4.96 
(124.01) 
110.72* 
(64.76) 
16.00 
(25.85) 
-6.99 
(15.12) 
 
.66 
(2.22) 
-5.00** 
(1.21) 
-.29 
(1.83) 
.00 
(.31) 
-.38 
(1.72) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
58.19 
(5.40) 
814 
.18 
-7.30 
(8.75) 
-2.09 
(3.53) 
-4.53** 
(.61) 
-1.43 
(12.03) 
2.26 
(1.87) 
1.20 
(.78) 
1.73 
(2.62) 
 
-13.48 
(19.09) 
13.02 
(21.60) 
5.72 
(3.93) 
-3.03 
(4.95) 
 
6.80** 
(2.10) 
3.10** 
(1.23) 
-1.76 
(2.29) 
.61 
(.34) 
1.92 
(1.98) 
.00 
(.00) 
 
57.34 
(5.60) 
703 
.21 
8.50 
(10.31) 
-3.23 
(3.39) 
3.37** 
(.54) 
-9.31 
(13.92) 
-1.21 
(2.05) 
.66 
(.69) 
1.52 
(3.31) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
.13 
(2.19) 
-4.62** 
(1.22) 
-.94 
(1.86) 
-.07 
(.30) 
.33 
(1.70) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
58.44 
(5.56) 
838 
.17 
12.19 
(15.48) 
1.41 
(3.05) 
-4.28** 
(.69) 
7.12 
(24.59) 
-4.59 
(5.44) 
-.44 
(.75) 
-7.68 
(6.77) 
 
-46.03 
(33.07) 
-45.50 
(38.24) 
13.76* 
(7.60) 
16.50* 
(8.63) 
 
6.29** 
(2.14) 
3.29** 
(1.23) 
-1.76 
(2.13) 
.56* 
(.34) 
2.23 
(2.00) 
-.00 
(.00) 
 
56.22 
(5.98) 
700 
.19 
-14.57 
(15.28) 
1.15 
(3.60) 
3.35** 
(.61) 
-58.39** 
(20.88) 
3.23 
(2.65) 
-.03 
(.72) 
9.88** 
(4.06) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
.25 
(2.14) 
-5.61** 
(1.15) 
-.82 
(1.77) 
.08 
(.30) 
.27 
(1.67) 
-.01** 
(.00) 
 
60.61 
(5.63) 
848 
.19 
Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<.1, 
**p<.05 
Each image group is paired with a verbal issue as follows: children and education, 
senior citizens and Medicare/Social Security, farmers and agriculture, teachers and 
education, police officers and crime, soldiers and national defense, workers and job 
creation/employment issues, businesspeople and business regulations, African-Americans 
and civil rights, Latinos and civil rights 
 Figure 5.1: Predicted favorability for Republicans who pictured children (continued 
on next page) 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.1: Predicted favorability for Republicans who pictured children (continued 
from previous page) 
 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.2: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing seniors (continued on 
next 3 pages) 
Republican candidates 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.2: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing seniors (continued from 
previous page) 
Republican candidates 
 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.2: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing seniors (continued from 
previous page) 
Democratic candidates 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.2: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing seniors (continued from 
previous page) 
Democratic candidates 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.3: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing African-Americans 
(continued on next 3 pages) 
Republican candidates 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.3: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing African-Americans 
(continued from previous page) 
Republican candidates 
 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.3: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing African-Americans 
(continued from previous page) 
Democratic candidates 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.3: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing African-Americans 
(continued from previous page) 
Democratic candidates 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.4: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing Latinos (continued on 
next 3 pages) 
Republican candidates 
 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.4: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing Latinos (continued from 
previous page) 
Republican candidates 
 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.4: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing Latinos (continued from 
previous page) 
Democratic candidates 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
 144
 Figure 5.4: Predicted favorability for candidates picturing Latinos (continued from 
previous page) 
Democratic candidates 
 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.5: Predicted favorability for candidates mentioning Social Security and 
Medicare (continued on the next 3 pages) 
Republican candidates 
 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.5: Predicted favorability for candidates mentioning Social Security and 
Medicare (continued from previous page) 
Republican candidates 
 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.5: Predicted favorability for candidates mentioning Social Security and 
Medicare (continued from previous page) 
Democratic candidates 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Figure 5.5: Predicted favorability for candidates mentioning Social Security and 
Medicare (continued from previous page) 
Democratic candidates 
 
Predicted favorability is represented along the Z axis as a function of the percentage of ads picturing a 
group (Y axis) and either partisanship (with issue position held at the neutral point) or issue position (with 
partisanship held at constant as Independent) on the X axis.  
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 Chapter 6: Imagery Effects in a Controlled Setting 
6.1: Introduction 
In this chapter, I present evidence from a series of controlled experiments 
designed to isolate the influence of verbal and visual campaign appeals and see how those 
appeals affect voters. The nature of cross-sectional surveys makes it difficult to be 
confident when making causal inferences. Experiments on campaign effects are, of 
course, nothing new, and provide an ideal framework to get a handle on the individual 
components of campaign ads, such as the impact of verbal and visual content. The survey 
data and aggregate data analysis presented in chapters 4 and 5 indicate that campaign 
imagery affects voters according to how the images interact with their partisanship and 
policy beliefs. In this chapter, I use a controlled setting to make inferences about how 
campaign imagery influences voters, perceptions of candidate positions and ideologies, 
and how people use those perceptions when making overall evaluations of the candidate.  
In the experiments that follow I answer some of the outstanding questions raised 
elsewhere in this project and run critical tests for the Identity, Group Support and 
Ideology hypotheses.  I will also examine an important question raised in the last chapter: 
Do different identity groups draw different inferences from ad imagery? My analysis of 
survey data in the previous chapter indicated that members from different groups had 
different reactions to ad imagery. In this chapter, I will demonstrate how individuals from 
different social groups make inferences about a candidate based on ad imagery, and how 
individuals react (or fail to react) to self-congruent imagery in campaign ads. 
Finally, I will show how the groups pictured in a campaign ad affect individuals’ 
overall feelings about the candidate. I find substantial differences in the way that 
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 individuals react to verbal and visual appeals. As in the last chapter, the evidence from 
these experiments reveals that candidates may make enormous strides with voters using 
visual appeals, and they may be able to do so without incurring the costs that come with 
taking an explicit verbal position.  
 
6.2: Creating the campaign 
In order to run a controlled experiment, I created a number of campaign ads to 
present the subjects with realistic, 30-second campaign content. To produce these ads for 
the experiment I collected audio and video footage from a number of sources and used 
video-editing software to create a new series of ads.48 Many of these scenes come from 
the Washington Post’s campaign video archives, though I also drew video from other 
publicly available sources such as Youtube to obtain images of individuals belonging to 
different social identity groups.   
In order to field a candidate for the experiments, I used archived campaign 
commercials from Mark Kennedy’s failed 2006 Minnesota senate campaign and 
presented Kennedy as the candidate in all of the following experiments.  Kennedy, a 
sitting member of Congress at the time, ran many different ads during the campaign, so 
considerable amount of video of the candidate was publicly available after the campaign. 
It was important to actually picture the candidate within the experiment in order to 
maintain the illusion of authenticity. The vast majority of House and Senate campaign 
ads featured images of the candidate, and usually had the candidate speaking to the 
camera for at least part of the ad. Kennedy is a white, male Republican, who was in his 
                                                 
48 Storyboards and complete scripts for the ads used in these experiments can be found in the appendix of 
this chapter.  
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 40’s at the time of the campaign.  As a candidate, he had an ideal generic look since he 
was not unusually old, young, handsome or from a minority ethnic group.49 As a first 
step, I used selected footage from Kennedy’s ads as well as video footage of 
Minneapolis, St. Paul and the surrounding area to create two thirty-second campaign 
commercials.  I used these commercials, which had similar content, as control ads in the 
experiments described below. Each commercial’s basic format was as follows: about 15 
seconds of Minnesota scenery inter-cut with a brief shot of the capital dome and images 
of Kennedy speaking to the camera or standing next to “average” people.  These average 
people were all white adults. The scenes of the Twin Cities and surrounding areas did not 
have any footage of people, focusing instead on buildings, highways and rivers.  The 
resulting ads show Kennedy on screen a good portion of the time alone and interacting 
with a few people, though the people in the control ad do not represent a particular group 
or constituency. The scenes of Minnesota are split and appear at roughly the 10 and 20 
second marks within the ad.50 
To create image treatment ads, I collected video of children, senior citizens, 
farmers, teachers, police officers, soldiers, blue-collar workers, businesspeople, Latinos 
and African-Americans. Demographic types were pictured in a few casual home or office 
settings, while occupational groups were identified by attire and activity (e.g. Teachers 
were shown at the blackboard, blue-collar workers were shown working with tools and 
                                                 
49 In the future, it may be interesting to investigate how the characteristics of the candidate (race, gender, 
age, etc.) interact with the other images presented in the campaign ad.  In this case, however, I held the 
candidate constant across different treatments so it was important to have a candidate who did not present 
an exceptional image, and whose appearance did not conform to the image of any of the groups tested. 
50 Valentino, Hutchings and White (2003) used a similar approach in their investigation of racial images. 
They contrasted campaign ads picturing African-Americans with ads featuring x-rays and hospitals without 
any people present in the image.  In an experiment focused on campaign images it is not always clear what 
the control condition should look like. In this case, I used Minnesota scenery in order to ensure that the 
images in the control ad presented no kind of substantive cue to the subjects. 
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 wearing hard hats, etc.). I went through the control ad and replaced the footage of 
Minnesota with footage of a particular group.51  In each treatment ad, the group appeared 
on screen from, roughly, the 10 to 15 second and 20-29 second marks within the ads. As 
a result, the treatment ads still contain footage of Kennedy alone and Kennedy alongside 
the adults pictured in the control ad as well as pictures of the people I am interested in 
investigating.  The treatments, therefore, effectively mimic real ads52 while keeping the 
intent of the experiment hidden. Note that the treatments are not as strong as they might 
have been if the ad featured only one type of person. For example, in the senior citizen 
video treatment, the ads contain footage of senior citizens as well as footage of Kennedy 
with the middle-aged adults pictured in the control ads.  
Of course, the ads needed audio as well as visual content. I recorded an audio 
track for each ad with new music and an actor playing the voice of Mark Kennedy. In the 
control condition Kennedy talks about the importance of change and working for people 
rather than special interests (without any policy specifics). His only policy statement 
concerns the need to balance the federal budget.  In the verbal treatment conditions his 
support for balancing the budget is replaced with an appeal for support for a particular 
group.  For example, in the case of African-Americans, this meant voicing support for 
affirmative action policies in college admissions.  
Once completed, I combined the audio and video content to produce ads in which 
Kennedy made a verbal appeal to a group, made a visual appeal to a group, did both, or 
                                                 
51 In the treatment conditions no individual represented more than one group in order to ensure that the 
treatment was not contaminated. So, for example, all of the farmers pictured were Caucasian rather than 
African-American or Latino so any difference between the control and treatment conditions must be due to 
the appearance of an individual as a farmer, rather than his or her ethnicity. I did, however, include male 
and female members of each group. 
52 In pilot tests conducted through a student subject pool none of the subjects questioned the authenticity of 
the ads. 
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 did neither. I also included a final ad that focused on Kennedy’s family and personality, 
which featured Kennedy and his immediate family and contained no policy information 
at all.  The family merely comments on Kennedy’s personality and the ad attempts to 
humanize the candidate. This biographical ad ran after the treatment ads and served as a 
brief distraction, while also bringing some authenticity to the experiment. 
 
 6.3: Experiment #1: Picturing blacks and workers when partisanship is known 
 In the first experiment, I tested responses to imagery in a situation where the 
candidate’s partisanship was known to the subjects in the experiment. I used the 
Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project (CCAP) as a platform for this experiment in 
order to collect a sample of 1000 adult residents of the state of Illinois.  The CCAP was a 
multi-institution national panel survey that consisted of 6 waves beginning in December 
2007 using a sample of registered voters stratified by battleground and non-battleground 
states. Respondents were chosen from the YouGov/Polimetrix Polling Point Panel with 
an eye toward creating a sample representative (by gender, age, race and education) of 
the state population. The surveys were conducted online and the surveys for each wave 
took approximately 20 minutes to complete.  
Though the online format of the experiment lacks the absolute control of a 
traditional lab, the size and diversity of the sample in the CCAP was absolutely essential 
in order to investigate how members of different social groups might respond to 
campaign imagery. Because I was interested in different group responses, and how those 
responses varied according to political predispositions, it was necessary to limit the 
number of conditions. In this experiment I tested campaign ads with verbal and visual 
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 messages related to African-Americans and blue-collar workers. In addition to 
representing strong social identities of race and class, each of these groups is fairly 
common in campaign ads (see Chapter 4), and both are relatively strong ideological 
signals (see Chapter 2). 
The experiment ran in the September 2008 wave of the CCAP. Subjects were told 
that Kennedy was a Republican Congressman from Minnesota, and they were asked to 
view two ads from his Senate campaign.  The subjects were also told that they would be 
asked what they remembered from the ads and about their impressions of the candidate. 
The first ad contained the experimental treatment, while the second ad was the non-
substantive biographical ad.  Table 6.1 shows the number of subjects within each 
condition. Each subject, then, saw two ads, and only one actually contained an 
experimental treatment.  Though the subjects knew that the ads were the focus of the 
experiment, they were still unaware of the verbal and visual distinctions between 
conditions, and the actual treatment within each ad amounted to roughly 15 seconds of 
audio and/or video. Once they had seen the ads, I then asked the subjects to place the 
candidate on a number of issues (aid to blacks, affirmative action, the minimum wage and 
free trade), their perception of the candidate’s overall ideology and their overall feeling 
toward the candidate.  All of these dependent variables were scaled from 0-100.  
Recall that the Group Support Hypothesis suggests that viewers should see 
images as a message of implicit support for policies that support the group being 
pictured. The evidence from this experiment strongly supports the Group Support 
Hypothesis. The results show that the subjects made inferences about the candidate’s 
views based on both the images shown and the verbal content. Figure 6.1 shows where 
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 the subjects placed the candidate on the two race-related issues.  As expected, both the 
visual and verbal content had a strong impact on perceptions of the candidate’s positions. 
The mean placements for both issues were more supportive of benefits for African-
Americans in the treatment conditions than the control condition.  This gap was both 
statistically significant and, substantively, quite large. For example, subjects who saw ads 
with no verbal racial content and no African-American images placed the candidate at 
36.09 on the 0-100 scale on the issue of aid to blacks.  In the conditions where the 
subjects viewed an ad with some racial content (verbal, visual, or both) they ranked the 
candidate between 52.89 and 58.61.  Even when the ad contained no verbal racial 
content, there was an 18 point, statistically significant (p<.01) difference in mean 
placements between the control condition and the treatment with images of African-
Americans.  
There was also a gap between the racial treatment conditions depending on 
whether the ad included verbal support for affirmative action.  Subjects who heard the 
candidate verbally support affirmative action rated the candidate as more liberal on 
affirmative action than subjects who saw only images of African-Americans. Subjects in 
all racial treatments ranked the candidate as more supportive of affirmative action, than 
subjects in the control condition did. When the subjects only received the visual message 
of support for African-Americans, with no verbal message, they placed the candidate at 
49.9, or almost precisely at the mid-point. When a verbal message supporting affirmative 
action was included, the subjects placed the candidate in a significantly more liberal 
position. 
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 In contrast, there was no difference between racial treatment conditions on the 
issue of aid to blacks.  In the verbal treatment, the candidate took an explicit position on 
affirmative action, so it is no surprise that this verbal message might have more impact on 
the specific issue mentioned.  However, when it came to a more generic issue of 
supporting the group’s interest there was no statistically significant difference between 
picturing blacks and verbalizing support for blacks.   This finding seems to indicate that 
picturing a group is sufficient to deliver a generic message of support, and 
complementing that image with a verbal message does not seem to increase the power of 
the message.  Although a verbal message that addresses a specific issue can be more 
powerful on that specific issue, it is not necessary in order to express support for a group. 
Candidates who wish to show support for a group, then, can do so without incurring the 
backlash (discussed further below) that may come from making a possibly controversial 
verbal statement. 
 The partisanship of the candidate may have limited the extent to which subjects 
were willing to place the candidate on the liberal side of the scale on issue positions, 
regardless of the candidate’s explicit positions within the ad. For example, even those 
subjects who saw an ad picturing African-Americans where the candidate took an explicit 
pro-affirmative action stance only placed the candidate at 58.02 (or just slightly to the left 
of center) on the issue of aid to blacks. It seems that even in these conditions there was a 
ceiling on the amount of liberal ideology respondents were willing to credit the 
candidate.53 The significant differences between the treatment and control conditions on 
racial issue placement came from the subjects’ willingness to place the candidate on the 
                                                 
53 Alternatively, it is also possible that many subjects paid so little attention to the ad that they missed both 
the verbal and visual content and relied to a large degree on the candidate’s partisanship on the ensuing 
questions. 
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 conservative end of the scale in the control condition as much as their willingness to 
place him toward the liberal end in the treatment conditions. Not surprisingly, the 
Republican Party’s modern history on race and racial issues made it relatively easy for 
most respondents in the control condition to place the candidate at a fairly conservative 
point (Carmines and Stimson, 1989; Petrocik, 1996). 
As with the racial treatments, subjects in the worker treatment conditions may 
have been reluctant to place a Republican candidate on the liberal end of an issue, even 
when given explicit information in the ad.  In the condition with images of workers and a 
verbal statement supporting an increase in the minimum wage, the mean placement of the 
candidate was 48.21, or almost exactly at the midpoint of the scale. On the other hand, 
subjects in the control condition did not place the Republican candidate in a conservative 
position on worker issues. On the issue of the minimum wage, the mean placement of the 
candidate in the control condition was 46.2, or slightly to the right of center, on the 0-100 
scale. Simply put, the subjects in the control condition had already placed the candidate at 
a fairly moderate position on workers’ issues. A post-experiment look at those subjects in 
the control condition shows that subjects in the control condition actually identified 
unions as more conservative than those in the worker treatment conditions, so it should 
be no surprise that those in the control condition may have been predisposed to view the 
Republican candidate as worker friendly. 
The differences between the worker conditions, therefore, were often minimal. 
Figure 2 shows the mean differences across conditions for ratings of Mark Kennedy on 
free trade and support for increasing the minimum wage.  On both issues, subjects who 
saw blue-collar workers or heard a message about the minimum wage rated Kennedy as 
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 more liberal on these issues; however, the differences between the treatment conditions 
and the control condition were small and none of these differences was statistically 
significant.54  
In addition to inferences about policy positions, subjects also used the images in 
the experiment as a signal about the candidate’s ideology. The Ideology Hypothesis 
suggests that viewers should see images as a signal about the candidate’s ideology; 
picturing liberal groups like blacks and workers should leave viewers with the impression 
that the candidate is more liberal. However, a partisan ceiling effect is also apparent when 
looking at how the subjects rated the candidate’s ideology. Even in conditions with 
liberal visual and verbal messages the perception of the candidate’s ideology never 
moved much farther than slightly-left-of-center. Figure 3 shows the mean rating of the 
candidate’s ideology within each group. In the control condition subjects rated the 
candidate at 41.70 on a 100 point scale. In order to achieve a statistically significant 
difference, subjects in the treatment groups would have had to place a Republican at a 
substantially more liberal position. Still, all of the treatment groups featuring race based 
verbal and/or visual appeals placed the candidate at a statistically significant (though 
substantively small) distance from the control group.  Though the mean ideological 
placements in the worker treatment conditions were always more liberal than the control 
group, the differences in these group means were negligible. 
These analyses of reactions to campaign images treat all respondents within 
condition as one group. Not all groups felt the same way about viewing images, or 
hearing various campaign appeals; however, it seems that each respondent did get the 
                                                 
54 The lack of significant differences between conditions could also be a result of subjects’ failure to 
connect blue-collar images with the issues of the minimum wage and free trade. 
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 same substantive message from both verbal and visual cues within the ad. Figure 6.4 
shows placements on aid to blacks and the minimum wage within condition broken down 
by partisanship. There is a slight tendency, across all conditions, for Republicans to place 
the candidate in a more conservative position than Democratic respondents. More 
importantly, the pattern of responses between conditions is the same for Republicans, 
Democrats and Independents. It never seems to be the case that partisans are interpreting 
messages differently. Nor does political knowledge play a role. Previous research on 
political heuristics has shown that politically knowledgeable citizens are actually better at 
using heuristics to make decisions (Lau and Redlawsk 2001); however, in this experiment 
politically sophisticated respondents did not differ in their reactions to the political ads in 
the experiment. 
Further, to return to one of the main questions unanswered in the last chapter, 
there is no evidence that members of a group drew substantively different inferences 
from the campaign ads. Figure 6.5 shows a comparison of mean placements, within each 
condition, among union and non-union respondents. There are no statistically significant 
differences. In fact, union and non-union placements of the candidate were virtually 
identical. Similarly, there are no statistically significant differences within conditions 
between black and white respondents. This result speaks directly to one of the questions 
raised in the last chapter. Observational evidence from Congressional campaigns 
indicated that members of a social identity group had stronger reactions to images of the 
group than non-members did. Based on this experiment we can rule out any explanation 
that suggests that differences between groups would arise due to differences in 
interpretations of imagery (at least with regard to images of African-Americans and 
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 workers). To the extent that images provide information, they appear to provide that 
information equally to all groups, not just those pictured in the ad. All respondents 
seemed to take away the same political message about the candidate’s support for 
policies and overall ideology regardless of demographic background, partisanship or 
level of political knowledge. 
How the voters used that information when making an overall judgment of the 
candidate varied according to the characteristics and predispositions of the candidate. In 
addition to placing Kennedy on various issues, I also asked the subjects how warmly they 
felt toward the candidate.  The Identity Hypothesis suggests that individuals are more 
likely to notice self-congruent images, and, rather than making a substantive inference 
about the candidate, images should simply generate warm feelings among the subjects 
who see images congruent with their own identity in the ad. The results of the experiment 
show little support for the Identity Hypothesis. The images used and the verbal appeals in 
the ad had a strong influence on how subjects felt about the candidate, but these subjects’ 
feelings were contingent upon their own political predispositions. There is nothing to 
suggest that members of a group being pictured reacted positively, without regard to their 
own beliefs. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that members of an identity drew 
different inferences from political imagery. However, there is some indication that 
respondents who identified with the group pictured might have had stronger positive 
reactions than other respondents if their political predispositions led them to like the 
visual message presented. 
Table 6.2 compares subjects who identified as African-American and blue-collar 
workers.  These groups rated how they felt about the candidate, and I have grouped them 
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 by whether or not the treatment campaign ad pictured a member of the group (ignoring 
verbal treatment effects for the moment).55  Among African-American subjects and union 
members, there were no statistically significant differences between conditions. Simply 
picturing members of a group did nothing to increase affection for the candidate.   
Instead, it was the respondent’s political predispositions that determined how he 
or she felt about the candidate after viewing the ads. In fact, breaking down respondents 
by partisanship and issue positions reveals an interesting pattern in their responses. In 
order to understand how issue positions affected reactions I used some of the attitude 
measures found in the common content of the CCAP. The CCAP has a number of 
attitudinal measures, including a racial resentment scale, which measures a respondent’s 
attitudes about economic benefits for blacks, and a question about government’s role in 
creating jobs and guaranteeing a standard of living, which I used as a proxy of support for 
government intervention and support for the working class.56  
 Unsurprisingly, Republican respondents had generally warm feelings toward the 
Republican candidate depicted, and these feelings are constant across conditions for the 
                                                 
55 Results are not substantively different when the groups are merged by video condition with no regard to 
audio content.  The mean placement among black subjects who saw ads with African-Americans was only 
49.85. 
56 The item measuring support for the working class is asked, “Some people feel that government in 
Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the 
government should just let each person get ahead on his or her own. Where would you place yourself on 
this scale?” The racial resentment scale is actually four items, which I have condensed to a 1-5 scale. I also 
inverted the response scale on items 1 and 3 so that higher numbers always mean increased resentment. 
Subjects were asked how much they agree or disagree (on a 5 point scale) with the following statements: 
(1) Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for African 
Americans to work their way out of the lower class, (2) Many other minority groups have overcome 
prejudice and worked their way up. African Americans should do the same without any special favors, (3) 
Over the past few years, African Americans have gotten less than they deserve, (4) It’s really a matter of 
some people not trying hard enough; if African Americans would only try harder they could be just as well 
off as whites. 
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 most part.57 Republicans did not seem disappointed in the candidate supporting an 
increase in the minimum wage; however, there was a significant backlash when the 
candidate verbally supported affirmative action. Compared to the control condition, 
Republican respondents rated the candidate 18 points lower when he expressed support 
for affirmative action. Interestingly, this backlash was not mirrored in the experimental 
condition that only featured images of African-Americans.  When the candidate pictured 
blacks, but made no verbal statement of support for them, there was no statistically 
significant drop in favorability. 
 Democrats and Independents varied more in their favorability toward the 
candidate, responding based on how they viewed the verbal and visual messages the 
candidate displayed. Table 6.3 shows a breakdown of respondents’ feelings toward 
Kennedy based on partisanship, support for government intervention in the economy and 
experimental condition. There is a marginally significant increase in favorability among 
pro-worker Democrats when the candidate either shows workers or talks about increasing 
the minimum wage. On the other hand, the effects among independent voters were quite 
substantial. Independents who favored government support for jobs increased their 
feelings toward the candidate by 12 points when he mentioned raising the minimum wage 
and 21 points when he pictured workers. Just as important, picturing workers caused no 
significant changes in favorability among anti-worker respondents. Though anti-worker 
                                                 
57 Republicans also varied little in their issue positions on racial resentment and guaranteed standard of 
living. Only 5.6% (or 14 total respondents) of Republicans placed themselves on the liberal end of the 
racial resentment scale, and only 15 Republicans placed themselves on the liberal end of the guaranteed 
standard of living scale. As a result, I can say little about how a pro-affirmative action republican or a pro-
economic intervention Republican might react to campaign images. Thus, while I report Republican 
reactions as a whole, there is little point into delving into the affect of varying issue positions might have 
modified Republican reactions. 
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 Democrats rated the candidate 8 points lower when the candidate mentioned raising the 
minimum wage, their support was unaffected by the images of blue-collar workers. 
 This pattern repeats itself in Table 6.4, which shows favorability among 
respondents in the racial treatment conditions. When the candidate makes a verbal 
statement, he increases support among respondents favorable toward that policy, but also 
decreases his favorability among respondents opposed to the policy. In contrast, picturing 
African-Americans increased the candidate’s favorability ratings among respondents who 
support benefits for African-Americans, but it had no effect on those who oppose such 
benefits. In other words, the candidate could reach out to some voters through the images 
used in the campaign without experiencing any kind of backlash.  
 These results mirror the observational findings in the previous chapter. My 
analysis of image effects in Congressional campaigns showed that members of the group 
being pictured may react negatively to campaign imagery. Voters who did not identify 
with the image shown either reacted positively or had no significant reaction to the group 
pictured.  The major difference in the experimental findings is the lack of a backlash 
among the group being pictured. Union members and African-Americans did not respond 
negatively to self-congruent images even if they disagreed with the benefits for their 
identity group. Table 6.5 shows differences between conditions for union respondents. 
Democratic union members supporting government intervention actually had a much 
stronger positive response than non-union Democrats. While support among pro-benefit 
Democrats as a whole only increased by 7 points when the candidate pictured workers, 
support among union members with this predisposition increased 20 points. However, 
even among union respondents, there was no significant negative reaction to images of 
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 workers. Across partisanship, regardless of a respondents issue positions, there simply 
was no backlash for picturing workers. 
 While the results in Table 6.5 might indicate some support for the Identity 
Hypothesis, these results did not carry over to ads picturing African-Americans. In that 
instance, African-Americans never showed a significant reaction between conditions 
regardless of issue position or partisanship.58 Differences in favorability between 
conditions are driven instead by racially liberal, Democratic white respondents, who 
reacted positively to the candidate when he pictured African-Americans. 
 Overall, then, the results of the CCAP experiment show substantial support for the 
Group Support and Ideology hypotheses. Subjects were able to use images to make 
inferences about the candidates issue positions and ideology, regardless of their own 
political predispositions or social identity. At the same time, those inferences clearly had 
an impact on feelings toward the candidate, with respondents reacting positively when 
they saw images in line with their own political beliefs. On the other hand, the support for 
the Identity Hypothesis is extremely weak. As with the observational results, there is no 
evidence to support the idea that individuals have a positive affective reaction to images 
based on their social identity. Though union Democrats responded more positively than 
non-union Democrats, this is the only instance in which there is any substantial difference 
based on social identity. Union, non-union, African-American and white respondents all 
made the same substantive inferences based on campaign imagery, and overall 
impressions of the candidate changed in line with respondents’ predispositions. 
                                                 
58 The low number of African-Americans in the sample limited variation in partisanship and issue positions, 
and made it difficult to see significant results; however, even among those Democratic, pro-affirmative 
action African-Americans in the experiment, the difference in favorability between the control condition 
and “picturing African-Americans” condition is insignificant and in the wrong direction. 
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 It is not entirely clear why images would result in only positive feelings, without 
any kind of backlash, and here I can only speculate. I can safely conclude that any 
difference in favorability is not due to a difference in interpretation of campaign imagery. 
The unanimity among partisans and social identity groups when viewing images safely 
rules out that explanation. It may be that, rather than responding to self-congruent 
imagery, individuals respond more favorably to visual messages that line-up with their 
own political beliefs, ignoring those that contradict those beliefs. It is also possible that 
individuals can use campaign imagery to make an inference about the candidate, but, in 
the absence of a verbal statement, they may not be certain about those inferences. Images 
of workers and African-Americans may lead respondents to believe that a Republican 
candidate (as depicted in this experiment) is more moderate than a typical Republican. 
Median voter theory would suggest that Democrats and Independent voters would prefer 
a moderate Republican to a conservative one (Downs 1957). When the candidate 
verbalize an issue position respondents, particularly in an experiment like this with 
limited information, may latch on to this issue position and alter their feelings according 
to their own predispositions. Without the verbal statement, respondents may fall back on 
their partisan beliefs (as many respondents clearly did) in order to make a judgment about 
the candidate. 
It should also be noted that there were no substantive differences between 
conditions that verbally supported a group and conditions that offered verbal support and 
pictured the group. In Figure 6.3 (as well as previous figures) you can see that the 
placement of the candidate on issues and on overall ideology is virtually identical when 
the candidate makes a verbal statement, regardless of whether or not a visual message is 
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 included. It does not seem that adding the visual cues to the ad strengthens the impact of 
the visual message. Though the candidate was placed in a slightly more liberal position 
when he pictured and talked about blacks and workers than when he just talked about 
them, these differences are negligible.  
 
6.4: Experiment #2: Campaign ads with no partisan reference 
 While the CCAP experiment showed the effects of picturing African-Americans 
and blue-collar workers in campaign ads, there are many other types of groups that can be 
pictured within a campaign ad. I followed up on the results of the CCAP experiment in 
the fall of 2008 and spring of 2009 with an experiment using the University of Illinois 
subject pool to test the effects of African-Americans and workers, but also senior 
citizens, children, farmers, police officers, soldiers, teachers, businesspeople, and 
Latinos. The subject pool uses undergraduate students recruited from introductory 
courses in political science. Thus, the sample is far too homogenous to look at the effect 
of different social identities; however, the flexibility of the pool did offer the chance to 
test numerous image types and see whether or not subjects could use images of different 
groups to make inferences about the candidate. Given that social identity did not play a 
role in these inferences in the CCAP experiment, the homogeneity of the subject pool 
sample should not inhibit conclusions about the Group Support or Ideology Hypotheses.  
The number of subjects within each treatment group was much smaller in these 
experiments (roughly 15-30 subjects per cell), so I strengthened the treatment in the 
experiment. Subjects were still told that Mark Kennedy was a candidate for Senate from 
Minnesota and were told that they would view three campaign ads and be asked about 
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 their impressions afterward, but were not given his party identity, nor was Kennedy’s 
partisanship mentioned in the subsequent ads. Without the party label to provide an 
anchor for perceptions of the candidate, subjects should be far more likely to be 
influenced by the ad content (Rahn 1993).59 Subjects saw two 30-second ads featuring 
either visual or verbal content supporting a particular group (or neutral images and verbal 
content in the control condition). In verbal treatment conditions the first ad contained a 
specific policy statement (e.g. “I want to increase the Medicare prescription drug 
benefit.”) The second ad contained a more generic message of support for the group (e.g. 
“I’ll work to help seniors.”) As in the CCAP experiment, the neutral images depicted 
Minnesota scenery, and were replaced in treatment ads by images of a particular group. 
Following the two substantive ads, the subjects viewed the Kennedy biographical ad and 
then answered questions about the issue positions, ideology and partisanship of the 
candidate.60 
As in the previous experiment, the results from the subject pool provide a strong 
indication that viewers use images to make substantive inferences about the candidate. 
Table 6.6 presents a summary of comparisons between conditions on issue placements 
related to the group pictured.  For each type of imagery I have used two different issue 
items to measure support for the group. Most of these focus on economic benefits (ex. aid 
to Latinos, support for teacher and police pay increases) or health benefits (ex. Medicare 
and veterans’ healthcare). For police and soldiers, I have included measures on harsher 
                                                 
59 Whether or not the candidate’s partisanship should have been mentioned the ads and whether or not it 
should have been given to the subjects are still open questions. While some candidates will specifically 
identify their partisanship in their ad, many do not, and it is not clear which approach increases the external 
validity of the experiment. 
60 For technical reasons the issue and ideological scales in the subject pool ran from 1-7, rather than 0-100 
as they had in the CCAP experiment. 
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 punishment for criminals and defense spending, respectively, because respondents may 
draw policy inferences from these images that are not strictly related to benefits for the 
group. All of the significant differences reported in Table 6.6 are in the expected 
direction. In 8 out of 10 cases, subjects who viewed a campaign picturing a particular 
group believed that the candidate was more supportive of that group than those that did 
not view an ad that pictured a group.  
The only exceptions to this pattern were children and blue-collar workers. As in 
the CCAP experiment, it is possible that subjects simply did not make a connection 
between blue-collar workers and wages or trade issues. Furthermore, the students in the 
subject pool are not parents, and, therefore, may not have been as susceptible to images 
of children. In the observational analysis in the previous chapter I found that non-parents 
had little or no reaction to images of children in campaign advertising. 
Those exceptions aside, for the most part imagery did seem to have an impact on 
how the subjects viewed the candidate. Ads picturing a group had a similar effect to ads 
that verbally expressed support for a group. With the exception of children, there were no 
groups tested in which the verbal support ad had an effect on perceptions of the 
candidate, but the image alone had no effect. Substantively, it seems that talking about a 
group and showing that group led respondents to the same inferences. At the same time, 
as in the CCAP experiment, there appears to be no added benefit to picturing a group and 
expressing verbal support for the group. Usually, a verbal or visual message alone was 
sufficient to convey a message of support. There is only one issue (teacher pay raises) 
where a combined verbal and visual message had an effect where the audio and image 
content were insufficient on their own. More often than not, combining verbal and visual 
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 messages yielded an effect similar to verbal messages alone, and responses in these 
conditions were not significantly different from each other.  
I also asked respondents to place the candidate on the more general question of 
government support for jobs and a standard of living in order to see how images affected 
respondent views of a candidate at a more general level. While the different groups used 
in this experiment may carry different ideological connotations, most of them seem to 
send a message of government support for a particular group, as seen in Table 6.6. These 
group support questions are almost all linked to support for a standard of living 
(Medicare, aid to farmers, aid to African-Americans, etc.) It would seem that all of the 
groups pictured should lead respondents to infer that the candidate supports government 
aid in general. In order to see how campaign ads affected perceptions of the candidate on 
this issue I estimated an ordered logit model with the 7 point standard of living question 
as the dependent variable coded so that higher numbers indicated the candidate was 
strongly in favor of government support. I used indicator variables to show whether or 
not a respondent viewed a particular image or heard a particular appeal.  In a separate 
model I also controlled for other factors, such as the respondent’s self placement on the 
issue, partisanship, ideology, gender and race. 
The results in the first two columns of Table 6.7 show that images had an impact 
on respondents’ views of the candidate on a more general economic issue, beyond 
support for one group. Five of the group image types used in these ads, African-
Americans, Latinos, blue-collar workers, farmers and soldiers, had a significant, positive 
impact on respondent placements of the candidate, while none had a statistically 
significant negative effect. These results show that respondents used imagery to make 
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 general inferences about the candidate’s economic views. While these groups may have 
carried different ideological connotations (see below), they all conveyed the message that 
the candidate would use government power to help its citizens.  
On the other hand, there was much more variance among the verbal treatments. 
Verbal support for Latinos and African-Americans increased the candidates perceived 
support for a guaranteed standard of living, but messages relating to soldiers, police 
officers and businesspeople had a significant negative effect. For this last group, the 
negative effect was expected because the verbal message related to business includes 
lessening government regulation, essentially arguing for less government involvement in 
the economy. The effect for soldiers and police officers is more unusual, since neither of 
the verbal appeals in those cases would seem to have anything to do with a guaranteed 
standard of living. It is possible that subjects view the verbal support for police and 
soldiers as a signal of the candidate’s conservatism, and used that conservative signal to 
make inferences about his support for a guaranteed standard of living. 
I repeated this analysis using gun control as the dependent variable (also on a 7 
point scale with lower values favoring increased gun control measures). Unlike the 
standard of living variable, there is no reason to believe that any of the images used in the 
experimental ads would have an effect on perceptions of the candidate’s position on gun 
control.61 The results are in the last two columns in Table 6.7 and show that the images 
from the experiment ads had little effect on how respondents perceived the candidate on 
gun control. Only one coefficient (for images of African-Americans) is statistically 
significant, and even this coefficient ceases to be statistically significant when other 
                                                 
61 It is possible that images of police officers might influence perceptions of the candidate on this issue 
since both are related to criminal policy. It is not clear, however, what inference a viewer would draw from 
an image of a police officer. 
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 control variables are introduced. The absence of significant results suggests that used the 
people pictured in ads to make inferences about the candidate’s policy positions, but only 
when the images actually conveyed relevant information. For an issue like gun control, 
where we would not expect images to have an impact on perceptions of the candidate, 
there is no evidence that campaign images had an effect, which would indicate that the 
results from the first two columns in Table 6.7 are not simply a spurious artifact. 
In addition to drawing inferences about support for a group, it seems that subjects 
also used the images in the ads to make a judgment about the candidate’s ideology. 
Figure 6.7 shows where respondents placed the candidate on a 7-point ideological scale. 
In the control condition, with non-ideological images and relatively banal policy 
promises, respondents placed the candidate at 3.76 on the scale, or just slightly to the left 
of center. For almost every group pictured, respondents in the image treatment placed the 
candidate to the left or right of the control condition as expected. Due to the small 
sample, not all of these differences are statistically significant, but the overall pattern is 
still remarkable. For example, while subjects who viewed campaign ads with images of 
blue-collar workers did not see the candidate as more supportive on substantive issues, 
they did see him as significantly more liberal than those in the control condition. Images 
of workers, African-Americans and Latinos all led the subjects to place the candidate to 
the liberal side of the control condition, while images of senior citizens, police officers, 
soldiers, farmers and business led respondents to assume that the candidate was more 
conservative. This is the precise pattern expected, based on the ideological reputations of 
each of these groups. 
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  There is one odd instance of a group being pictured and leading subjects to a 
conclusion about the candidate’s ideology that is the opposite of what I expected. When 
the candidate pictured teachers, apparently, subjects viewed him as more conservative 
than they did in the control condition. This is the only case of a candidate picturing a 
group and not placing the candidate in the correct ideological direction. Notice, however, 
that respondents did not really interpret verbal support for teachers as a liberal signal, nor 
did they interpret the combination of verbal and visual support as an indication of the 
candidate’s ideology. Verbal support for teachers and the combined verbal and visual 
support yielded a perception of ideology that was almost identical to perceptions in the 
control condition. For whatever reason, it seems that subjects within the experiment did 
not regard teachers as a liberal group. 
In fact, for each group pictured the pattern of responses across all three types of 
treatments (verbal, visual, verbal and visual combined) is remarkably similar. It seems 
that, in general, subjects interpreted visual cues about the candidate’s ideology in exactly 
the same way that they would interpret verbal statements about policy positions. When 
the candidate supported police officers verbally subjects gave him a mean ideological 
rating of 4.35. When the candidate pictured police officers without mentioning crime as 
an issue subjects gave him a rating of 4.29. The response pattern, and in many cases the 
actual mean ratings, between subjects who only saw an image of a group and subjects 
who heard a verbal message of support is identical. Support for conservative groups, be it 
verbal or visual, led to perceptions of the candidate as more conservative and support for 
liberal groups led subjects to believe the candidate was more liberal. 
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 6.5: Summary 
These experiments provide strong evidence of the importance of campaign 
imagery, and the way that voters use images to make substantive inferences. Visual 
information from the campaign ad had a strong impact on voter perceptions. This chapter 
confirms much of the previous, indirect evidence in earlier chapters while explaining 
some of the discrepancies in those observational analyses. In these experiments I have 
shown that images can influence perceptions of candidate’s issue positions and 
ideological reputation. Further, voters draw the same inferences from campaign ad 
imagery regardless of their own personal characteristics: Democrats, Republicans, and 
members of different social groups all seem to interpret visual information in the same 
manner.  
Campaign images can also be used to increase a candidate’s favorability among 
voters who are predisposed to like the visual message presented in the ad, and there is 
little evidence that these image appeals will hurt the candidate with other voters. 
Combining verbal and visual appeals did not noticeably strengthen the candidate’s 
message. When the candidate made a verbal appeal, perceptions of the candidate were 
unaffected by whether or not this verbal appeal was matched with a visual appeal. The 
advantage of using a visual appeal is not that it strengthens verbal messages. Instead, 
candidates can make similar appeals using images or words, but it seems that images do 
not result in the kind of negative reaction that verbal appeals elicit among voters who 
disagree with the issue position taken by the candidate. 
As with any experiment, there should be questions about the external validity of 
these results. Most notably, while no respondents had a negative reaction to images in the 
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 lab, the CCAP experiment only measured reactions after viewing one ad with an 
unknown candidate. In a real-world campaign setting, with repeated exposure to an ad, it 
is entirely possible that campaign images would start to elicit a negative response. If 
respondents had a chance to repeatedly view a candidate’s advertisement and develop a 
stronger impression of the candidate, they might well react to imagery with the same 
negativity that they had when presented with a verbal message they disliked. The results 
from the previous chapter’s survey analysis would seem to indicate that, over the course 
of the campaign, images can create a negative impression among some respondents. It 
may be that repeated exposure over the course of the campaign either increases a voter’s 
certainty about a candidate’s positions or simply increases the importance of a particular 
issue. In either case, a voter opposed to the candidate’s visual signal would be more 
likely to punish that candidate. 
With that caveat aside, however, the results from these experiments show a strong 
connection between image and substance. Regardless of whether or not citizens in an 
actual campaign would feel the same way about the candidate as the subjects in this 
experiment, there seems little reason to think that they would not learn the same things 
about the candidate from his campaign ad imagery. It now seems clear that individuals 
form substantive impressions about a candidate based on the visual information presented 
in a campaign ad. This information signal exists independent of the verbal information in 
the ad and affects overall perceptions of the candidate. If anything, it seems that repeated 
exposure over the course of the campaign would increase the strength of this information 
signal. Candidates looking to manipulate voters, then, might do well to remember that 
voters believe their eyes as well as their ears. Candidates should take care and examine 
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 exactly what story the pictures in their ads tell about them.
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 Chapter 6 Tables and Figures 
Table 6.1: Design of the CCAP experiment 
  Video condition 
  Generic 
video 
African-
American video 
Worker video 
Generic audio 
 
159 155 169 
Pro-min. 
wage audio 
155 -- 161 
Audio 
condition 
Pro-
affirmative 
action audio 
152 140 -- 
Cells indicate the number of subjects randomly assigned to each condition 
Table 6.2: Testing affective responses-Blacks 
Group Condition Mean placement on 
feeling thermometer
N 
African-
Americans 
Video pictured 
blacks 
 
Control 
 
49.00 
(7.66) 
 
57.00 
(7.11) 
 
13 
 
 
7 
Union 
members 
Video pictured 
workers 
 
Control 
58.41 
(2.99) 
 
59.21 
(3.17) 
 
58 
 
 
53 
Cells are mean values with standard errors in parentheses 
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 Table 6.3: Feelings toward Kennedy among Democrats and Independents, by issue 
beliefs 
Partisanship Attitude Ad pictured 
workers 
Ad mentioned 
min. wage 
Control 
Pro 
benefit 
 
56.80 
(4.82) 
N=15 
55.67 
(7.85) 
N=15 
49.54 
(7.37) 
N=11 
Democrat 
Anti 
Benefit 
 
65.24 
(4.67) 
N=21 
56.45 
(5.12) 
N=20 
64.18 
(3.81) 
N=17 
Pro 
benefit 
 
62.67 
(3.50) 
N=9 
53.25 
(8.53) 
N=4 
41.22 
(7.44) 
N=9 
Independent 
Anti 
benefit 
 
66.77 
(2.83) 
N=31 
69.26 
(3.17) 
N=19 
63.26 
(3.85) 
N=27 
Cells are mean values with standard errors in parentheses 
 
Table 6.4: Feelings toward Kennedy among Democrats and Independents, by issue 
beliefs 
Partisanship Attitude Ad pictured 
African-
Americans 
Ad mentioned 
affirmative 
action 
Control 
Pro 
benefit 
 
60.31 
(4.09) 
N=26 
63.42 
(4.38) 
N=31 
50.91 
(5.38) 
N=24 
Democrat 
Anti 
Benefit 
 
60.59 
(4.67) 
N=17 
54.60 
(7.86) 
N=10 
61.13 
(3.42) 
N=15 
Pro 
benefit 
 
55.13 
(6.92) 
N=15 
65.86 
(6.33) 
N=8 
46.75 
(7.34) 
N=8 
Independent 
Anti 
benefit 
 
56.58 
(3.28) 
N=19 
54.00 
(6.68) 
N=17 
65.13 
(3.63) 
N=31 
Cells are mean values with standard errors in parentheses 
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 Table 6.5: Feelings about Kennedy among union members 
Partisanship Attitude Ad pictured 
workers 
Control Difference 
Pro benefit 
 
57.38 
(8.06) 
N=8 
36.6 
(11.12) 
N=5 
20.78* 
(13.44) 
Democrat 
Anti Benefit 
 
55.90 
(5.15) 
N=20 
54.71 
(6.09) 
N=14 
1.19 
(7.99) 
Pro benefit 
 
72.67 
(4.33) 
N=13 
49.75 
(7.36) 
N=14 
22.92** 
(9.44) 
Independent 
Anti benefit 
 
58.78 
(4.30) 
N=18 
64.92 
(5.52) 
N=13 
-6.15 
(6.90) 
Republican -- 
 
66.63 
(10.01) 
N=8 
67.41 
(5.50) 
N=17 
-.79 
(10.52) 
Cells are mean values with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.1,  **p<.05 
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 Table 6.6: Summary of differences in mean value of issue placements 
Group Issues Differences 
Education spending Verbal only** 
Image* 
Image and verbal** 
Teachers 
Teacher pay Image and verbal* 
Minimum wage -- Blue-collar workers 
Free trade -- 
Gov’t regulation Verbal only** 
Image* 
Image and verbal** 
Businesspeople 
Free trade Verbal only* 
Farm subsidies Image only* 
Verbal only** 
Image and verbal** 
Farmer 
Ethanol subsidies Image only** 
Verbal only** 
Image and verbal** 
Police hiring Verbal only** 
Image only* 
Image and verbal** 
Police 
Tough on crime Verbal only** 
Image only* 
Image and verbal** 
Defense spending Verbal only** 
Image* 
Soldiers 
Veteran healthcare Image only** 
Verbal only** 
Medicare Image only* 
Verbal only** 
Image and verbal** 
Senior citizens 
Social Security -- 
Affirmative Action Image only** 
Verbal only** 
Image and verbal** 
African-Americans 
Aid to blacks Image only* 
Verbal only** 
Image and verbal** 
Aid to Latinos Image only* 
Verbal only** 
Image and verbal** 
Latinos 
Immigration Verbal only** 
Image and verbal** 
Education spending Verbal only** 
Image only* 
Image and verbal** 
Children 
Children’s healthcare -- 
*p<.1, **p<.05, indicate statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups 
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 Table 6.7:  Effects of video and audio treatments on perceptions of candidate 
 DV=standard of 
living (7 point scale) 
 DV=standard of 
living (7 point scale) 
DV=support for gun 
control (7 point scale) 
 DV=support for gun 
control (7 point scale) 
Video      
     Children 
 
     Senior citizens 
 
     Teachers 
 
     Farmers 
 
     Blue-collar workers 
 
     Businesspeople 
 
     Soldiers 
 
     Police officers 
 
     African-Americans 
 
     Latinos 
 
Audio     
     Children 
 
     Senior citizens 
 
     Teachers 
 
     Farmers 
 
     Blue-collar workers 
 
     Businesspeople 
 
     Soldiers 
 
     Police officers 
 
     African-Americans 
 
     Latinos 
 
Partisanship 
 
Ideology 
 
Self-placement 
 
African-American 
 
Latino 
 
Female 
 
 
Log Likelihood 
N 
 
-.37 
(.34) 
-.26 
(.45) 
.25 
(.41) 
1.10** 
(.40) 
.63* 
(.39) 
-.28 
(.37) 
.77** 
(.30) 
.46 
(.34) 
.98** 
(.40) 
.75* 
(.44) 
 
-.13 
(.34) 
-.82 
(.66) 
-.45 
(.42) 
.08 
(.39) 
.12 
(.39) 
-.92** 
(.41) 
-.96** 
(.29) 
-.73** 
(.36) 
.69* 
(.38) 
1.15** 
(.39) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-982.19 
547 
 
.00 
(.35) 
-.40 
(.44) 
.33 
(.42) 
.96** 
(.41) 
.96** 
(.40) 
-.17 
(.37) 
.60** 
(.30) 
.43 
(.34) 
1.08** 
(.41) 
.75* 
(.44) 
 
-.29 
(.34) 
-.56 
(.47) 
-.58 
(.43) 
.25 
(.40) 
.01 
(.39) 
-.83** 
(.41) 
-.80 
(.30) 
-.63* 
(.36) 
.65* 
(.38) 
1.20** 
(.39) 
.00 
(.04) 
.03 
(.08) 
.44** 
(.06) 
.11 
(.33) 
-.34 
(.29) 
.23 
(.16) 
 
-942.80 
547 
 
-.17 
(.34) 
.36 
(.46) 
.10 
(.44) 
.01 
(.41) 
.04 
(.37) 
-.41 
(.36) 
-.39 
(.31) 
.41 
(.34) 
-.80** 
(.38) 
-.30 
(.42) 
 
-.26 
(.34) 
-.09 
(.47) 
-.87* 
(.45) 
.02 
(.40) 
-1.01** 
(.38) 
-.04 
(.39) 
.42 
(.47) 
-1.01** 
(.37) 
-.48 
(.36) 
-.64* 
(.36) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-972.43 
547 
 
-.14 
(.35) 
.32 
(.46) 
.24 
(.44) 
-.10 
(.42) 
-.15 
(.38) 
-.52 
(.36) 
-.41 
(.31) 
.42 
(.35) 
-.66 
(.41) 
-.27 
(.44) 
 
-.32 
(.34) 
-.13 
(.48) 
-1.02** 
(.47) 
..02 
(.41) 
-1.06** 
(.38) 
-..06 
(.38) 
.12 
(.30) 
-1.16** 
(.38) 
-.48 
(.37) 
-.64* 
(.38) 
-.03 
(.04) 
-.12 
(.08) 
.20** 
(.05) 
-.39 
(.32) 
.24 
(.29) 
-.08 
(.16) 
 
-961.89 
547 
Cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.1, **p<.05 
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 Figure 6.1: Mean placement of Kennedy on racial issues 
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 Figure 6.2: Mean placement of Kennedy on worker issues 
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 Figure 6.3: Mean placement of Kennedy on ideology 
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 Figure 6.4: Perceptions of Kennedy, by partisanship 
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 Figure 6.5: Perceptions of Kennedy among union and non-union respondents 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Feelings toward Kennedy-Republicans only 
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 Figure 6.7: Placement on liberal/conservative scale 
Image only 
 
Verbal message only 
 
Verbal and Visual Message 
 
Each graph shows the mean placement, within condition, on a liberal/conservative scale with 95% 
confidence intervals shown (the number of subjects in each cell is indicated in parentheses). Higher values 
indicate a more conservative placement. The red line on each graph represents ideological placement in the 
control condition 
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 Chapter 7: Seeing is Believing 
7.1: Summary 
In this chapter, I will summarize my main findings and discuss their implications 
for campaign research and campaign practices. The aim of this dissertation has been to 
show how voters use visual information in campaign ads to make inferences about 
candidates, and, ultimately, use those inferences to make judgments about the candidate. 
In Chapter 2 I used research in advertising and psychology to derive three hypotheses 
about the effects of campaign imagery: the Identity Hypothesis stated that responses 
should be affective and a function of the match between the identity of the viewer and the 
identity of the people pictured in the ad, the Group Support Hypothesis stated that 
viewers would use images of groups to make inferences about the candidate’s issue 
positions, and the Ideology Hypothesis stated that viewers would use images to make 
inferences about a candidate’s overall ideology.  
I found strong evidence that campaign images are often treated as substantive 
information. I have shown that the groups pictured in campaign ads (children, senior 
citizens, farmers, teachers, soldiers, police officers, blue-collar workers, businesspeople, 
African-Americans, and Latinos) often affect voter perceptions of a candidate. While the 
approaches used in each chapter are subject to important limitation on their own, the 
analysis in each chapter supports the same basic conclusion. The multi-method approach 
in this dissertation ensures that the results of the analysis are not merely a by-product of 
one research design. Experimental and observational evidence consistently supported the 
Group Support and Ideology hypotheses. Voters can use visual information to make 
inferences about candidates, and the people pictured within a campaign ad can lead 
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 individuals to make judgments about a candidate in the same way that they would use a 
candidate’s verbal statements. In contrast, I found little evidence that individuals respond 
positively to self-congruent campaign imagery. While there was some indication that 
picturing a group may be more likely to affect members of that group, those individuals 
who reacted to the image did not do so according to their social identity. Instead, they 
liked or disliked the candidate based on how well the implicit message of the image 
aligned with their own political views. Overall it seems clear that voters draw a great deal 
of substantive information from campaign ad images, and the affective impact of 
picturing a group within a campaign ad on members of that group is vastly overrated.  
Considering the prevalence (and expense) of audio/visual appeals in television 
advertising and, recently, in online campaign videos, it is imperative that we understand 
how both audio and visual stimuli affect individuals. My findings suggest that there is a 
strong informational undercurrent in political advertisements that campaign researchers 
have not addressed. There is a strong body of literature on the verbal information 
contained in campaign ads (Sulkin 2009; Geer 2006; Kaplan, Park, and Ridout 2006) and 
the effect of that verbal information on voters (Huckfeldt et al. 2007; Hutchings et al. 
2004; Druckman, Jacobs, and Ostermeier 2004; Kam 2006; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; 
Sides and Karch 2008; Valentino, Hutchings, and Williams 2004); however, until now 
there has been little discussion of the visual information in campaign ads. As a result, we 
have systematically mischaracterized the informational content of political campaigns, 
and many observational studies that only analyzed verbal appeals may need to be 
revisited. Though there may be a correlation between verbal and visual appeals within 
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 some campaigns, these represent different information streams and both must be 
accounted for in order to understand how the campaign affects the voter. 
 
7.2: How are images used in campaign ads? 
While campaign research has been slow to pick up on the informational content of 
campaign imagery, campaign strategists have also been slow to realize its importance. In 
Chapter 3 I used surveys and qualitative data to get a sense of what campaigns try to 
accomplish with ad imagery. Images are treated as a high priority when designing 
campaign materials, and it is generally believed that the images in the ad may actually 
have more of an impact than its explicit verbal content. On the other hand, strategists’ 
beliefs about the effects of images indicate that the Identity Hypothesis drives decision-
making in political campaigns. The survey data and subsequent interviews with campaign 
consultants revealed that the people who make campaign ads often try to play on social 
identity cues to generate affective ties between the candidate and the voters. These 
findings fit with previous literature on campaign consultants (Perloff and Kinsey 1992; 
Kern 1989), and the perception that affect is most important persists even though 
professionals seem to believe that imagery also has a substantive component. Though 
many agreed that images transmit a signal about the candidate’s issue positions or 
ideology, few believed that these signals mattered. In interviews, when I attempted to 
bring up the substantive component of ad images, many consultants redirected the 
conversation back to affect and emotion. When consultants talk about the impact of ad 
imagery they talk about it primarily in terms of how it makes voters feel. The prevailing 
 190
 view seems to be that campaign imagery is best utilized as a way to show voters that the 
candidate is “one of them” by using images that remind voters of themselves. 
Importantly, the considerations that drive image choices seem to be very different 
from those that drive the verbal content of the campaign ad. Campaign consultants, in 
both the survey and follow-up interviews, indicated that insincere verbal appeals have 
little chance of being effective in campaigns. Further, every consultant I spoke with 
believed that the candidate’s own sincere views and priorities would help decide the 
issues discussed and the general direction of the campaign. One campaign manager told 
me, “If a candidate doesn’t believe it’s difficult to get the message across.  It’s hard to 
fake it.  On any campaign a candidate cares about 3 or 4 issues.  Those are the ones he 
fights for, those are the one he will not compromise on.”  In contrast, most consultants 
believed that image choices could be more pliable and designed to meet the needs of the 
campaign regardless of the sincerity of the implicit message in the image. 
It seems that visual and verbal messages are designed with very different goals in 
mind, so there was little agreement among consultants on whether or not visual messages 
should match the verbal content within a campaign ad. Some believed that the visual and 
verbal content should match in order to maximize the impact of the message or to make it 
easier for the voter to understand. Others argued that the ad should multi-task and use 
varying visual and verbal content to reach out to as many different constituents as 
possible. Notice, though, that both of these groups implied that campaign ad images do 
send a substantive message. 
This disagreement on congruence can be seen in congressional campaigns. In 
Chapter 4, I presented findings from the 2000, 2002 and 2004 Congressional campaigns. 
 191
 These data showed a strong association between the demographics of the district and the 
groups pictured in campaign ads, confirming the strategic role of images described in 
Chapter 3. Importantly, the data also showed the disconnect between visual and verbal 
appeals within campaigns. There was often a significant correlation between picturing a 
group and talking about issues related to that group, but this relationship was far from 
perfect. Campaign ads frequently picture groups like blue-collar workers, soldiers, or 
African-Americans without verbally addressing issues such as job training, military 
spending, or Affirmative Action. This lack of congruence between visual and verbal 
appeals is particularly important for observational campaign research since it 
demonstrates that researchers cannot simply assume that visual information is redundant. 
My analysis of these three election cycles indicates that the verbal and visual content of 
campaign ads often present viewers with different information. 
 
7.3: How does ad imagery affect voters? 
Furthermore, that visual information affects how voters judge candidates and how 
they vote on Election Day. Chapter 4 shows that candidates rely on district demographics 
to make image choices, but it also shows that, in the aggregate, this may be an inefficient 
use of campaign imagery. My analysis of election returns and congressional campaigns 
show that the utility of picturing groups in campaign ads varied according to how well 
the group matched the ideological make-up of the district. Picturing liberal groups had a 
positive effect on candidates’ fortunes in liberal districts and a negative effect in 
conservative districts, and vice versa for picturing conservative groups.  
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  This aggregate data is backed up by the results of individual-level analysis in 
Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5 I used data from the 2000 congressional campaigns and 
the National Annenberg Election Study to show that individual feelings about candidates 
varied as a function of the groups pictured in the campaign and the individual’s own 
predispositions. Individuals who supported benefits for a group, or whose partisanship 
coincided with the ideological reputation of the group, felt more favorable toward a 
candidate who pictured that group. Those who were opposed to the group and its 
ideology reacted negatively to the group. The difference in feelings indicated that 
respondents were using visual messages to make substantive inferences about the 
candidate. This evidence was confirmed with a direct test in the experiments discussed in 
Chapter 6. Subjects who viewed an ad picturing a group believed the candidate to be 
more supportive of that group, and more liberal or conservative, depending on the 
ideological reputation of the group. 
 Like the aggregate analysis, the results from Chapters 5 and 6 provide strong 
evidence that a campaign strategy based solely on the Identity Hypothesis is a tactical 
mistake. The observational analysis in Chapter 5 provided some evidence that individuals 
were more likely to respond to a self-congruent image, but those responses were 
conditioned by the respondent’s political predispositions. Senior citizens, for example, 
had stronger reactions to images of seniors than respondents below age 65; however, 
liberal seniors liked candidates less when they pictured senior citizens in their ads. 
Similarly, seniors opposed to increased Medicare and Social Security benefits reacted 
negatively to candidates who pictured seniors, while those who favored such policies 
reacted positively to candidates who pictured seniors. Respondents who were not a 
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 member of the group pictured tended to respond favorably or not at all to a group image. 
If the group pictured had an ideological reputation consistent with the respondent’s 
political views, he or she might like the candidate more, but there was little evidence that 
the respondent would punish a candidate for picturing a group he or she did not like. 
While individual political predispositions dictated voters’ feelings about 
candidates, they did not prevent voters from making similar inferences about a 
candidate’s ideology and issue positions. In Chapter 6 I showed that image-based 
inferences do not vary across different groups. In an experimental setting, subjects made 
the same inferences about the candidate based on the images in the ad regardless of 
whether or not they were members of the group being pictured. This would seem to 
indicate that candidates’ ads can have a strong impact on how they are viewed by the 
voters. Republicans, Democrats, African-Americans, whites, and so on all received the 
same message from campaign imagery. 
While all individuals drew the same inferences from campaign imagery, there 
were substantial differences in how they felt about the candidate. For example, in the 
Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project experiment, union members were more likely to 
have positive feelings about a candidate who showed blue-collar workers if they were 
Democrats and favored government benefits for workers. On the other hand, white 
subjects actually had strong positive reactions to images of African-Americans (provided 
they were Democrats in favor of government aid to blacks), but there was little change in 
the feelings of African-American subjects toward the candidate regardless of the images 
in the campaign ad. In this experiment, there was never a significant negative reaction to 
the candidate among respondents opposed to benefits for workers or blacks.  
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 This absence of a backlash, which was mirrored among many respondents in the 
NAES, is somewhat puzzling. All individuals got the same information from campaign 
images, so why didn’t subjects opposed to benefits for the group pictured react 
negatively? Here I can only speculate. It is possible that individuals who favor a group 
benefit may also feel more strongly about the issue than those who oppose it, and, 
therefore, are more likely to alter their overall feelings about a candidate based on their 
beliefs about where the candidate stands on that issue. It is also possible that individuals 
are willing to give candidates the benefit of the doubt. Picturing a group is an implied 
message of support for the group, but not one explicitly stated, and opponents of group 
benefits may be reluctant to punish candidates for an inference made based on visuals.  
The experimental and observational results indicate that campaign imagery can be 
a powerful tool for influencing voters. By providing cues about candidate policy 
positions, it alters the perceived issue positions and ideology of candidates and can 
change the way voters feel about the candidates in a way that offers enormous benefits to 
candidates with few costs. The observational evidence indicates that picturing a group 
may lead to negative feelings among members of the group who oppose benefits or who 
stand in opposition to the group’s reputed ideology. If that is true, then a candidate who 
makes an image appeal may receive some negative reaction from a small subset of the 
electorate, but this would likely be offset by positive reactions from voters both within 
the group and in the electorate as a whole who support the group being pictured. At the 
very least, it seems unlikely that the image appeal would harm the candidate, and it may 
work to his or her benefit. Campaign images may be especially useful for candidates who 
need to broaden their appeal while avoiding a backlash among their key supporters. In the 
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 CCAP experiment, a Republican candidate received much higher ratings from white 
Democrats in favor of Affirmative Action when he pictured African-Americans in his ads 
without suffering any negative effects among Republican subjects.  
Campaign strategists are incorrect to focus solely on social identity factors when 
they choose campaign images, but they may have an accurate view of the flexibility and 
utility of campaign images. It would seem difficult to question the sincerity of a 
candidate’s image choices. That is, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where a candidate 
would be called disingenuous because he or she pictured Latinos, for example, but failed 
to act to benefit Latinos in office. If imagery can be used to shape voter perceptions with 
little negative impact, then it would be an important campaign tool with low cost, low 
risk, and high reward. Given that campaigns generally prefer to picture people in their ads 
anyway (see Chapter 3), it would not be difficult to retool, shift away from an identity-
based approach to campaign imagery, and choose people based on how well they match 
up with the issue beliefs and partisanship of the constituency. 
 
7.4: Accounting for visual information 
 While campaign strategists may need to rethink their approach to using campaign 
imagery, political scientists may also need to change their approach to studying 
campaigns. If campaign images are providing information to voters, then we must 
account for that information signal when trying to determine campaign effects. To some 
extent, the findings from this dissertation are very intuitive. It is not surprising that 
viewers would be able to see an image of African-Americans and associate that image 
with an issue position, and because many of the findings in this study are intuitive, it may 
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 be easy to dismiss their importance. Although there has been other research on racial 
images (Philpot 2004), this is the first study to confirm the idea that viewers use images 
of different social identity groups to make inferences about candidates. These findings 
indicate that all research on campaign effects should take verbal and visual appeals into 
account. Failure to do so results in a research design where the researcher has not 
properly identified the total content of the campaign. 
 For example, in their study on mobilizing issue publics, Sides and Karch (2007) 
studied the effect of campaign appeals on voter turnout among issue publics in 1998, 
2000, and 2002 by matching campaign data from the Wisconsin Ads Project with survey 
data from the Current Population Survey. They studied how appeals on education and 
childcare, Social Security and Medicare, and veterans’ issues affected turnout rates 
among parents, senior citizens, and military veterans, respectively. They hypothesized 
that these groups should be more likely to turn out to vote if they viewed campaign ads 
that talked about issues important to them, and found little evidence that these issues 
motivated these groups to go to the polls. They report a modest turnout effect among 
parents and null results for seniors and veterans. 
Naturally, the Sides and Karch study focused only on what candidates talked 
about in their ads, neglecting any visual information that may have been present. The 
present study focuses on how images change attitudes about candidates, rather than 
whether or not images might motivate participation; however, it seems many of my 
findings on campaign imagery could apply here. Sides and Karch hypothesize that issue 
publics should participate when campaigns make issues important to them salient. 
Essentially, by giving people information, the campaign sends a signal that the election 
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 will be of particular importance to a group. The evidence presented here shows that 
images of groups (like children and senior citizens) are also signals about candidate 
positions. Since voters treat campaign images as information, they may also be 
encouraged to participate (or not) based on whether or not that visual information is 
present in the campaign. What if visual messages (or some combination of visual and 
verbal cues) actually motivate issue publics to vote? Children and seniors are often 
pictured in campaign ads (see Chapter 4), and it is not hard to imagine voters using visual 
as well as verbal cues when deciding to turn out to vote.  
The example of senior citizens is particularly illustrative. In 2002, according to 
my coding of Senate and House campaigns, candidates aired 659 distinct ads that either 
pictured a senior citizen or mentioned Medicare or Social Security. Of those ads, 320 
simply pictured a senior without ever mentioning the issues, 139 mentioned an issue 
without ever picturing seniors, and 200 did both. Recall from Chapter 5 that seniors 
varied in their feelings toward candidates based on whether or not the candidate pictured 
seniors and their own political predispositions. On the other hand, the amount of time 
candidates spend talking about Medicare and Social Security seemed to have no impact 
on feelings about congressional candidates. This does not necessarily imply that visual 
appeals increase turnout, but it does demonstrate that visual appeals have an effect on 
voter judgments and provide the kind of information that Sides and Karch suggest should 
increase turnout. They reported that campaigns featuring increased discussion of Social 
Security had no impact on turnout among senior citizens; however, it seems entirely 
plausible that campaign ads that picture seniors increase issue salience. At the least, it 
seems like an empirical question worthy of study. 
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 I use this example not to scold particular scholars but to point to a larger gap in 
the existing study of political campaigns. Political scientists study a large number of 
campaign effects (persuasion, mobilization, learning, etc.) that require measures of the 
information present in the campaign and how voters receive and interpret that 
information. By and large, though, the discipline has only focused on verbal information 
and ignored visual information. In doing so, observational studies of campaign appeals 
have been using incomplete measures of the campaign. As I showed in Chapter 4, verbal 
and visual content in campaign ads may be correlated, but the two are hardly 
synonymous. One measure cannot be substituted or serve as a proxy for the other. 
Political scientists have generally accounted for verbal information, but my findings 
make it clear that voters derive both verbal and visual information from campaign ads. 
 
7.5: Puzzles and future research 
 In this dissertation, I have attempted to highlight the importance of visual 
information and its role in shaping voter perceptions. The findings presented here are 
important, but they should hardly be considered the last word on campaign images. This 
dissertation provides some answers about the role of visual information in political 
campaigns but also raises important questions about campaign strategy and campaign 
effects. 
For example, in my discussions with campaign consultants and in the data on 
congressional campaigns, it became clear that campaign ad images are chosen based on 
how well those images match the identity of the voters. This brings up an interesting 
puzzle: Campaign ad images are chosen simply for their ability to generate affective 
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 bonds between candidates and voters. Campaign managers believe that images are a 
tactical tool and not subject to constraints like a candidate’s record or issue positions. In 
short, there is no reason to believe that campaign images would serve as a valid signal 
about behavior in office. Yet, there is a strong correlation between picturing a group and 
supporting it in office (Sulkin and Swigger 2008).  
It is entirely reasonable to believe that candidates might face penalties with 
disappointed voters for failing to live up to the verbal promises they made in campaign 
ads—indeed, the evidence suggests that candidates work to live up to their verbal appeals 
(Sulkin 2009)—but one of the main advantages of visual appeals is that, seemingly, there 
would be no incentive to follow-up on the campaign appeal. Campaign consultants were 
quite open about their perception of campaign imagery as flexible, and they felt no need 
to worry about congruence between the image appeal and either past or future behavior in 
office. Why, then, does empirical evidence suggest there is a connection between 
campaign imagery and behavior in office? The correlation may be spurious. Candidates 
who base their image strategy on the Identity Hypothesis presumably choose to picture 
certain groups because those groups have a large presence in the district, and the 
candidate then acts on behalf of the group when in office in order to maintain a policy 
record congruent with the beliefs of an important constituency. Alternatively, candidates 
may use campaign images to send a signal to voters who may be resistant to verbal 
appeals (Rahn 1993) or are uninformed about a candidate’s actual issue positions. Given 
that voters actually use images as a signal about candidate positions, it seems vital to 
understand the normative quality of visual information in campaigns and the possible 
reasons why images may serve as an effective signal about legislative behavior. 
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 Questions about campaign strategy and the interaction of campaigns and policy 
behavior aside, there are also unanswered questions surrounding the effect of campaign 
images on voters. In this dissertation I have dealt with only one type of campaign 
imagery: the people pictured in the campaign ad. Other factors, such as setting or 
symbols of religion and patriotism, may also contribute important signals that voters may 
use to judge candidates. Typically, these symbols are talked about in terms of the 
emotions generated (Brader 2006), but they may also contribute to the substantive 
evaluation of a candidate. I have also focused on how image appeals affect perceptions of 
a white, male candidate. Females and minorities present a different image, and voters 
make different inferences based on the appearance of the candidate (Huddy and 
Terkildsen 1993; Todorov et al. 2004). In this study, I kept the appearance of the 
candidate constant in order to establish the effects of other images within the ad. In 
principle, the effects of those images should remain constant even as the appearance of 
the candidate changes. It is possible that there may be some interactions if the social 
identity of the candidate coincides with the images shown (e.g., an African-American 
candidate picturing African-Americans), but it is equally feasible that the effect of the 
images would stay constant and only the baseline impact of the candidate’s appearance 
would vary. 
 More importantly, my dissertation has not really touched on the interaction 
between emotional reactions and substantive inferences. Past research on political 
imagery has found that ads can elicit emotional reactions (Brader 2006; Brader 2005; 
Huddy and Gunnthorsdottir 2000). In this study, I have looked at how viewers use images 
to make a judgment about the candidate. To some degree, ads probably elicit emotional 
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 responses and transmit substantive signals simultaneously. Not all ads may provoke 
strong emotional responses; by the same token, not all ads provide a great deal of visual 
information. Undoubtedly, though, there are instances where an ad provokes a strong 
emotional reaction and provides substantive visual cues, and it is not clear how a viewer 
would be affected by the combination of those appeals. For example, Brader (2006) 
found that fear-based appeals provoked anxiety in viewers. Because of that anxiety, 
viewers paid more attention and remembered more from a subsequent news segment. 
What would happen if an ad provoked anxiety and provided a visual policy cue? It is not 
clear if the anxiety response would make voters more likely to pay attention and pick up 
the policy cue, or if the emotional content of the ad would make it less likely that viewers 
would detect the visual cue, assuming that the emotional appeal and policy cue would 
interact at all. 
 Ultimately, if we intend to understand how campaign ads affect voters we need to 
move toward a synthesis of all of the components of the ads. Campaigns are about 
information. What did the candidate say and what did the voters hear? What did the 
candidate show and what did the voters see? How did what the candidate said and 
showed make the voters feel? Because political scientists have not taken visual and 
verbal information into account, it is difficult to say whether American campaigns 
manipulate helpless voters, or if a savvy public resists the influence of political 
charlatans. If we want to understand the effects and normative quality of campaigns, then 
it is imperative that we account for verbal and visual information and how voters make 
sense of that information and use it to make decisions. By examining the visual appeals, I 
have shown that candidates can have a strong influence on voter perceptions, and further 
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 investigation could reveal that voters and candidates have been communicating in ways 
that a narrow focus on verbal appeals overlooks. The pictures may not tell the whole 
story, but they are certainly part of it. Like the viewers who drew inferences from these 
ads, political scientists can learn a great deal by being watchful and keeping our eyes 
open.  
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 Appendix A: Online Survey of Political Consultants 
 
[Introduction and instruction page] 
The survey involves answering some general demographics questions and some questions 
about your attitudes toward campaign advertisements.  I am particularly interested in 
your opinion of the use and impact of the verbal and visual elements of a television ad. 
The survey takes about 5 minutes to complete and must be done in one sitting.   If you 
wish to skip a question, you may leave it blank and continue with the survey.  If, at any 
point prior to the end of the survey, you wish to end your participation, simply close your 
Internet browser.  This is a research project being conducted by Nathaniel Swigger under 
the direction of Dr. Kuklinski at the University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign.  The 
results of this survey will be disseminated in Mr. Swigger’s doctoral dissertation. 
 
Your participation is completely voluntary, and your responses will be completely 
anonymous.  The ID code you were given in the introductory email is the only identifying 
information collected, and this code is known only to you and the project administrator.  
The data I collect will be analyzed at the group level only.   You do not have to answer 
any question you’d rather not answer.  There are no consequences if you decide not to 
complete the survey.  The decision to participate, decline, or withdraw from participation 
will have no effect on your status at, or future relations with the University of Illinois.   
There are no tangible risks in taking the survey beyond those incurred with normal use of 
a computer, and your opinions will be invaluable to me as I try to understand the 
dynamics of campaign advertising. 
 
If you have any questions about the study you may contact Nathaniel Swigger at the 
University of Illinois department of political science either by phone (217-766-2270) or 
email (swigger@uiuc.edu). 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, please contact 
the University of Illinois  Institutional Review Board at 217-333-2670 (collect calls 
accepted if you identify yourself as a research participant) or via email at irb@uiuc.edu. 
 
If you would like to make a copy of this page for your records you may do so using the 
print function on your browser prior to beginning the survey. 
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 1. In the past, what type of campaigns have you worked on? (check all that apply) 
1. Presidential 
2. U.S. Senate 
3. U.S. House of Representatives 
4. Governor 
5. State legislature 
6. Other statewide offices (Attorney General, Treasurer, etc.) 
7. Local offices (Mayor, City Council member, etc.) 
8. Ballot initiatives and voter referendums 
 
2.  Many campaign professionals only work with one particular party.  Which (if any) 
party’s candidates do you tend to work with? 
1. Democrat 
2. Republican 
3. Green 
4. Reform 
5. Some other political party 
6. Non-partisan only 
7. I work with candidates from any party 
 
3. How long have you worked as a professional on political on political campaigns 
 1. Less than a year 
 2. 1-4 years 
 3. 5-10 
 4. 10-20 
 5. More than 20 years 
 
4. How influential do you think television ads are in shaping voter perceptions of a 
candidate? 
1. Very influential 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
7. Not at all influential 
 
5. How influential do you think the issues discussed in a TV ad are in shaping voter 
perceptions of a candidate? 
1. Very important 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
7. Not at all important 
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6. How influential do you think the visuals shown in a TV ad are in shaping voter 
perceptions of a candidate? 
1. Very important 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
7. Not at all important 
 
7.  How much time and attention do you think a campaign should devote to scripting the 
verbal content of a TV ad? 
1. A great deal of time and attention 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
7. None at all 
 
8.  How much time and attention do you think a campaign should devote to selecting or 
designing the visual look of a TV ad? 
1. A great deal of time and attention 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
7. None at all 
 
9.  In general, do you think it is better for a candidate to appear alone in an ad, or do you 
prefer to have the candidate appear alongside other people? 
1. Prefer candidate alone 
2. Prefer candidate with other people 
3. No preference 
 
10. Is it more effective to have an ad with “average” Americans or an ad with well-
known public figures and celebrities? 
 1. Ordinary Americans 
 2. Celebrities and public figures 
 3. No preference 
 
11. Are ads usually targeted at a specific demographic group or population, or do 
campaign ads usually try to appeal to the electorate as a whole? 
1. Usually target specific group 
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 2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. Usually appeal to constituency as a whole 
 
12.  How important is it that a television ad feature images of people from different racial 
backgrounds? 
 1. Very important 
 2. 
 3. 
 4. 
 5. 
 6. 
 7. Not at all important 
 
13.  How would you describe the production capabilities of the typical campaign?  Is the 
campaign fully capable of producing the ads you want, or do you face a lot of practical 
limitations? 
1.  Full capabilities 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. Very limited production capability.  
 
Based on your experience and knowledge as a campaign professional, please mark 
whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree 
somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following statements: 
 
14. Voters pay more attention to what is said in a campaign ad than they do to the visuals 
in an ad. 
1. Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 
 
15. Voters respond more to ads with people who “look like” themselves. 
1.   Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 
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16. When targeting a specific group, a campaign ad should talk about issues important to 
that group. 
1.   Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 
 
17. When targeting a specific group, a campaign ad should include images of the people 
in that that group. 
1.   Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 
 
18. Candidates, in general, believe the things they say in their campaign ads. 
1. Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 
 
19. Candidates, in general, use the images in their ads to paint an accurate picture of 
themselves. 
1. Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 
 
20. Campaign ad images send voters a signal about the candidate’s ideology. 
1. Agree strongly 
2. Agree somewhat 
3. Neither agree nor disagree 
4. Disagree somewhat 
5. Disagree strongly 
 
 
21. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an 
Independent, or what? 
 1. Democrat 
 2. Republican 
 3. Independent 
 4. Other 
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  5. No preference 
 
22. What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you? Please mark up to three of 
the following choices. 
1. African American/Black 
2. Asian 
3. Native American 
4. Hispanic or Latino 
5. Caucasian/White 
6. Other 
7. Don’t know 
 
 
23. Finally, would you be willing to sit down for a follow-up interview at a later date? If 
so, we may contact you to set up an appointment to discuss your experiences as a 
campaign professional.  This could be done at your office or some other location, and at a 
time that would be convenient for you. 
 1. Yes, I would be willing to conduct a follow-up interview 
 2. No, I would not be willing to conduct a follow-up interview 
 Appendix B: Complete Tables from Aggregate Data Analysis 
 
Table B.1: Image choices in Congressional elections (continued on next page) 
 Children Seniors Latinos Blacks 
 DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP 
% of district in 
demographic group 
 
District ideology 
 
 
% of ads 
mentioning issue  
 
Incumbency 
 
 
Female 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2004 
 
 
Constant 
 
R2 
N 
2.32** 
(1.18) 
 
.44** 
(.21) 
 
.31** 
(.08) 
 
.10** 
(.04) 
 
.13** 
(.06) 
 
-.03 
(.05) 
 
-.17** 
(.05) 
 
-.45 
(.26) 
.20 
235 
-.77 
(.94) 
 
-.44** 
(.25) 
 
.43** 
(.09) 
 
.03 
(.04) 
 
-.05 
(.05) 
 
-.04 
(.05) 
 
-.14** 
(.05) 
 
.66 
(.24) 
.14 
285 
1.10* 
(.62) 
 
.11 
(.24) 
 
.41** 
(.08) 
 
.11** 
(.04) 
 
.01 
(.06) 
 
.05 
(.05) 
 
.02 
(.05) 
 
.04 
(.15) 
.16 
235 
.72* 
(.44) 
 
-.18 
(.27) 
 
.28** 
(.10) 
 
.10** 
(.04) 
 
.06 
(.05) 
 
.09* 
(.05) 
 
-.03 
(.05) 
 
.26 
(.16) 
.09 
285 
.96** 
(.21) 
 
.24* 
(.13) 
 
.50** 
(.18) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
-.03 
(.02) 
 
.03 
(.02) 
 
.04* 
(.02) 
 
-.16 
(.07) 
.37 
235 
.21** 
(.08) 
 
.10 
(.08) 
 
-.01 
(.04) 
 
.03** 
(.01) 
 
-.00 
(.01) 
 
-.01 
(.02) 
 
-.00 
(.02) 
 
-.06 
(.03) 
.06 
286 
1.14** 
(.20) 
 
.33 
(.22) 
 
-.07 
(.10) 
 
.06* 
(.03) 
 
.07 
(.04) 
 
-.04 
(.04) 
 
-.05 
(.04) 
 
-.10 
(.11) 
.22 
235 
.66** 
(.17) 
 
.02 
(.18) 
 
-.13** 
(.05) 
 
.04 
(.03) 
 
.04 
(.04) 
 
.02 
(.03) 
 
.02 
(.03) 
 
-.01 
(.09) 
.09 
286 
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable in each of the models is the percentage of ads where the candidate pictured the group.  
Independent variables include the percentage of the group within the candidate’s constituency, the 
percentage of their ad runs that discussed related issues (listed below), the ideology of the district and 
candidate, and demographic characteristics of the legislator (also listed below). The analyses are limited 
to candidates who pictured at least one ordinary person in their ads. ** = p < .05; * = p < .10  
Issue: For the seniors model, Medicare; for the children and teacher 
models, education; for the black and Latino models, civil rights; for the blue 
collar workers model, jobs; for the businesspeople model, business and 
regulation; for the military model, national defense; for the police model, 
crime; and for the farmers model, agriculture.  
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Table B.1: Image choices in Congressional elections (continued from previous page) 
 Farmers Teachers Police Workers Businesspeople Soldiers 
 DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP 
% of district in 
demographic group 
 
District ideology 
 
 
% of ads mentioning 
issue  
 
 
Incumbency 
 
 
Female 
 
 
2002 
 
 
2004 
 
 
Constant 
 
R2 
N 
.09* 
(.05) 
 
-.09 
(.06) 
 
.17 
(.13) 
 
-.00 
(.02) 
 
-.01 
(.02) 
 
-.00 
(.02) 
 
.00 
(.02) 
 
.05 
(.04) 
.06 
235 
.11** 
(.04) 
 
.01 
(.12) 
 
.26* 
(.14) 
 
.03 
(.02) 
 
-.03 
(.02) 
 
-.03 
(.02) 
 
.01 
(.03) 
 
.01 
(.06) 
.09 
286 
-.05 
(.36) 
 
-.25 
(.11) 
 
.11 
(.05) 
 
.04** 
(.02) 
 
-.03* 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
-.02 
(.02) 
 
.13 
(.10) 
.12 
235 
.06 
(.28) 
 
-.11 
(.12) 
 
.05* 
(.03) 
 
.03* 
(.02) 
 
-.03* 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
-.02 
(.02) 
 
.06 
(.09) 
.03 
286 
.05* 
(.02) 
 
.02 
(.12) 
 
.15** 
(.06) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
-.00 
(.02) 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
.00 
(.02) 
 
-.04 
(.06) 
.09 
235 
-.03 
(.03) 
 
-.08 
(.06) 
 
.21* 
(.12) 
 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
.07 
(.04) 
.09 
286 
.13 
(.37) 
 
.54** 
(.19) 
 
.22** 
(.10) 
 
.03 
(.03) 
 
-.02 
(.03) 
 
.08* 
(.04) 
 
.10* 
(.06) 
 
-.26 
(.11) 
.16 
235 
.28 
(.25) 
 
-.32** 
(.16) 
 
.17 
(.07) 
 
.03 
(.02) 
 
.03 
(.04) 
 
.03 
(.04) 
 
-.03 
(.03) 
 
.14 
(.10) 
.08 
285 
-.05* 
(.03) 
 
-.01 
(.03) 
 
.02 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.01) 
 
.02 
(.02) 
 
.00 
(.01) 
 
-.00 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.02) 
.04 
235 
-.14* 
(.08) 
 
.06 
(.07) 
 
.10* 
(.06) 
 
.03** 
(.01) 
 
-.02** 
(.01) 
 
.01 
(.02) 
 
.00 
(.02) 
 
-.01 
(.04) 
.08 
286 
.14 
(.75) 
 
-.03 
(.14) 
 
.18** 
(.08) 
 
.04* 
(.02) 
 
-.03* 
(.02) 
 
-.00 
(.03) 
 
.03 
(.03) 
 
.01 
(.08) 
.13 
235 
.26 
(.44) 
 
-.03 
(.09) 
 
.19** 
(.07) 
 
-.02 
(.02) 
 
-.02 
(.02) 
 
.01 
(.01) 
 
-.00 
(.02) 
 
.01 
(.07) 
.14 
285 
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable in each of the models is the percentage of ads where the candidate pictured the group.  
Independent variables include the percentage of the group within the candidate’s constituency, the 
percentage of their ad runs that discussed related issues (listed below), the ideology of the district and 
candidate, and demographic characteristics of the legislator (also listed below). The analyses are limited 
to candidates who pictured at least one ordinary person in their ads. ** = p < .05; * = p < .10  
Issue: For the seniors model, Medicare; for the children and teacher 
models, education; for the black and Latino models, civil rights; for the blue 
collar workers model, jobs; for the businesspeople model, business and 
regulation; for the military model, national defense; for the police model, 
crime; and for the farmers model, agriculture.  
 Table B.2: Modeling deviation from normal vote (continued on next page) 
 Children Seniors Latinos Blacks 
Dem candidate 
     % of ads with group image 
 
     Image × group in district 
 
    Image × district ideology 
 
    Image × group × ideology 
 
     % of ads mentioning issue 
 
     Verbal × group in district 
 
GOP candidate 
     % of ads with group image 
 
     Image × group in district 
 
    Image × district ideology 
 
    Image × group × ideology 
 
     % of ads mentioning issue 
 
     Verbal× group in district 
 
 
% of district in demographic group 
 
District ideology 
 
Group in district × district 
ideology  
 
Democratic female candidate 
 
Republican female candidate 
 
Number of Democratic ads (LN) 
 
Number of Republican ads (LN) 
 
Midterm election 
 
Constant 
 
R2 
N      
 
-.19 
(1.37) 
1.62 
(6.45) 
.83 
(2.75) 
-5.07 
(13.14) 
-.11 
(.36) 
.74 
(1.72) 
 
.24 
(1.70) 
-1.38 
(8.19) 
-.67 
(3.74) 
3.84 
(18.02) 
-.03 
(.34) 
.09 
(1.54) 
 
-3.56 
(3.44) 
-1.03 
(1.65) 
5.90 
(8.06) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.04* 
(.02) 
.01* 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
-.10** 
(.02) 
 
.60 
(.70) 
.35 
164 
 
.36 
(.55) 
-1.14 
(4.22) 
-.46 
(1.25) 
-.46 
(9.71) 
.11** 
(.03) 
-.03 
(.04) 
 
-.41 
(.37) 
3.63 
(2.79) 
.47 
(.76) 
-5.35 
(5.77) 
.04 
(.05) 
-.13 
(.09) 
 
-.83 
(1.81) 
.20 
(.55) 
1.81 
(4.41) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.05** 
(.02) 
.02** 
(.01) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
-.08** 
(.02) 
 
-.15 
(.24) 
.42 
164 
 
.62 
(1.90) 
-25.06** 
(12.01) 
-.72 
(3.45) 
52.09** 
(23.40) 
.82** 
(.19) 
-6.47** 
(1.70) 
 
-5.12 
(4.53) 
80.08** 
(32.43) 
7.92 
(8.51) 
-170.04** 
(64.58) 
-.62* 
(.34) 
16.13 
(4.28) 
 
-1.26** 
(.42) 
-.03 
(.10) 
3.50 
(3.45) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.04** 
(.02) 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
-.09** 
(.01) 
 
-.01 
(.06) 
.44 
164 
 
-.21 
(.35) 
1.43 
(2.19) 
.60 
(.75) 
-3.25 
(4.77) 
.54** 
(.24) 
-1.06 
(2.04) 
 
.11 
(.35) 
-1.41 
(2.98) 
-.24 
(.89) 
2.63 
(6.74) 
.22 
(.81) 
-10.84 
(13.24) 
 
.23 
(.53) 
.11 
(.14) 
-.19 
(1.14) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
.02** 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
-10** 
(.01) 
 
-.10 
(.07) 
.36 
164 
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable in each of the models is the deviation from the normal Democratic share of the 2-party vote. The 
analyses are limited to candidates who pictured at least one ordinary person in their ads. 
 ** = p < .05; * = p < .10  
Issue: For the seniors model, Medicare; for the children and teacher 
models, education; for the black and Latino models, civil rights; for the blue 
collar workers model, jobs; for the businesspeople model, business and 
regulation; for the military model, national defense; for the police model, 
crime; and for the farmers model, agriculture.  
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Table B.2: Modeling deviation from normal vote (continued from previous page) 
 Farmers Teachers Police Workers Businesspeople Soldiers 
Dem candidate 
     % of ads with group image 
 
     Image × group in district 
 
    Image × district ideology 
 
    Image × group × ideology 
 
     % of ads mentioning issue 
 
     Verbal × group in district 
 
GOP candidate 
     % of ads with group image 
 
     Image × group in district 
 
    Image × district ideology 
 
    Image × group × ideology 
 
     % of ads mentioning issue 
 
     Verbal× group in district 
 
 
% of district in demographic group 
 
District ideology 
 
Group in district × district 
ideology  
 
Democratic female candidate 
 
Republican female candidate 
 
Number of Democratic ads (LN) 
 
Number of Republican ads (LN) 
 
Midterm election 
 
 
Constant 
 
R2 
N      
 
-2.34 
(1.47) 
5.46 
(3.35) 
5.63* 
(3.01) 
-13.51* 
(7.57) 
-.10 
(.13) 
.24 
(.47) 
 
.77 
(1.54) 
-1.91 
(3.88) 
-2.28 
(3.77) 
5.64 
(9.77) 
.07 
(.41) 
-.09 
(1.10) 
 
.08 
(.22) 
.22 
(.18) 
-.25 
(.48) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
-.10** 
(.01) 
 
-.08 
(.09) 
.33 
164 
 
.23 
(6.10) 
2.25 
(28.57) 
2.26 
(11.76) 
-17.16 
(55.10) 
.02 
(.32) 
.10 
(1.55) 
 
-.41** 
(.10) 
2.05** 
(.48) 
.87** 
(.21) 
-4.24** 
(1.01) 
-.21 
(.23) 
.96 
(1.10) 
 
-4.61** 
(2.20) 
-1.43 
(1.02) 
8.02 
(4.99) 
.00 
(.02) 
-.05** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
-.10** 
(.02) 
 
.84 
(.46) 
.38 
164 
 
.42 
(.98) 
-2.55 
(2.39) 
-.96 
(2.19) 
6.21 
(5.78) 
.07 
(.05) 
-.22 
(.12) 
 
1.45 
(1.07) 
-4.52* 
(2.63) 
-4.31 
(2.74) 
12.72* 
(7.01) 
.11 
(.16) 
-.29 
(.47) 
 
.27 
(.25) 
.31 
(.19) 
-.63 
(.53) 
-.00 
(.02) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
.02** 
(.01) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
-.09** 
(.02) 
 
-.13 
(.09) 
.36 
164 
 
.87** 
(.31) 
-3.36** 
(1.11) 
-2.18** 
(.67) 
8.34** 
(2.54) 
-.08 
(.09) 
-.02 
(.38) 
 
.75** 
(.26) 
-3.33** 
(.85) 
-2.79** 
(.77) 
11.80** 
(2.71) 
-.25* 
(.13) 
.93* 
(.50) 
 
1.16** 
(.60) 
.94** 
(.28) 
-4.00** 
(1.20) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.03* 
(.02) 
.01** 
(.00) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
-.08** 
(.02) 
 
-.30 
(.15) 
.61 
164 
 
4.51** 
(.90) 
19.48** 
(3.89) 
10.61** 
(2.12) 
-45.81** 
(9.16) 
-.04 
(.11) 
-.19 
(.40) 
 
-.76 
(1.85) 
.76 
(6.35) 
.66 
(3.65) 
1.66 
(13.59) 
-.38** 
(.12) 
1.35** 
(.45) 
 
.67 
(.61) 
.66** 
(.29) 
-2.62** 
(1.26) 
-.01 
(.02) 
-.04** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.02** 
(.01) 
-.09** 
(.02) 
 
-.16 
(.15) 
.56 
164 
 
.32 
(.35) 
.03 
(.53) 
-1.50 
(1.00) 
4.90 
(4.26) 
.21 
(.22) 
-1.52 
(1.58) 
 
.06 
(.26) 
-.13 
(.39) 
-1.78 
(1.29) 
12.73* 
(8.15) 
-.03 
(.29) 
-.27 
(2.23) 
 
2.68 
(1.68) 
1.34** 
(.45) 
-9.75** 
(3.60) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
.01* 
(.00) 
-.01* 
(.00) 
-.09** 
(.01) 
 
-.45 
(.22) 
.56 
164 
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. The dependent 
variable in each of the models is the deviation from the normal Democratic share of the 2-party vote. The 
analyses are limited to candidates who pictured at least one ordinary person in their ads. 
 ** = p < .05; * = p < .10  
Issue: For the seniors model, Medicare; for the children and teacher 
models, education; for the black and Latino models, civil rights; for the blue 
collar workers model, jobs; for the businesspeople model, business and 
regulation; for the military model, national defense; for the police model, 
crime; and for the farmers model, agriculture.  
 Table B.3: Effect of campaign ad imagery in Congressional elections (continued on 
next page) 
 Workers Businesspeople Latinos Blacks 
Ideology held constant at .5, while % of group varies 
 DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP 
.00 
 
.05 
 
.10 
 
.15 
 
.20 
 
.25 
 
.30 
 
 
-- 
 
-.18 
(-.29, -.06) 
-.14 
(-.22, -.05) 
-.09 
(-.15, -.04) 
-.05 
(-.09, -.02) 
-.01 
(-.05, .02) 
.11 
(.01, .20) 
-- 
 
-.52 
(-.70, -
.34) 
-.39 
(-.53, -
.25) 
-.26 
(-.37, -
.16) 
-.13 
(-.20, -
.06) 
-.00 
(-.05, 
.04) 
.12 
(.06, 
.18) 
-- 
 
.62 
(.46, .79) 
.45 
(.33, .58) 
.29 
(.21, .36) 
.11 
(.82, .14) 
-.06 
(-.07, -.04) 
-.23 
(-.29, -.17) 
-- 
 
-.35 
(-.64, -
.06) 
-.27 
(-.49, -
.05) 
-.19 
(-.36, -
.03) 
-,11 
(-.27, 
.05) 
-.03 
(-.24, 
.18) 
.05 
(-.24, 
.33) 
-- 
 
.31 
(.10, .52) 
.36 
(.18, .54) 
.41 
(.24, .58) 
.46 
(.29, .62) 
.51 
(.33, .68) 
.56 
(.36, .75) 
-- 
 
-1.41 
(-2.03, -
.79) 
-1.66 
(-2.22, -
1.09) 
-1.91 
(-2.46, -
1.36) 
-2.15 
(-2.73, -
1.57) 
-2.40 
(-3.04, -
1.76) 
-2.65 
(-3.38, -
1.91) 
-- 
 
.08 
(.01, 
.15) 
.07 
(.02, 
.13) 
.06 
(.01, 
.12) 
.05 
(-.01, 
.12) 
.04 
(-.03, 
.12) 
.03 
(-.06, 
.13) 
-- 
 
-.01 
(-.15, 
.11) 
-.02 
(-.13, 
.09) 
-.03 
(-.13, 
.07) 
-.03 
(-.14, 
.08) 
-.04 
(-.16, 
.08) 
-.04 
(-.19, 
.11) 
% of group within district is held at mean while district ideology varies 
.35 
 
.40 
 
.45 
 
.50 
 
.55 
 
.60 
 
.65 
 
-.04 
(-.11, .02) 
-.01 
(-.06, .05) 
.03 
(-.03, .09) 
.07 
(-.01, .14) 
.10 
(.01, .20) 
.14 
(.02, .26) 
.18 
(.04, .32) 
-.07 
(-.13, -
.00) 
-.09 
(-.14, -
.04) 
-.11 
(-.17, -
.06) 
-.13 
(-.20, -
.06) 
-.15 
(-.25, -
.06) 
-.18 
(-.29, -
.06) 
-.20 
(-.34, -
.05) 
.07 
(.05, .09) 
.03 
(.02, .04) 
-.02 
(-.02, -.01) 
-.06 
(-.08, -.04) 
-.10 
(-.13, -.07) 
-.14 
(-.18, -.11) 
-.19 
(-.23, -.14) 
-.19 
(-.40, 
.01) 
-.14 
(-.26, -
.02) 
-.09 
(-.21, 
.03) 
-.03 
(-.25, 
.18) 
.02 
(-.31, 
.34) 
.07 
(-.37, 
.52) 
.13 
(-.44, 
.69) 
-.65 
(-.89, -
.41) 
-.30 
(-.49, -
.11) 
.06 
(-.11, 
.22) 
.41 
(.24, .58) 
.76 
(.56, .96) 
1.12 
(.87, 
1.37) 
1.47 
(1.16, 
1.79) 
1.76 
(1.07, 
2.45) 
.46 
(.16, .76) 
-.84 
(-1.06, -
.63) 
-2.15 
(-2.73, -
1.57) 
-3.46 
(-4.44, -
2.48) 
-4.76 
(-6.15, -
3.38) 
-6.07 
(-7.86, -
4.27) 
.03 
(-.06, 
.12) 
.05 
(-.02, 
.11) 
.06 
(.00, 
.12) 
.07 
(.02, 
.13) 
.09 
(.02, 
.15) 
.10 
(.01, 
.19) 
.12 
(.01, 
.22) 
.02 
(-.07, 
.12) 
.01 
(-.07, 
.10) 
.00 
(-.11, 
.11) 
-.01 
(-.17, 
.14) 
-.02 
(-.23, 
.18) 
-.04 
(-.30, 
.23) 
-.05 
(-.37, 
.27) 
Entries in each cell are the effect of picturing a particular group given the ideology and 
demographic make-up of the district with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. The 
first set of numbers shows how the effect of imagery changes according to the percentage 
of the group pictured within the district when the ideology of the district is .5. The second 
set of numbers shows how the effect of imagery changes as the ideology of the district 
varies when the percentage of the group within the district is equal to the mean 
percentage of the group across all districts within the sample. 
Note that the dependent variable in the regression is deviations from the normal 
Democratic share of the 2-party vote. When interpreting effects, therefore, Republican 
candidates actually benefit when the effect is negative, since this implies that the image is 
lowering the Democratic vote. 
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 Table B.3: Effect of campaign ad imagery in Congressional elections (continued 
from previous page)  
 Soldiers Seniors Farmers Teachers Police 
Ideology held constant at .5, while % of group varies 
 DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP DEM GOP 
.00 
 
.05 
 
.10 
 
.15 
 
.20 
 
.25 
 
.30 
 
 
-- 
 
-.31 
(-.65, .04) 
-.18 
(-.38, .02) 
-.06 
(-.22, .10) 
.07 
(-.20, .34) 
.19 
(-.24, .62) 
-- 
-- 
 
-.52 
(-2.34, 1.30) 
-.20 
(-1.95, 1.54) 
.11 
(-1.62, 1.84) 
.42 
(-1.35, 2.19) 
.73 
(-1.13, 2.59) 
-- 
-- 
 
.06 
(-.05, .08) 
-.01 
(-.06, .05) 
-.07 
(-.13, -.02) 
-.14 
(-.26, -.03) 
-.21 
(-.40, -.02) 
-.28 
(-.54, -.02) 
-- 
 
-.12 
(-.22, -.02) 
-.07 
(-.13, -.02) 
-.03 
(-.09, .03) 
.02 
(-.09, .13) 
.07 
(-.10, .24) 
.12 
(-.12, .35) 
.48 
(.14, .81) 
.41 
(.11, .71) 
.35 
(.08, .62) 
.28 
(.04, .53) 
.22 
(-.00, .44) 
.15 
(-.05, .36) 
.09 
(-.12, .30) 
-.37 
(-.94, .20) 
-.32 
(-.81, .17) 
-.28 
(-.69, .14) 
-.23 
(-.56, .10) 
-.19 
(-.44, .07) 
-.14 
(-.33, .05) 
-.10 
(-.22, .03) 
-- 
 
-- 
 
.73 
(.14, 1.32) 
.41 
(.08, .75) 
.10 
(-.01, .20) 
-.22 
(-.42, -.02) 
-- 
-- 
 
-- 
 
1.37 
(.46, 2.27) 
.79 
(.26, 1.32) 
.21 
(.04, .37) 
-.37 
(-.63, -.11) 
-- 
-.06 
(-.32, .20) 
-.03 
(-.26, .20) 
-.00 
(-.19, .19) 
.02 
(-.13, .18) 
.05 
(-.07, .18) 
.08 
(-.02, .18) 
.11 
(.01, .20) 
-.70 
(-1.16, -.24) 
-,61 
(-1.01, -.21) 
-.52 
(-.85, -.18) 
-.43 
(-.70, -.16) 
-.33 
(-.54, -.13) 
-.24 
(-.39, -.09) 
-.15 
(-.24, -.06) 
% of group within district is held at mean while district ideology varies 
.35 
 
.40 
 
.45 
 
.50 
 
.55 
 
.60 
 
.65 
 
.53 
(-.08, 1.15) 
.38 
(.03, .79) 
.23 
(.01, .45) 
.08 
(-.07, .23) 
-.08 
(-.37, .21) 
-.23 
(-.72, .26) 
-.53 
(-1.07, .31) 
-.56 
(-.93, -.19) 
-.41 
(-.70, -.12) 
-.25 
(-.53, -.03) 
-.10 
(-.44, .24) 
.06 
(-.39, .50) 
.21 
(-.36, .78) 
.36 
(-.34, 1.07 
.06 
(.01, .13) 
.04 
(.00, .09) 
.02 
(-.02, .06) 
-.01 
(-.06, .05) 
-.03 
(-.10, .04) 
-.06 
(-.14, .03) 
-.08 
(-.19, .03) 
 
.11 
(-.01, .22) 
.08 
(-.01, .17) 
.05 
(-.02, .13) 
.02 
(-.07, .11) 
-.01 
(-.11, .09) 
-.04 
(-.16, .09) 
-.07 
(-.22, .08) 
.49 
(.04, .95) 
.38 
(.03, .73) 
.27 
(.00, .53) 
.15 
(-.05, .36) 
.04 
(-.17, .26) 
-.07 
(-.35, .21) 
-.18 
(-.55, .19) 
-.01 
(-.19, .17) 
-.05 
(-.17, .06) 
-.10 
(-.22, .02) 
-.14 
(-.33, .05) 
-.18 
(-.45, .09) 
-.23 
(-.59, .13) 
-.27 
(-.72, .18) 
.46 
(-.63, 1.55) 
.44 
(-.37, 1.26) 
.43 
(-.15, 1.01) 
.41 
(-.02, .85) 
.40 
(-.08, .88) 
.38 
(-.29, 1.06) 
.37 
(-.56, 1.29) 
2.43 
(1.59, 3.27) 
1.50 
(.92, 2.07) 
.56 
(.22, .91) 
-.37 
(-.62, -.11) 
-1.30 
(-1.72, -.89) 
-2.24 
(-2.90, -1.57) 
-3.17 
(-4.10, -2.23) 
.07 
(-.24, .37) 
.03 
(-.18, .25) 
.00 
(-.18, .18) 
-.03 
(-.25, .20) 
-.06 
(-.39, .26) 
-.10 
(-.53, .34) 
-.12 
(-.68, .43) 
-.08 
(-.19, .03) 
-.04 
(-.13, .04) 
-.00 
(-.08, .07) 
.03 
(-.06, .12) 
.07 
(-.05, .28) 
.11 
(-.06, .36) 
.15 
(-.06, .44) 
Entries in each cell are the effect of picturing a particular group given the ideology and 
demographic make-up of the district with 95% confidence intervals in parentheses. The 
first set of numbers shows how the effect of imagery changes according to the percentage 
of the group pictured within the district when the ideology of the district is .5. The second 
set of numbers shows how the effect of imagery changes as the ideology of the district 
varies when the percentage of the group within the district is equal to the mean 
percentage of the group across all districts within the sample. 
Note that the dependent variable in the regression is deviations from the normal 
Democratic share of the 2-party vote. When interpreting effects, therefore, Republican 
candidates actually benefit when the effect is negative, since this implies that the image is 
lowering the Democratic vote. 
 215
 Appendix C: Storyboards for Mark Kennedy ads 
 
Campaign ads for the Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project Experiment 
 
Control ad  
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to live 
the American dream. My parents taught 
me that America never guarantees success; 
it’s up to each of us. 
 
 
 
Right now too many Americans are 
suffering and struggling to make ends 
meet.  
 
 
 
 
And our leaders in Washington need to 
recognize that and take steps to help 
ordinary families. We need to balance the 
budget so that we can get our country 
moving on the right track.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our citizens 
have the same chance at the American 
dream.” 
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 African-Americans ad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of us.
 
 
 
Right now the African-American 
community is suffering and struggling 
to make ends meet. 
 
 
 
 
We need Affirmative Action in our 
universities to make sure that African-
Americans have a chance to get the 
education they need. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Blue-collar workers ad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never guarantees 
success; it’s up to each of us. 
 
 
 
Right now working Americans are 
suffering and struggling to make ends 
meet. 
 
 
 
We need to increase job training, 
increase the minimum wage, crack down 
on unfair trade and make sure that we 
keep America’s manufacturing base 
strong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Biographical ad 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
     
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Various] 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I don’t know 
why, but I approved this message.” 
 
 
“Mark was always close to his brothers.”
“They slept 4 to a room.” 
“I met Mark in 4H at the state fair.” 
 
 
“Mark fell for her first.” 
”Debbie took a little longer. I’m not sure 
why. Mark was always such a snazzy 
dresser.” 
“Dad likes to help people.” 
”He’s principled, independent.” 
 
 
”Just not much of a party guy…I meant 
he doesn’t do whatever the party says 
to.” 
 
 
 
“The bottom line?” 
”He’s smart.” 
“Independent.” 
”A little different.” 
”And he’ll make a great senator.” 
 
”I can’t believe you did that party hat 
thing.” 
”I know.” 
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 Campaign ads for the Subject Pool 
experiment 
 
Control ad 1 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of us.
 
 
 
Right now too many Americans are 
suffering and struggling to make ends 
meet.  
 
 
 
 
And our leaders in Washington need to 
recognize that and take steps to help 
ordinary families. We need to balance 
the budget so that we can get our 
country moving on the right track.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Control ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesotans work hard and deserve to 
keep more of their money. We need to 
balance the budget and make the tough 
choices for Minnesota.  
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.”
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 African-Americans ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved 
this message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of 
us. 
 
 
 
Right now the African-American 
community is suffering and struggling 
to make ends meet. 
 
 
 
 
We need Affirmative Action in our 
universities to make sure that African-
Americans have a chance to get the 
education they need. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 African-American ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesota’s African-American 
community is struggling. I’ll work to 
help African-Americans and make the 
tough choices for Minnesota.  
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Blue-collar workers ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of us.
 
 
 
Right now working Americans are 
suffering and struggling to make ends 
meet. 
 
 
 
We need to increase job training, 
increase the minimum wage, crack 
down on unfair trade and make sure that 
we keep America’s manufacturing base 
strong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Blue collar workers ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesota workers are struggling and 
they need our help. I’ll help Minnesota’s
workers and make the tough choices.  
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Businesspeople ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of us.
 
 
 
Right now American businesses are 
suffering and struggling under the 
weight of too many government taxes 
and regulations.  
 
 
 
I’ll work to make sure that American 
businesses can prosper and keep our 
economy moving forward. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Businesspeople ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesota businesses are struggling and 
they need our help. I’ll work to help 
businesses and make the tough choices 
for Minnesota.  
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Children ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved 
this message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of 
us. 
 
 
 
Right now too many children are 
suffering and struggling to make the 
grade. I want to increase federal 
funding of public schools and help our 
children learn. 
 
 
Giving our kids a good education will 
help us ensure a safe and prosperous 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Children ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesota’s children and they need our 
help. I’ll work to help students and 
make the tough choices for Minnesota. 
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Farmers ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of us.
 
 
 
Right now too many family farms are 
suffering and struggling to make ends 
meet, and I want to increase federal aid 
to help our farmers 
 
 
 
We need to increase federal support for 
ethanol production so that we can get 
our country moving on the right track. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Farmers ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesota farmers are struggling and 
they need our help. I’ll work to help 
family farms and make the tough 
choices for Minnesota.  
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Latinos ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of us.
 
 
 
Right now the Latino community is 
struggling and some Americans are 
getting left behind.  
 
 
 
I want to make sure that all Americans 
have the same opportunities regardless 
of race. We need bilingual education in 
our schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Latinos ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesota’s Latino community is 
struggling and needs our help. I’ll work 
to help Latinos and make the tough 
choices for Minnesota.  
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Police ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved 
this message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity 
to live the American dream. My 
parents taught me that America 
never guarantees success; it’s up to 
each of us. 
 
 
 
Right now our police officers are 
struggling to keep the peace and 
protect our communities.  
 
 
 
I want to devote our resources to 
training more police officers and 
cracking down on crime to ensure a 
safe and prosperous future. 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Police ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesota police officers are 
struggling and they need our help. I’ll 
work to help the police and make the 
tough choices for Minnesota. 
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader 
who puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Senior citizens ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved 
this message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of 
us. 
 
 
 
Right now too many seniors are 
suffering and struggling to make ends 
meet. 
 
 
 
I want to increase the Medicare 
prescription drug benefit so that our 
seniors can enjoy the quality of life that 
they deserve. 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Senior citizens ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesota seniors are struggling and 
they need our help. I’ll work to help 
seniors and make the tough choices for 
Minnesota. 
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Soldiers ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved 
this message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of 
us. 
 
 
 
Right now American soldiers are 
struggling to win the war on terror 
and keep all of us safe. 
 
 
 
Our troops are doing their part to keep 
America safe and we need to do our 
part to increase funding for the 
military so that our troops know they 
have support here at home. 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Soldiers ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
American soldiers are struggling and 
they need our help. I’ll work to help our 
troops and make the tough choices. 
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Teachers ad 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved 
this message.  
 
My passion is the American dream 
because I really had an opportunity to 
live the American dream. My parents 
taught me that America never 
guarantees success; it’s up to each of 
us. 
 
 
 
Right now too many teachers are 
struggling to teach our kids in 
overcrowded classes with out of date 
materials. 
 
 
 
We need to increase teacher pay and 
teacher training. Our kids should get 
the best education they can. 
 
 
 
 
 
We need to make sure that all our 
citizens have the same chance at the 
American dream.” 
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 Teachers ad 2 
 
 
“Change and lots of it, that’s what 
Washington needs. The key is what 
kind?  
 
 
 
 
Minnesota teachers are struggling and 
they need our help. I’ll work to help 
teachers and make the tough choices for 
Minnesota. 
 
 
 
 
 
People expect you to face the tough 
issues head on and vote based on your 
principles, not party or president or 
special interests that are moving you 
one way or another.  
 
I want to be a leader that all 
Minnesotans can look to.  
 
 
 
The bottom line? We need a leader who 
puts principle ahead of party.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I’m Mark Kennedy and I approved this 
message.” 
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 Biographical ad 
   
 
   
 
   
 
   
 
     
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Various] 
“I’m Mark Kennedy and I don’t know 
why, but I approved this message.” 
 
 
“Mark was always close to his brothers.”
“They slept 4 to a room.” 
“I met Mark in 4H at the state fair.” 
 
 
“Mark fell for her first.” 
”Debbie took a little longer. I’m not sure 
why. Mark was always such a snazzy 
dresser.” 
“Dad likes to help people.” 
”He’s principled, independent.” 
 
 
”Just not much of a party guy…I meant 
he doesn’t do whatever the party says 
to.” 
 
 
 
“The bottom line?” 
”He’s smart.” 
“Independent.” 
”A little different.” 
”And he’ll make a great senator.” 
 
”I can’t believe you did that party hat 
thing.” 
”I know.” 
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